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Fake news has become a powerful and disruptive force in the social media environment, 
with serious consequences for democracy. As a result, news organizations and tech 
companies have taken measures to reduce or eliminate the propagation and 
dissemination of fake news. The current study analyzes data gathered from Facebook 
and Twitter from two major events that occurred in U.S. politics: the 2016 U.S. 
presidential election and the 2019/2020 impeachment inquiry and trial of Donald Trump. 
Qualitative content analysis revealed that the majority of posts and tweets examined in 
this study could be classified as fake news, and that they were decidedly pro-Trump in 
angle. Through the lens of agenda setting theory, it was observed that the major issues 
covered in both time periods under study favoured Trump and his policies, while they 
denigrated the Democratic party and its members. Multiple themes emerged that shed 
new light on the tactics employed by hostile foreign actors to micro-target and influence 
social media users.  
Keywords:  Fake News; Disinformation; U.S. Presidential Election; Impeachment; 
Agenda Setting Theory; Social Media 
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Chapter 1.  
 
Introduction 
Social media plays an essential role in the distribution of concepts about politics 
and public policies. Government and political leaders worldwide are employing bots, 
algorithms and people to engage in political conversations online (Howard & Kollanyi, 
2016; Narayanan et al., 2017). On the other hand, legislators and government regulatory 
agencies around the world are facing serious challenges when it comes to dealing with 
these emerging online threats, such as the weaponization of social media that was 
witnessed in particular with the 2014 election in the Ukraine (Khaldarova & Pantti, 2016; 
Mejias & Vokuev, 2017), the 2016 U.K. Brexit referendum (Bastos & Mercea, 2019; 
Evolvi, 2018; Howard & Kollanyi, 2016; Intelligence and Security Committee, 2020; 
Narayanan et al., 2017), and the 2016 U.S. presidential election (Allcott & Gentzkow, 
2017; Badawy et al., 2018; Bennett & Livingston, 2018; Mueller, 2019). The Russian 
Troll Army, employed by the Internet Research Agency (IRA), distributed “fake news” 
posts and tweets via social media accounts, in order to manipulate public opinion during 
the 2016 U.S. presidential election. Most of the fake news generated by the IRA 
favoured Donald Trump and disparaged his rival Hillary Clinton (Allcott & Gentzkow, 
2017; Badawy et al., 2018; Mueller, 2019; Shane & Mazzetti, 2018). 
According to Special Counsel Robert S. Mueller’s (2019) report into Russian 
interference in the U.S. election, IRA-sponsored Facebook and Twitter accounts 
targeted certain groups, including Southern Whites (through the Patriototus Facebook 
page), blacks (through the Blacktivist Facebook page), and the right-wing anti-
immigration movement (through the Secured Borders Facebook page), as well as 
through Twitter feeds such as @America_1st (an anti-immigration account), and 
@TEN_GOP (which falsely claimed to have a connection to the Republican Party of 
Tennessee) (Bastos & Mercea, 2019; DiResta et al., 2018; Evolvi, 2018). Evidence also 
indicated that the Russians used social media bots to spread fake news, in an effort to 
influence a much wider social media audience (Badawy et al., 2018; Bennett & 
Livingston, 2018; Howard et al., 2018; Shao et al., 2018).   
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Social media providers such as Facebook and Twitter are coming under pressure 
from legislators and government regulatory agencies to change their policies with 
respect to how they deal with fake news issues. In April 2018, Mark Zuckerberg, the 
CEO of Facebook, was questioned by the U.S. Congress regarding Facebook’s 
involvement and knowledge of Russian-generated messaging during the 2016 U.S. 
presidential election campaign (Politico Staff, 2018). Moreover, in April 2018, the chief 
technology officer of Facebook, Mike Schroepfer, was questioned by a Parliamentary 
Committee in the U.K. regarding Facebook’s political advertising, fake accounts, and the 
role of Cambridge Analytica in voter targeting (Satariano, 2018). In Canada, yet again in 
April 2018, “Robert Sherman (Deputy Privacy Officer of Facebook), and Kevin Chan (in-
charge of Facebook’s public policy for Canada), were both questioned by a 
Parliamentary Committee about the role that Facebook and Cambridge Analytica played 
in the U.S. election and the U.K. Brexit referendum and about its possible violations of 
Canadian privacy law” (Tasker, 2018). In July 2019, the U.S. Federal Trade Commission 
fined Facebook $5 billion U.S. for its failure to protect user privacy (McGill & Scola, 
2019).  
On the 25th of July, 2019, Donald Trump made a phone call to Ukrainian 
President Volodymyr Zelensky, and demanded that in exchange for a White House 
meeting and the release of $400 million in military aid already appropriated by the U.S. 
Congress, Zelensky should publicly announce an investigation into the Ukrainian 
business dealings of Joe Biden’s son, Hunter Biden (Allin, 2020; Meacham, 2019). It 
was obvious that Donald Trump wanted the public announcement of an investigation to 
politically damage the former Vice President, Joe Biden, who is Donald Trump’s rival in 
the upcoming election (Allin, 2020). Because of his phone call and his attempt to 
interfere in the 2020 election, President Trump faced an impeachment inquiry in the U.S. 
House of Representatives, followed by an impeachment trial in the U.S. Senate. Multiple 
questionable Facebook pages and trending Twitter hashtags were mobilized to offer 
support for Donald Trump and to denounce the impeachment process.  
1.1. Aim of the Current Study 
The ultimate aim of the current study is to deepen our understanding of how 
social media has been used thus far to influence the public when it comes to political 
opinions. The current study examines two major political events that transpired in the 
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U.S., both of which featured Donald Trump as a central character: the 2016 U.S. 
presidential election, and the 2019/2020 impeachment inquiry and trial. To accomplish 
this, the first part of this thesis reports on the qualitative content analysis of five different 
Facebook pages sponsored by the Russian Internet Research Agency (IRA) from 
January 2015 through December 2017, which encompasses the time period leading up 
to, during and following the 2016 U.S. presidential election. In total, 100 posts from each 
of five Russian IRA-sponsored Facebook pages were randomly selected for 
examination: Being Patriotic, Blacktivist, Secured Borders, LGBT United, and United 
Muslims of America. Further qualitative content analysis was conducted on 500 tweets 
from the same time period, to probe into the alleged degree of Russian involvement in 
that disinformation campaign. It was also found in this study that these posts and tweets 
were employed by the Russian IRA to micro-target specific populations, in order to 
maximize the potential voter base for Donald Trump (Badawy, Ferrara, & Lerman, 2018; 
Bastos & Dan, 2019). To better understand the micro-targeting behind these posts and 
tweets, NVivo was used to generate the 10 most frequent words appearing in each of 
the data sets. Inspection of these messages provided new insights into the language 
used to target specific social media users. 
Secondly, this study reports on the findings from an examination of potential fake 
news posts and tweets that were posted from September 2019 to February 2020, that is, 
during the impeachment inquiry and trial against U.S. President Donald Trump. First, five 
different Facebook pages that were considered questionable/fake by the Media 
Bias/Fact Check website (MBFC) were examined: American Thinker, Council of 
American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), Godfather Politics, United American Patriots, and 
Wallbuilders. Moreover, Twitter data was collected from five different hashtags that were 
trending during the impeachment inquiry and trial: #Impeachment, #RussianInterference, 
#ShamImpeachment, #Trump2020, and #Trump2020Landside. Similar to the approach 
used in the study of the 2016 election dataset, qualitative content analysis was 
conducted on 100 posts from each Facebook page, and on 100 tweets from each Twitter 
hashtag. This study also reports on the 10 most frequently mentioned words in these 
posts and tweets, to further understand the micro-targeting of social media users. 
Finally, this study explores and reports on the overarching themes that emerged from 
the data analysis.  
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 The qualitative content analysis of the social media messaging that occurred 
during both of these political events involved inductive and deductive approaches, and 
used agenda setting theory as a theoretical lens, as the theory helped to provide a better 
understanding of the use of the social media in politics. This study used both first level 
agenda setting and second level agenda setting theory. The application of first level 
agenda setting theory indicated how social media promoted certain issues to tell people 
what they should think about, whereas the application of second level agenda setting 
theory focused more on the characteristics of those issues and how people should view 
or interpret them (McCombs, 2007; McCombs & Shaw, 1972). To date, agenda setting 
theory has only been used to study mainstream media and news outlets. However, it has 
been demonstrated that more and more people get their daily news information through 
social media platforms, and that social media has begun to play an essential role in 
politics (Gottfried & Shearer, 2016). Therefore, for this present study, social media 
platforms were being examined, by applying the lenses of first and second level agenda 
setting theory.  
1.2. Layout of the Thesis 
The first chapter of this thesis explores the literature surrounding fake news, 
including the distinction between misinformation, disinformation, and news fabrication. 
Next, the literature review explores the issue of Russian interference in the 2016 U.S 
presidential election. It also discusses the use of social media bots in politics. 
Furthermore, it examines how users perceive fake news that they encounter in social 
media, and discusses Charter rights issues as they pertain to freedom of expression and 
the dissemination of fake news on social media platforms.  
As mentioned above, this study reports on two different political events—the U.S. 
presidential election, and the impeachment process. Therefore, the literature review also 
provides an overview of the impeachment inquiry and trial of Donald Trump. An overview 
of the theoretical framework of agenda setting theory is also considered. Lastly, the 
literature review ties everything together with a discussion of the criminological 
perspective as it relates to the propagation and dissemination of fake news on social 
media.  
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Next, the methods chapter sets out the data collection and sampling approach 
employed in the two different phases of the study, and later explains the qualitative 
content analysis approach that was employed. The methods chapter also addresses the 
issue of the credibility and trustworthiness of qualitative research. Chapters 4 and 5 
report on the results of the analysis of messages posted by foreign actors on social 
media, both during the 2016 presidential election campaign and possibly during the 
2019/2020 impeachment process. Chapter 6 explores the overarching themes that 
emerged from both studies, as seen through the lens of agenda setting theory. This 
thesis concludes with a discussion of the limitations of the research, ideas for future 
research, and discussion on criminological and legislative perspectives on the 
dissemination of fake news content on social media platforms.  
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Chapter 2.  
 
Literature Review 
This chapter provides an overview of the current research on fake news, the 
manner in which fake news was employed in the 2016 U.S. presidential election to 
support Donald Trump’s campaign, and how it may have influenced the 2019/2020 
impeachment inquiry and trial. It explores how the Russian Internet Research Agency 
(IRA) interfered in the 2016 election, and explains how messages on social media 
platforms such as Facebook and Twitter were utilized to micro-target users by 
highlighting specific inflammatory or divisive topics in those “fake news” posts. U.S. 
Constitutional and Canadian Charter rights issues concerning legislative and regulatory 
approaches to the handling of fake news are contemplated. As well, this chapter 
discusses the events of Trump’s impeachment proceedings. Agenda setting theory will 
be used to provide a contextual framework. Lastly, to tie everything together, a 
criminological perspective is advanced regarding the propagation of fake news on social 
media.  
2.1. Fake News 
There has been considerable discussion in recent years about “fake news” and 
the “post-truth” era (Berghel, 2017a). In fact, some have incorrectly attributed the term 
fake news to U.S. President Donald Trump, who views fake news as anything that runs 
contrary to his own narrative (especially when it comes from traditional news sources 
like CNN or The Washington Post) (Kirtley, 2018; Sullivan, 2019b). It is important to 
acknowledge that fake news is not a new phenomenon; indeed, rumours and false 
stories have been around for as long as humans have lived in groups where power 
matters (Burkhardt, 2017, p.5). Moreover, media manipulation—including trolling and 
memeification—is a strategic tool that is used by the political parties, especially alt-right 
groups, to disguise the revival of familiar, long-established racist and misogynist themes 
(Marwick & Lewis, 2017, p.4).  
There are many other categories of fake news that scholars have contemplated 
throughout the years. For example, Claire Wardle (2017) identified seven different types 
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of fake news: satire or parody, false connection, misleading content, false context, 
imposter content, manipulated content, and fabricated content. Similar to Wardle, 
Tandoc et al. describe fake news as: news satire, news parody, news fabrication, photo 
manipulation, advertising and public relations, and propaganda (Tandoc et al., 2018). 
According to Al-Rawi (2018), fake news can be seen as “low-quality information” that 
goes viral on social networking sites (SNS), due to its partisan or sensational nature (p. 
2). Allcott and Gentzkow (2017) emphasize the production of fake news as being 
motivated by both pecuniary and ideological considerations (Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017). 
In other words, pecuniary motivation occurs when news articles go viral on social media 
and draw significant advertising revenue, especially when users click to the original site. 
An ideological motivation is observable when fake news providers seek to advance 
political candidates or political agendas that they favour (Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017, p. 
217). However, for the purpose of this study, the primary focus will be on misinformation 
disinformation and news fabrication, as set out below.  
2.1.1. Misinformation 
The type of fake news or false information contemplated in this thesis generally 
consists of misinformation, disinformation, and news fabrication circulating online in the 
social media. Misinformation, disinformation, and news fabrication represent the biases 
that are inherent in news produced by humans (Marwick & Lewis, 2017). These human 
biases help to explain this current  phenomenon as “fabricated information that mimics 
news media content in form but not in organizational process or intent” (Lazer et al., 
2018, p. 1094; Torabi Asr & Taboada, 2019, p.1-2). Put simply, misinformation is 
incorrect or false information (Desai et al., 2020; Lazer et al., 2018; Tandoc et al., 2018). 
Misinformation may be based upon a genuine misapprehension of the facts, as opposed 
to wanting to deliberately deceive or manipulate people (de Cock Bunning, Ginsbourg, & 
Alexandra, 2019). 
An example of misinformation might be when rumors were spread that the 
combination of pop-rocks (a popular 1970’s candy) and drinking soda would cause the 
stomach to boil and explode. Urban legend, a common form of misinformation, claimed 
that John Gilchrist (who played the little “Mikey” character in a popular cereal 
commercial) died after eating pop rocks and drinking Coke (Blakemore, 2020). In 2012, 
a very much alive John Gilchrist told a reporter that his incorrectly reported death was “a 
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long-ago-urban legend” (Best, 2012). It is worthwhile to note that a full 30 years before 
the advent of the internet and social media, this myth or “urban legend” created a 
significant problem for the cereal manufacturers, General Mills, who were forced to send 
letters to school principals and buy ads in major publications to dispel the unfounded 
rumours (O’Neill, 2017). The Food and Drug Administration even had a hotline devoted 
to the issue as late as 1979 (Pop Rocks, 2011). This example shows the aggregated 
cost of the measures necessary to correct misinformation. 
Another example of misinformation might be the oft-repeated claims by anti-
vaccination groups that vaccinations contain toxins, or cause autism or sudden infant 
death syndrome (Kata, 2010). Many such claims are strengthened by referring to a 
discredited study by Andrew Wakefield (1998), which lacked reliability and validity and 
had been withdrawn by The Lancet.  In this study, the research group consisted of only 
12 children, had no control group, and relied upon the beliefs and recollections of the 
parents of those children (Bester, 2016). Even though the article was retracted by The 
Lancet, the misinformation it contained is still believed by many people, and to this day 
provides fuel for the anti-vaccination movement on the internet (Cartwright, Weir, Nahar, 
et al., 2019; Kata, 2010). Fake news may be promulgated for a variety of reasons, 
including pushing for a particular partisan ideology, or supporting unfounded beliefs, or 
to advance conspiracy theories (Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017; Berghel, 2017a; Berghel, 
2017b; Vosoughi et al., 2018). 
2.1.2. Disinformation 
Disinformation, especially in the hands of hostile foreign actors, is created and 
spread intentionally, to manipulate and deceive public opinion (Bovet & Makse, 2019; 
Desai et al., 2020; Kshetri & Voas, 2017; Lazer et al., 2018; Marwick & Lewis, 2017; 
Tandoc et al., 2018; Torabi Asr & Taboada, 2019). The interference by the Russian IRA 
in the 2014 election in the Ukraine (Khaldarova & Pantti, 2016; Mejias & Vokuev, 2017), 
the 2016 Brexit referendum in the UK (Bastos & Mercea, 2019; Evolvi, 2018; Howard & 
Kollanyi, 2016; Intelligence and Security Committee, 2020; Narayanan et al., 2017), and 
the 2016 U.S. presidential election serve to illustrate the impact of disinformation 
campaigns mounted by hostile foreign actors (Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017; Badawy et al., 
2018; W. L. Bennett & Livingston, 2018; Mueller, 2019). These acts were designed and 
carried out by the Russian IRA in order to disrupt the normal democratic processes of 
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the Ukraine, the U.K. and the U.S. (W. L. Bennett & Livingston, 2018; Bovet & Makse, 
2019). With respect to the 2016 U.S. presidential election, it has been argued that the 
fake news distributed via “false” Facebook and Twitter pages that were created 
specifically for that purpose by the IRA was intended to fortify the presidential campaign 
of Donald Trump, while at the same time weakening the campaign of his opponent, 
Hillary Clinton (Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017; Badawy et al., 2018; Cartwright, Weir, Frank, 
et al., 2019; Cartwright, Weir, Nahar, et al., 2019; Kshetri & Voas, 2017; Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence, 2017; Shane & Mazzetti, 2018; United States v. Internet 
Research Agency LLC, 2018). 
2.1.3. News Fabrication 
Tandoc et al. (2018), referred fake news as news fabrication. This refers to “news 
articles which have no factual basis but are published in the style of news articles to 
create legitimacy” (p. 143). Tandoc et al., further explained that “the producer of the item 
[news article] often has the intention of misinforming” (p. 143). They also noted that it is 
difficult to distinguish fabricated news as it looks very similar to the legitimate news 
articles. It is important to note that the news articles are also shared on different 
legitimate social media platforms to gain legitimacy. Similarly, Allcott and Gentzkow 
(2017) defined fake news as “news articles that are intentionally and verifiably false, and 
could mislead readers” (p. 213). Allcott and Gentzkow (2017) examined intentionally 
fabricated news articles from now-defunct websites, such as denverguardian.com, 
wtoe5news.com, and 5news.com (pp. 213-214). An example of a fabricated news story, 
which was shared more than one million times on Facebook was titled, “Pope Francis 
had endorsed Donald Trump’s presidential candidacy” (Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017, p. 
214; Tandoc et al., 2018, p. 143). Study found that pro-Trump fake stories were shared 
on Facebook a total of 30 million times, and pro-Clinton fake stories shared a total of 7.6 
million times (Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017, p. 212). Approximately half of those who 
remembered these stories also believed them (Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017; Tandoc, Lim, 
et al., 2018). The authors concluded that fake news might have been pivotal in the 2016 
U.S. presidential election.  
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2.2. Russian Interference in 2016 U.S. Election 
It is widely thought that Vladimir Putin and the Russian government did their 
utmost to support Donald Trump’s presidential campaign. In 2017, the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the National 
Security Agency (NSA) concluded in their joint report that the Russians deliberately set 
out to criticize and discredit Hillary Clinton, while actively promoting the candidacy of 
Donald Trump (Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2017). Their assessment 
pointed a finger directly at Russia’s Internet Research Agency (IRA) and their use of 
social media (Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2017). In February 2018, 
U.S. Special Counsel Robert Mueller obtained a grand jury indictment against the IRA 
(financed by Yevgeniy Prigozhin, referred as “Putin’s chef”), Concord Management and 
Consulting LLC and Concord Catering (companies operated by Yevgeniy Prigozhin), 
Yevgeniy Prigozhin himself, plus a dozen Russian “trolls” employed by Prigozhin’s IRA 
(Chen, 2018; Mueller, 2019; Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2017). The 
indictment stated that those companies and individuals had “operated social media 
pages and groups designed to attract U.S. audiences,” with the Russians falsely 
claiming that those pages and groups were controlled by American activists (Mueller, 
2019). The indictment further stated that the Russians had used social media platforms 
such as Facebook, Twitter, Instagram and YouTube to advance divisive issues to create 
dissension and distrust (United States v. Internet Research Agency LLC, 2018). Overall, 
Mueller laid out his justifications for prosecuting various individuals linked to Donald 
Trump, such as his campaign organizers and cabinet appointees, and for indicting 
Russian individuals and organizations for their efforts to influence the 2016 election. 
While Mueller’s report did not conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the President 
committed a crime, Mueller stated that it also did not exonerate him (Mueller, 2019, p. 2).  
The Russian IRA, located in St. Petersburg, employed hundreds of bloggers to 
mass-produce disinformation through Facebook and Twitter posts (Chen, 2018; Green, 
2018; Reston, 2017). Those employees, working for Putin’s chef, toiled in two shifts: a 
12-hour day shift from 9:00 AM to 9:00 PM, and a 12-hour night shift from 9:00 PM to 
9:00 AM, in order to ensure that the posts went online at what appeared to be regular, 
“Western” times. These shifts were also scheduled to coincide with U.S. holidays, to 
make it look as though the Facebook and Twitter posts were coming from people within 
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the U.S., and not from Russia (United States v. Internet Research Agency LLC, 2018; 
Wagner, 2018).  
It is important to note that the IRA trolls were not hackers, because they did not 
attempt to hack into computers or computer systems. Rather, they used social 
engineering and deception to influence public opinion (Kshetri & Voas, 2017). When it 
seemed that Hillary Clinton was going to win the election, the IRA trolls increased their 
efforts to influence public opinion, using fake news that was constructed to undermine 
Clinton’s chances for the presidency (Chen, 2018; Mueller, 2019; Office of the Director 
of National Intelligence, 2017; Reston, 2017).  
It has been suggested that Putin wanted to discredit Clinton because of the 
grudge that he held against her for derogatory comments she made about him over the 
years. Clinton was also an opponent of Russian intelligence operations and military 
interventions around the globe. Apart from that, Putin felt that Trump’s policies would be 
more favourable to Russia than those of Clinton (Bevan, 2018; Cartwright, Weir, Nahar, 
et al., 2019; Murray, 2018). At the press conference in Helsinki following his 2018 
meeting with Donald Trump, when asked whether he wanted Trump to win the election, 
Putin replied: “Yes, I did. Because he talked about bringing the U.S.– Russia relationship 
back to normal” (Friedman, 2018). 
As part of the Russian disinformation campaign, Russia Today’s (RT) television 
coverage of Clinton focused mostly on her “leaked” emails, and on what was claimed to 
be her poor mental and physical health (Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 
2017). However, those “leaked” emails were actually the result of a Russian-
orchestrated attack on the Democratic National Committee’s computer network – a hack 
conducted by Russia’s General Main Staff Intelligence Unit (the GRU), which is the 
foreign military intelligence agency of the Russian Armed Forces (Mueller, 2019; Office 
of the Director of National Intelligence, 2017).   
2.3. Social Media Bots 
Bots are social media accounts that automate interaction with other users. Bots 
can perform tasks that range from legitimate tasks such as  generating a large volume of 
benign tweets that deliver news or update feeds, to more malicious tasks such as 
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spreading spam by delivering appealing text content with a link that directs the reader to 
malicious content or even malware (Howard & Kollanyi, 2016, p. 1). According to 
Howard and Kollanyi (2016), networks of such bots may be described as “botnets,” a 
term that combines “robot” with “networks” and that refers to a collection of connected 
computers with programs that communicate across multiple devices to perform specific 
tasks (p.1). The 2016 U.S. election was a defining moment in the evolution of 
computational techniques for spreading political propaganda via social network sites. In 
testimony before the U.S. Congress, Mark Zuckerberg, the CEO of Facebook, admitted 
that around 126 million people might have been exposed to the IRA fake news posted 
on Facebook, as well as to the 11 million related advertisements that were paid for by 
the IRA (Politico Staff, 2018). However, Zuckerberg had been quoted earlier as saying: 
“Personally, I think the idea that fake news—of which it is a small amount of content—
influenced the election is a pretty crazy idea” (Berghel, 2017a; Berghel, 2017b; 
Parkinson, 2016). These fake news posts were seen and shared by over 100 million 
people; therefore, the account of the events provided by Zuckerberg might be regarded 
as misleading (Berghel, 2017a; Berghel, 2017b; Parkinson, 2016). The content of those 
fake news items, which were seen and shared by millions of people, could arguably 
have had a large influence on the outcome of the election (Howard, 2018; Parkinson, 
2016). 
Multiple studies have focused on the use of social media bots in the U.S. 
presidential election and the U.K. Brexit referendum (Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017; Badawy 
et al., 2018; Bastos & Mercea, 2019; Evolvi, 2018; Howard, 2018; Howard & Kollanyi, 
2016; Intelligence and Security Committee, 2020; Narayanan et al., 2017; Reston, 2017; 
Shao et al., 2018; Zannettou et al., 2019). The Internet Relay Chat System is considered 
to be an early example where bots were being used to manage and regulate social 
interaction on the Internet (Howard et al., 2018). The Cambridge Analytica app that 
attracted so much negative attention to Facebook after the 2016 U.S. presidential 
election and the 2016 U.K. Brexit referendum is an example of an bot algorithm that was 
designed for the purpose of collecting behavioral and psychological data such as the 
shares, likes, dislikes and political activities of social media users (Stark, 2018, p. 206). 
In other words, these bots are social media accounts that are controlled by 
software, rather than by real people. These social media bots are estimated to include 
between 5-9% of the overall Twitter population, and to account for approximately 24% of 
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all tweets produced on Twitter (Morstatter et al., 2016, p. 533). Stories and hashtags that 
“go viral” or start trending are often pushed there through manipulation by these social 
media bots (Morstatter et al., 2016).  
 The Computational Propaganda Project, a multi-national project attached to the 
Oxford Internet Institute, reports that 19 million identifiable “bot” accounts tweeted in 
support of Trump or Clinton in the week prior to the 2016 presidential election, with 
55.1% in favour of Trump, and just 19.1% in favour of Clinton (Newman et al., 2018; 
Parkinson, 2016; Wineburg et al., 2016). In addition, Al-Rawi et al. (2019) reported that 
around 18 “pro-Trump” bots had been suspended by Twitter due to the high rate at 
which they were posting “fake news.” This disparity in Twitter support would appear 
difficult to explain, other than as deliberate and highly orchestrated political interference, 
given that Hillary Clinton received 65,844,954 votes in the 2016 U.S. presidential 
election, considerably more than the 62,979,879 votes for Donald Trump (Berghel, 
2017a).  
Zannettou et al. (2019) found that 71% of the Russian Internet Research 
Agency’s (IRA) fake accounts were created before the 2016 U.S. election. In addition, 
the 2017 Intelligence Community Assessment reported that Russian operatives started 
researching U.S. electoral processes and election-related technology as early as 2014, 
which was two years before the election, and that the IRA started advocating for Trump’s 
candidacy in 2015 (Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2017). It was also 
found that 24 accounts were created on July 12, 2016, about one week before the 
Republican National Conference, when Donald Trump was nominated as the Republican 
candidate for the 2016 presidential election (Zannettou et al., 2019). Moreover, Russian 
IRA trolls attempted to mask their disinformation campaign by adopting different 
identities, such as changing screen names and profile information, and deleting all their 
previous tweets. In their examination of tweets posted between January 2016 and 
September 2017, Zannettou et al. discovered that 19% of the IRA accounts changed 
their screen names as many as 11 times. In order to start with a clean slate, they deleted 
tweets in large batches. 
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2.4. Human Deception 
As indicated above, the main purpose of the disinformation campaign during  the 
2016 U.S. presidential election was to influence social media users to vote in favour of 
Republic candidate Donald Trump, or in the alternative, to suppress voting by social 
media users for  Democratic candidate Hillary Clinton. This section discusses the 
influence of fake news on social media users, and how some of them may accept such 
“news” at face value, without questioning the credibility of the source. As well, this 
section will discuss micro-targeting, the main tactic employed by the IRA-sponsored 
trolls in the 2016 election. Other topics to be considered include guns, race, and the 
mainstream media.   
2.4.1. Accepting Fake News at Face Value 
According to the Pew Research Center, 43% of Americans get their news from 
Facebook, while 12% get their news from Twitter (Shearer & Matsa, 2018). Other 
studies have indicated that two-thirds of Facebook users get their news from Facebook, 
while six-out-of-ten Twitter users get their news from Twitter (Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017; 
Gottfried & Shearer, 2016). Given the high percentage of people who depend on social 
media for their daily dose of news, there is definite reason for concern about the 
potential for manipulation of sentiment in social media. The main problem with fake news 
is that consumers tend to accept what they read at face value. 
A study by Vosoughi et. al (2018) demonstrated that between 2006 and 2017, 
approximately 126,000 rumours were spread by almost 3 million people on Twitter. The 
Vosoughi et al. study found that fake news was more innovative than real news, and that 
people were more likely to share/retweet innovative information. It was also indicated 
that false stories inspired fear, surprise, and disgust, whereas real stories inspired 
anticipation, trust, joy, and sadness (Vosoughi et al., 2018). This Vosoughi et al. study 
also found that false political news travelled more broadly, reached more people, and 
was more viral than any other category of false information. According to another survey, 
conducted in December 2016, 64% of Americans indicated that they believed that fake 
news had created serious confusion over basic facts. Various studies have shown that, 
in general, social media users may have shared a fake news story, either knowingly or 
unknowingly (Barthel et al., 2016).  
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To illustrate the scope of the problem, a 2016 Stanford History Education Group 
study of 7,000 middle school, high school and college students found that regardless of 
their supposedly advance technical knowledge, most were unable to recognize factual 
and non-factual content posted on social media pages such as Facebook, and Twitter 
(Kshetri & Voas, 2017; Wineburg et al., 2016). Many participants accepted the images 
and posts at face value, without questioning the source or the underlying motivation 
(Wineburg et al., 2016).  
2.4.2. Microtargeting  
Americans are very sensitive about their guns and gun laws, an issue which 
Donald Trump used against Hillary Clinton during the election campaign. Donald Trump 
frequently accused Hillary Clinton of stripping away the gun rights of Americans, while 
representing himself as protecting the rights of gun owners and preventing any 
legislation that might impede their right to bear arms (Marcotte, 2018; Sanchez, 2016). 
The topic of “guns” was mentioned repeatedly by the IRA trolls in order to influence the 
social media audience. Facebook pages designed for this purpose by the IRA, such as 
Secured Borders, Defend the 2nd, and Being Patriotic, talked at length about the 2nd 
Amendment, guns, and gun laws, in order to enflame the passions of gun owners and 
gun lovers (DiResta et al., 2018; Marcotte, 2018).  
In addition, Russian troll accounts deliberately stoked racial anxieties in the 
American public. They posted tweets and messages on social media platforms that were 
intended to persuade the American public that they were being inundated and being 
taken advantage of by the blacks and immigrants (DiResta et al., 2018; Faris et al., 
2017; Marcotte, 2018). One example of this would be the Facebook ad entitled “Another 
Gruesome Attack on Police by A BLM Movement Activist,” where a picture of a flag-
draped coffin at a police funeral was shown (Marcotte, 2018, p. 113). These IRA-
generated messages also attempted to organize rallies against immigration, and rallies 
in support of retaining Confederate statues, such as the statue of Confederate General 
Robert E. Lee, which was slated for removal from a roundabout in the City of New 
Orleans (Marcotte, 2018).  
The Russian-sponsored IRA messaging was aligned closely with the messaging 
of the Trump campaign. According to Marcotte (2018), Trump knew that running on 
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issues like cutting taxes for the rich or letting corporations poison the drinking water 
would not help him in the long run. Instead, Trump’s strategy was to post race-baiting 
tweets, which he thought that White, right-wing voters would appreciate, leading them to 
overlook some of his other flaws and policy weaknesses (Marcotte, 2018, p. 114). Trump 
calculated that the best way to reaffirm his connection to his base voters and to maintain 
their loyalty was to attack racial and religious minorities. This nexus can be observed by 
examining Trump’s personal social media pages, side-by-side with the pages of the 
Russian-sponsored IRA trolls. 
Trump’s war against the mainstream media was also a major topic in the 
election. This war has persisted throughout his presidency, and was even more 
noticeable during the 2019/2020 impeachment inquiry and trial (discussed further in 
section 2.6). Trump has continued to attack the mainstream media by insisting that 
mainstream media sources have a “liberal bias” and are not be trusted, in particular 
saving his venom for sources such as CNN or The Washington Post (Kirtley, 2018; 
Marcotte, 2018, p. 162; Sullivan, 2019). On the other hand, Trump has often voiced 
support Fox News, the foremost American conservative cable television news channel. 
Trump has referenced Fox News on multiple occasions on his social media accounts, to 
make it look like a credible (trustable) channel for the public to watch. However, studies 
have showed that Fox News viewers are less likely to be informed about the news than 
those who rely on other news sources. In fact, a 2016 study from Fairleigh Dickinson 
University demonstrated that people who took in no news whatsoever were better 
informed about current events than Fox News viewers (Cassino, 2011; Marcotte, 2018, 
p. 168). It is noteworthy that the Russian trolls posted similar messaging on their 
accounts to that of Donald Trump with respect to the mainstream media, reportedly to 
amplify the messaging with multiple links to Fox News. 
2.5. Charter Rights Considerations  
While there have been discussions about the potential for government regulation 
of the dissemination of fake news through social media, the issue is far too “new” to 
have fostered any legislation. Therefore, previous efforts to legislate and regulate 
comparable activities are discussed below. 
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According to the United Nations’ Universal Declaration on Human Rights,  
“everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression,” including the right to 
“impart information and ideas through any media…regardless of borders” (UN General 
Assembly, 1948). Legal positions regarding “acceptable speech” vary widely from 
country-to-country (Walker, 2018). A number of European countries, such as the U.K. 
and Germany, have enacted and enforced laws that are consistent with the European 
Council’s 2008 Framework Decision on Combating Certain Forms and Expressions of 
Racism and Xenophobia by Means of Criminal Law, which prohibits expressions that 
promote hatred or deny crimes of genocide (Article 19, 2018; Council of the European 
Union, 2008). On the other hand, some European nations, such as Lithuania, Italy, and 
France have struggled with the definition of “hate crime,” and have been more lenient 
when it comes to legal enforcement (Cartwright, Weir, Nahar, et al., 2019; Garland & 
Chakraborti, 2012). 
Although the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution does not protect speech 
that involves targeted harassment, threats, and imminent danger through incitement of 
violence, it does protect freedom of speech, no matter how offensive that speech might 
be. As a matter of fact, under U.S. law, there is no legal definition of unpatriotic speech 
(American Library Association, 2017). Moreover, Section 230 of the 1996 U.S. 
Communications Decency Act offers significant protections to social media platforms, 
stating that “no provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the 
publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content 
provider”(Communications Decency Act, 1996), meaning that platforms such as 
Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and Instagram cannot be held liable for user-generated 
content. In other words, it could prove difficult for the U.S. to criminalize the type of 
activity conducted by the Russian IRA or any similar foreign interference, without some 
major amendments to long-standing American legislation, and dramatic changes to legal 
precedent (Cartwright, Weir, Nahar, et al., 2019). 
In Canada, the Charter of Rights and Freedoms states that individuals have the 
right to “freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the 
press and other media of communication” (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 
1982). While actions such as defamatory libel and hate propaganda are prohibited by 
the Canadian Criminal Code (Council of the European Union, 2008; Criminal Code, 
1985), the courts have gone to considerable lengths to protect freedom of expression. 
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For example, in Crouch v. Snell, a case involving adult cyberbullying and the 
enforceability of the Province of Nova Scotia’s Cyber-safety Act, the judge confirmed 
that the right to freedom of expression “extends to any number of unpopular or 
distasteful expressions, including some forms of defamatory libel, hate propaganda and 
false news” (Alexandra, 2016; Crouch v. Snell, 2015). R. v. Elliott (2016) was a criminal 
harassment case in the Province of Ontario in which the accused repeatedly 
communicated and allegedly harassed two feminist activists via Twitter hashtags (Rita, 
2016). The judge opined that Twitter was like a “public square,” observing that creating a 
hashtag where people could follow you was similar to “announcing a public meeting,” 
further stressing that the fact that some opinions may be “morally offensive” to some 
people is not criminal (Alexandra, 2016; R. v. Elliott, 2016; Rita, 2016). 
Evidently, controversial issues involving freedom of expression and freedom of 
opinion can be expected to limit any effort to regulate the publication of fake news on 
social media. To be effective, regulatory agencies may need to target the creation of 
fraudulent Facebook pages and Twitter tweets, and in addition, target the use of social 
bots that amplify messages in such a way that they create the false impression that the 
messages have more followers and interactions than they do in reality. 
2.6. The 2019/2020 Impeachment Inquiry and Trial  
“The Trump–Ukraine affair was an extension of the Trump–Russia affair, and 
indicated that violations of the Constitution were ongoing. He would not, perhaps could 
not, stop” (Allin, 2020, p. 230). 
For the third time in the nation’s history, late 2019 and early 2020 witnessed the 
impeachment of a U.S. President, in this case, Donald Trump. The first three years of 
Trump’s presidency can be characterized by: multiple lies to the public on a daily basis 
from the president and his administration; multiple convictions and sentencing of high 
level election campaign and administrative officials for a variety of different crimes, 
including bribery, corruption, tax evasion, making false statements, fraud, perjury, and 
obstruction of justice; and an investigation by Robert Mueller into Russian involvement in 
2016 U.S. presidential election (Hasan, 2019; Trautman, 2020).  
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In the days following the release of Robert Mueller’s report, President Trump 
called the president of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelensky, and inappropriately pressured him 
to launch an investigation into his political rival, Joe Biden’s son (Hunter Biden), in 
exchange for the release for nearly $400 million of congressional-mandated military aid 
(Gramlich, 2020; Meacham, 2019; Trautman, 2020). A formal impeachment inquiry into 
President Trump started on September 24, 2019 and ended on December 18, 2019. 
After the impeachment inquiry, an impeachment trial started on January 16, 2020, which 
ended on February 5, 2020. Trump was charged with two articles of impeachment: 
abuse of power, and obstruction of Congress (Cai et al., 2020; J. Walters, 2020). The 
House Judiciary Committee approved the two articles of impeachment on December 18, 
2019 (Foran et al., 2019). The U.S. House of Representatives voted 230 in favour and 
197 against for the first article (abuse of power); for the second article (obstruction of 
Congress), 229 voted in favour and 198 voted against Trump’s impeachment (Foran et 
al., 2019).  
However, the impeachment proceedings did not seem to diminish Trump’s high 
popularity among Republicans. During the impeachment proceedings, Trump’s allies did 
their best to make it clear that breaking with Trump would come with a political price. 
During the Senate trial, for article I (abuse of power), 47 Democrats and one Republican 
(Mitt Romney) voted “guilty” (total 48), and 52 Republicans voted “not guilty.” After 
Romney became the only Republican who voted to convict Trump for Article I, Trump’s 
son Don Jr. tweeted that Romney was “now officially a member of the resistance & 
should be expelled from the @GOP” (Bennett, 2020). For article II (obstruction of 
Congress), 53 Republicans voted “not guilty,” and 47 Democrats voted him “guilty” (Cai 
et al., 2020). Hence, the Senate acquitted Trump on both counts of the House’s charges 
on February 5th, 2020. In terms of public opinion regarding this issue, a survey by the 
Pew Research Center found that 46% respondents of U.S. adults felt that Trump did 
something wrong regarding the Ukraine issue, and that it was enough to justify his 
removal from the office (Gramlich, 2020). Twenty-eight percent of respondents felt that 
while he did something wrong, it was not enough to justify removing him from the office, 
whereas 25% felt that he did nothing wrong.  
When Trump was questioned, he denied all of his wrongdoings and called the 
impeachment inquiry a “witch hunt” by Democrats and elements of the mainstream 
media (BBC News, 2019; Harriger, 2020; Keneally, 2020; Meacham, 2019). Moreover, 
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Trump denied using U.S. military aid as a bargaining chip with Ukraine President 
Zelensky, stating on multiple occasions that his phone call to the Ukrainian leader was 
“perfect” (Diamond, 2019; Gramlich, 2020; Meacham, 2019, p. 212; Walters, 2018). 
Contradicting his claims about the innocuous nature of the phone call, he insisted that it 
was appropriate for him to ask the Ukraine to investigate “corruption,” referring 
specifically to the energy firm where Joe Biden’s son, Hunter Biden, had previously 
worked for around five years (BBC News, 2019; Mayer, 2019). When things were not 
working Donald Trump’s way, he showed his frustration on his social media accounts, 
especially on Twitter. It was reported that on January 22nd, Trump broke his previous 
Twitter record by sending 142 tweets and retweets in a single day (Cillizza, 2020).  
During the impeachment inquiry, many hashtags began trending in support of 
Trump, such as, #ShamImpeachment, #Trump2020Landside, #Trump2020 and 
#PresidentialHarassment. There were also other hashtags that were in support of 
impeaching Trump, for example, #impeachTheMF, #ImpeachTrump, and #Impeachnow. 
There is no clear record of how many of these tweets were created by foreign bots or 
foreign trolls. However, multiple lawmakers have warned that Russia is again meddling 
in an effort to re-elect Trump in 2020 through disinformation campaigns on social media 
(Barbaro et al., 2020; Dilanian, 2020; Goldman et al., 2020). Therefore, it can be inferred 
that Russian trolls were actively participating on social media during the impeachment 
proceedings. Some have argued that Trump’s ongoing patterns of misconduct during the 
2016 U.S. election, and his recent efforts to interfere in the upcoming 2020 election 
(referring to his phone call to the Ukrainian leader) indicate that he is a potential threat to 
national security and to the rule of law (Bertrand, 2020; Schiff et al., 2020). 
Much has been said about the 2016 U.S. election and the accompanying 
disinformation campaign. However, there has been no study as of yet regarding the 
spread of misinformation, disinformation, and news fabrication during the impeachment 
inquiry and trial of Donald Trump. Therefore, this thesis helps to fill this gap by 
examining five different Facebook pages marked as questionable/fake by the Media 
Bias/Fact Check website. As well, five different Twitter hashtags that began to trend 
during the impeachment inquiry and trial are being examined in this thesis (see Chapter 
5). Before examining the 2019/2020 impeachment inquiry and trial data, however, the 
results of the examination of the dataset of IRA-generated social media messages 
during the 2016 U.S. presidential election will be reported, in order to examine the 
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influence of the Russian IRA in the presidential election, and to search for evidence that 
refutes or supports the findings of previous studies (see Chapter 4). This study also 
explored the manner in which these posts and tweets micro-targeted social media 
audiences in an effort to influence them to vote for Donald Trump, and/or to discourage 
them from voting for Hillary Clinton.  
2.7. Agenda Setting Theory 
Research done by Dautrich & Hartley (1999) showed that Americans got their 
political information from various media agencies, such as talk radio, print, and television 
journalism. According to agenda setting theory, members of the public learn what 
importance to attach to an issue from the amount and position of the coverage of the 
issue in the news media (McCombs & Shaw, 1972). There are two levels of agenda 
setting; the first level is “the transmission of object salience,” and the second level is “the 
transmission of attribute salience” (McCombs and Gnanem, as cited in Reese et al., 
2001, p. 68). In other words, the first level of agenda setting happens when the media 
tells the audience what to think about, while the second level of agenda setting happens 
when the media tells the audience how to think about these topics (McCombs & Shaw, 
1972).  
According to the first level of agenda setting theory, issues that are accorded 
higher priority by the media tend to gain greater prominence in the public sphere (Caulk, 
2016; Wallsten, 2007). When second-level agenda setting is added to the mix, it 
examines those issues that the media consider to be important, and emphasizes the 
particular attributes assigned to those issues by the media (McCombs & Shaw, 1972). 
Such attributes can then be framed in a positive, negative, or neutral way, presented in a 
cognitive or affective manner, and thus, the process of the second-level agenda setting 
becomes complete (Golan & Wanta, 2001). 
Golan and Wanta (2001), who studied the coverage of Bush and McCain during 
the 2000 New Hampshire Primary, observed that second-level agenda setting is more 
effective for cognitive attributes than affective attributes. They found that the 
respondents of their study were more influenced by the factual information expressed by 
second-level cognitive attributes than the negative or positive opinions of the candidates 
within the stories (2001). Kiousis (2003) looked at favorable ratings for President Clinton 
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during the Monica Lewinsky scandal. Kiousis argued that favorability is an emotional or 
affective measure when looking at the president. This is compared with the job approval 
rating that he states to be a more cognitive or fact-based measure. In the end, Kiousis 
found that news coverage of scandals as an attribute of coverage of the office of the 
president, has more of an effect on favorability ratings. This suggests that affective 
second-level agenda setting can impact how the public views a politician (2003). A study 
by Gondw and Muchangwe (2020), examined the influence of agenda setting theory in 
the Zambian presidential election. They found that the presence of media agenda 
influenced their decisions in choosing one candidate over the other.  
For over four decades, research in agenda setting theory has expanded its scope 
from the public agenda to factors that shape the media agenda (Fu, 2013; Golan, 2006). 
Past research on agenda setting shows that there is a relationship between the issues 
that the media emphasizes and the issues that the public thinks are important 
(McCombs & Shaw, 1972). Through first-level agenda setting, the media portrayed 
Trump as the most important candidate in the 2016 presidential race and portrayed 
Hillary Clinton as unfit for the job. In second level agenda setting, social media were 
used to frame the messaging in favour of Trump, in order to garner more voter support, 
while at the same time discouraging citizens from voting for Hillary Clinton. Additionally, 
during the impeachment proceedings, social media, in particular Facebook and Twitter, 
were used to support Donald Trump and disfavour the Democratic party and its 
members, especially Nancy Pelosi (Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives) and 
Adam Schiff (Chairman of the House Intelligence Committee and eventual House 
Manager at Donald Trump’s impeachment trial). 
In the past, agenda setting theory studied the influence of mainstream media, 
rather than the influence of social media. Nowadays, however, social media plays a 
significant role in bringing people their daily news. According to the Pew Research 
Center, 43% of Americans get their news from Facebook, while 12% get their news from 
Twitter (Shearer & Matsa, 2018). Other studies have indicated that two-thirds of 
Facebook users get their news from Facebook, while six-out-of-ten Twitter users get 
their news from Twitter (Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017; Gottfried & Shearer, 2016). Under the 
circumstances, there is justifiable concern for potential manipulation of political 
sentiment in social media. Therefore, agenda setting theory can play an important role in 
the examination of social media influence on recent political events. 
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2.8. A Criminological Perspective 
It is important to note that foreign interference and disinformation activities are by 
no means restricted to social media in the United States. As mentioned earlier in this 
literature review, extensive use was made of Twitter during the 2016 Brexit referendum 
(Bastos & Mercea, 2019; Evolvi, 2018; Howard & Kollanyi, 2016; Intelligence and 
Security Committee, 2020; Narayanan et al., 2017). Media reports claim that around 
150,000 active Twitter bot accounts linked to Russia were discovered during the Brexit 
campaign (Narayanan et al., 2017). The former British Prime Minister, Theresa May, 
accused Russia of interfering in the elections and planting fake stories in the media. The 
British Prime Minister said that it was an exceptional attack, and that it attempted to 
“weaponize information” in order to sow discord among the Western nations (BBC News, 
2017; Mason, 2017). The government released the Intelligence and Security Committee 
Russia report in July 2020, and recognized that the threat was underestimated and U.K. 
was considered to be as one of Russia's top targets (Intelligence and Security 
Committee, 2020). However, the U.S. government has pursued this matter quite 
vigorously, compared to the U.K. government, which has been in a state of turmoil with 
respect to Brexit and repeated changes in political leadership.  
In 2019, a progress report on an Action Plan Against Disinformation was 
released by The European Commission, working alongside the European External 
Action Service and other EU institutions and member states. This Action Plan put in 
place measures to prevent and expose disinformation attacks. According to this report, it 
was confirmed that ongoing disinformation activities were originating from Russian 
sources, and that they were believed to be undertaken for the purpose of influencing 
voter preferences and suppressing voter turnout in the EU Parliamentary elections (de 
Cock Bunning et al., 2019; European Commission, 2018, 2019). A recent study of 
Canadian Twitter data conducted by Al-Rawi and Jiwani (2019) indicated that Russian 
trolls were behind “fake news” stories that attempted to stoke fear and distrust between 
Muslims and non-Muslims following the 2017 shooting deaths of six worshippers at a 
mosque in Quebec City. Further, this study expressed concerns that foreign 
interference, especially Russian trolls, might have tried to influence the Fall 2019 
Canadian federal election. In February 2019, CBC issued an analysis of 9.6 million 
tweets from Twitter troll accounts that were linked to suspected foreign influence 
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campaigns and that were stroking controversy in Canada over pipelines, refugees, and 
immigration (Oral, 2019; Rocha & Yates, 2019). These accounts were suspected to have 
originated in Russia, Iran, and Venezuela (Oral, 2019). 
Foreign interference of this nature is by no means “new”—such activities have 
been documented in the Czech Republic and Slovakia as far back as 2013 (Smoleňová, 
2015), and in the 2014 election in the Ukraine (Khaldarova & Pantti, 2016; Mejias & 
Vokuev, 2017). In 2009, the Kremlin founded a “school for bloggers,” apparently 
predicting the long-range possibilities of utilizing social media to influence political 
campaigns around the world (Falk, 2018; Hodge, 2009) It can be assumed that the 
disinformation attacks by hostile foreign actors on the 2016 U.S. presidential election 
and the 2016 Brexit referendum were able to achieve results that likely would not have 
been attainable through more conventional military tactics. The disinformation tactics 
employed by the Russians apparently succeeded in disintegrating the European Union, 
installing a pro-Russian figure in the White House, and testing the strength of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), all without firing a single shot. This could be 
construed as an all-out assault on Western-style democracy (Cartwright, Weir, Frank, et 
al., 2019; Cartwright, Weir, Nahar, et al., 2019).  
With democracy under threat from the intentional and possibly criminal 
manipulation of social media, and the resultant “digital wildfires” (Webb et al., 2016), 
legislators and government regulatory agencies around the world are eagerly seeking 
solutions and defenses against disinformation warfare. Currently, much research has 
described the blatant attempts by foreign countries, particularly Russia’s Internet 
Research Agency, to manipulate public opinion in the Ukraine, U.K. and U.S., wherein 
the use of so-called “fake news” sought to influence democratic processes across 
international boundaries. However, no studies have been undertaken as of yet on the 
recent impeachment inquiry and trial against the president of U.S., Donald Trump. Thus, 
the current study will not only examine foreign interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential 
election, but also, look for possible inference in the 2019/2020 impeachment inquiry and 
trial, by examining the messaging on the two most widely used social media platforms, 
Facebook and Twitter.  
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2.9. Research Questions 
It is important to note that the current study does not attempt to examine the 
success or failure of the social media and U.S politics, as the data to effectively test this 
outcome were not available and also it was out of this thesis's scope. Despite this, the 
current study is sufficiently important given that no previous study has examined the two 
data together, or 2019/2020 impeachment proceeding data alone to evaluate the 
impacts of foreign interference in U.S. politics. Accordingly, the current study is informed 
by the following research questions: 
1. What are the major issues covered in the selected social media data, Facebook 
and Twitter, during the 2016 U.S, presidential election and during the 2019/2020 
impeachment proceedings of Donald Trump? 
2. Which political party/political candidate was most supported by the fake news 
content disseminated in the selected social media data?  
3. How did foreign interference in U.S. politics micro-target social media users in 
order to influence their political opinions? 
26 
Chapter 3.  
 
Research Methods 
This chapter sets out the methodological approach used in the current study. In 
particular, this chapter discusses how qualitative methodology guided the exploration of 
the current study’s research question(s), including: 1) the techniques for data collection 
and sampling of social media messages from the two most widely used social media 
outlets, Facebook and Twitter during the 2016 U.S. presidential election and the 
2019/2020 impeachment inquiry and trial; and (2) the qualitative content analysis 
method used to analyze the data, a method that provides a systematic and objective 
means to make valid inferences from verbal, visual, or written data. Finally, this chapter 
concludes with a discussion of what gives quality to qualitative research. 
3.1. Sampling and Data Collection 
The data was collected from two main events that occurred in U.S. politics: the 
2016 presidential election, and the 2019/2020 impeachment inquiry and trial. Both of 
these events involved current U.S. President, Donald Trump. The sampling and the 
retrieval process for the two datasets were quite distinct from each other, as set out 
below.  
3.1.1. 2016 U.S. Presidential Election 
The first part of the current study involves a qualitative content analysis of 500 
randomly selected “fake news” posts from Facebook (out of a total of 2,500 posts) and 
500 randomly selected “fake news” tweets from Twitter (out of a total of 2,500 posts). In 
this context, the term “fake news” is applied to any data item that was posted on these 
social media outlets and/or that included inflammatory opinions without backing them up 
with a credible source. These messages and tweets were posted by the Russian Internet 
Research Agency (IRA) between 2015 and 2017, which was the time period before, 
during, and after the 2016 U.S. presidential election (DiResta et al., 2018; Linvill & 
Warren, 2018; Mueller, 2019; Timberg, 2017). In order to analyze the data, two different 
software tools were utilized: NVivo 12, and Microsoft Excel. Both NVivo and Microsoft 
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Excel help with the codification and visualization of data and facilitate data queries of the 
entire dataset. Using computer software such as NVivo to assist with qualitative data 
analysis is believed by social researchers to produce superior results, by making 
analysis of textual content more systematic and transparent (Elg & Ghauri, 2019). 
In 2018, Facebook shut down 138 Facebook pages, 70 Facebook accounts and 
65 Instagram accounts that had been identified as belonging to the Russian IRA 
(Constine, 2018). All of these pages were deleted by Facebook when the company 
conducted an internal review of Russian penetration of its social network. However, the 
content and engagement metrics from these pages were captured by CrowdTangle, a 
social analytics tool, which was then gathered by Dr. Jonathan Albright (Confessore & 
Wakabayashi, 2017; Lapowsky, 2018; Timberg, 2017). It was found that these pages 
were tailored to fit seamlessly into the ordinary online conversation of particular 
audiences – politically activated gay women, African Americans, Muslims and people 
concerned about illegal immigration or the treatment of veterans. This was done to target 
voters with Russian-bought political ads shaped to their interests, with the intention in at 
least some cases of affecting voting behaviour (Timberg, 2017). 
Five Facebook pages were analyzed in this segment of the study: Being 
Patriotic, Blacktivist, Secured Borders, LGBT United, and United Muslims of America. 
Initially, all of these IRA-sponsored Facebook pages were saved separately in an Excel 
file format, with a total of 500 messages in each file. A research decision was made to 
analyze 100 randomly selected posts from each group. These messages were 
randomized by using the randomization formula (“=RAND()”) in Excel. Once the 
randomization formula was applied, the random numbers column was later sorted in 
ascending order, with the first 100 posts being saved in a new Excel file. The same 
process was repeated for all five of the Facebook pages. Next, all of the final files were 
imported into NVivo for further analysis. Multiple NVivo query functions were used to 
analyze the data. In particular, the word frequency query option was employed, in order 
to identify the 10 words that appeared most frequently within each of the datasets.  
In 2017, Darren Linvill from the Department of Communication and John Walker 
of the Department of Economics at Clemson University collected and saved vast 
numbers of Twitter posts, prior to their removal from the Internet by the social media 
platforms. Hence, removing the evidence of the IRA’s activities made it difficult to collect 
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further data for the purposes of academic research into foreign interference and 
disinformation campaigns as they relate to the U.S. presidential election. However, 
Linvill and Warren preserved the evidence and placed themselves in a position to make 
the data available to academic, law enforcement and cyber-security communities for 
further study and analysis (Linvill & Warren, 2018). It is noteworthy that Linvill and 
Walker investigated the Twitter dataset, both qualitatively and quantitatively, further 
breaking the tweets down into right trolls, left trolls, news feeders, and hashtag gamers. 
The first part of this thesis reports on the analysis of a randomized sample of the IRA’s 
Facebook and Twitter postings that were gathered, saved, and made available by Linvill 
and Walker.  
Initially, a dataset of 2,946,219 Twitter messages (tweets) from git.hub was 
downloaded from another website, fivethirtyeight.com. These tweets were described as 
originating from the Russian Internet Research Agency (Boatwright, Linvill & Warren, 
2018), Only “English” language tweets (n = 2,500) were retained for analysis. Unlike the 
Facebook datasets, the Twitter dataset was not separated into hashtags or account 
names, nor was it divided into separate data items or unique file numbers. Therefore, it 
was retrieved as one large dataset, with 2,500 tweets. In order to have the same number 
of postings as the Facebook dataset, a research decision was made to analyze 500 
tweets. Therefore, the first 500 ascending tweets (following the same randomization 
process as described above) were analyzed in this phase of the study. Again, this 
Twitter dataset was placed in an Excel file format and later imported into NVivo for 
further analysis. All words such as “the,” “are,” and “they” were excluded from the word 
frequency query in NVivo. 
3.1.2. 2019/2020 Impeachment Data 
The second part of the research reported in this thesis entails data retrieved from 
Facebook and Twitter pertaining to the 2019/2020 impeachment inquiry and trial. A 
formal impeachment inquiry into President Trump commenced on September 24, 2019, 
and ended on December 18, 2019, when the U.S. House of Representatives approved 
articles of impeachment. After the impeachment inquiry, an impeachment trial 
commenced in the U.S. Senate on January 16, 2020, ending with a contentious “not 
guilty” finding on February 5, 2020 (Cai et al., 2020; J. Walters, 2020). Both of these 
Facebook and Twitter datasets covered the time period of the impeachment inquiry and 
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subsequent Senate trial, that is, from September 2019 to February 2020. However, the 
data itself was collected in late February 2020.   
In this study of the impeachment proceedings, five different Facebook pages 
were analyzed: American Thinker, Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), 
Godfather Politics, United American Patriots, and Wallbuilders. All of these pages were 
considered to come from questionable sources, identified as such by the Media 
Bias/Fact Check website. Media Bias/Fact Check (MBFC) was founded in 2015 by Dave 
Van Zandt. This website rates factual accuracy and political biases in the news media 
(Media Bias Fact Check, 2020). It rates media sources on a political bias spectrum, as 
well as on the inclusion of factual reporting.  
Sources considered by Media Bias/Fact Check (MBFC) to be questionable would 
exhibit consistent promotion of propaganda, extreme bias, complete lack of transparency 
and/or fake news, and poor or no sourcing to credible news/sources (Media Bias Fact 
Check, 2020). With the exception of the CAIR Facebook page, all of the other four pages 
were rated to have an extreme right-wing bias on the political spectrum scale. The 
American Thinker page was observed to promote conspiracy theories and 
pseudoscience, and to use poor sources to support its posts. CAIR was rated to have 
right-center bias on the political spectrum scale, was reported to have either poor or no 
sourcing, and to have questionable funding from foreign governments, along with 
allegations of anti-Semitism (Media Bias Fact Check, 2020). The Godfather Politics page 
was found to be routinely promoting propaganda and conspiracy theories that were 
considered to be harmful to and disparaging of left-wing groups. The United American 
Patriots page was rated to be questionable based on its poor sources, propaganda, 
promotion of conspiracies, and a complete lack of transparency in its posts. Lastly, the 
Wallbuilders page was considered questionable, based on extreme right-wing bias, 
promotion of propaganda, and being identified as a hate group by multiple sources. 
MBFC reported that Wallbuilders has faced criticism for being an anti-LGBT hate group, 
as well as being designated by the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) as an anti-
Islam and anti-immigration group (Media Bias Fact Check, 2020). According to MBFC, 
Wallbuilders also failed fact checks on multiple occasions, therefore indicating that 
Wallbuilders was a highly questionable source.   
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The process with the data collection for the Twitter dataset was different from the 
Facebook dataset. This dataset of hashtags was collected on the basis of a daily 
inspection of Twitter. In total, five Twitter hashtags were analyzed: #Impeachment, 
#RussianInterference, #ShamImpeachment, #Trump2020, and #Trump2020Landside. 
These hashtags were trending1 on Twitter during the impeachment inquiry and trail. As 
indicated in chapter 2, there has been no research conducted to date on the influence of 
fake news posted on social media during the impeachment inquiry and trial of Donald 
Trump. Therefore, more research is required in this area.   
Once all of the data were collected from Facebook and Twitter, the individual 
data items were saved in separate Excel files. Initially, the American Thinker page 
consisted of 785 posts, CAIR of 733 posts, Godfather Politics of 670 posts, United 
American Patriots of 599 posts, and Wallbuilders of 205 posts, all posted between 
September 2019 and to February 2020. In order to have the same number of posts as 
the 2016 Facebook dataset, all of these 2019/2020 posts were randomized using the 
randomization formula in Excel. The random number column was then sorted in an 
ascending order with the first 100 posts being selected from each Facebook page and 
saved in a new file/dataset. The same process was followed for all five of the 2019/2020 
Facebook pages. All of the final Excel files/datasets were imported into NVivo for further 
analysis. In NVivo, the word frequency query option was again used to obtain the 10 
most frequently appearing words, which were then subjected for further analysis. All 
words such as “the,” “are,” and “they” were excluded from the word frequency query in 
NVivo.  
Much the same process was utilized for Twitter. All of the data items from the five 
hashtags were collected and saved in individual Excel files. In total, the #Impeachment 
hashtag had 14,893 tweets, #RussianInterference had 1,386 tweets, 
#ShamImpeachment had 13,608 tweets, #Trump2020 had 2,380 tweets, and 
#Trump2020Landside had 13,936 tweets, all posted during the time period between 
September 2019 and February 2020. All of the files within each of the five different 
hashtags were randomized in Excel. Thereafter, the first 100 tweets in the ascending 
order from each of the five Excel files representing the different hashtags were selected 
 
1 A “trend” on Twitter refers to a hashtag-driven topic that is immediately popular at a particular 
time. A hashtag is a keyword or phrase that is preceded with a pound (#) sign (Doctor, 2012). 
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and saved in new Excel files. Finally, all of the final Excel files/datasets were imported 
into NVivo for further qualitative analysis.  
3.2. Analytic Approach 
Qualitative content analysis was the primary method used for this current study. 
Qualitative content analysis may be described as “a research method for subjective 
interpretation of the content of text data through the systematic classification process of 
coding and identifying themes or patterns” (Cho & Lee, 2014; Hsieh & Shannon, 2005, p. 
1278; Moretti et al., 2011). It is “a method for systematically describing the meaning of 
qualitative material” (Cho & Lee, 2014; Schreier, 2014). Content analysis was best 
suited for the aims of this study, as it facilitated both inductive and deductive analytical 
approaches.  
An inductive approach that allowed for the themes to emerge from the data, 
rather than from rigid theoretical assumptions and “a priori” expectations, was 
considered to be most appropriate for the current study (Braun & Clarke, 2006; Elo & 
Kyngäs, 2008; Thomas & Magilvy, 2011). With an inductive approach, codes, 
categories, and/or themes are directly drawn from the data. On the other hand, a 
deductive approach starts with preconceived codes or categories derived from prior 
relevant research, literature, or theory (Cavanagh, 1997; Kondracki et al., 2002). A 
deductive approach might be more suitable when the objective of the study is to test 
existing theory, or to re-examine existing data in a new context (Cho & Lee, 2014). As 
mentioned above, the current study examines two quite different events that took place 
during two quite different periods: the 2016 U.S. presidential election, and the 2019/2020 
impeachment inquiry and trial. Through multiple Research Assistantship positions and 
the compilation of an extensive review of the literature on the Russian IRA’s 
disinformation campaign during the 2016 U.S. election, this researcher already had 
substantial prior knowledge about and understanding of the 2016 Facebook and Twitter 
datasets; therefore, many previously developed coding schemata were available for re-
use (for example, pro-Trump, anti-immigration, and pro-veteran, all of which were later 
re-coded under the pro-Trump category). Nevertheless, many new codes were 
generated when the Facebook and Twitter posts were re-read for this current study. No 
prior research had been conducted on the 2019/2020 impeachment proceeding dataset; 
therefore, it was necessary to develop a new coding and categorization schemata. 
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However, from the initial reading of the messages, it was evident that there were many 
pro-Trump messages, supporting his policies, and arguing against his impeachment. 
The qualitative content analysis approach can reveal both the manifest and latent 
content meanings of communication. With the analysis of manifest content, the 
researcher describes the information, uses the words, and describes the visible and 
obvious in the text as it is available in the data. In other words, manifest content analysis 
focuses on the data, and does not rely on interpretation (Bengtsson, 2016). In contrast, 
latent content analysis extends to the interpretive level, wherein the researcher seeks to 
uncover the underlying meaning of the text as well. To express it differently, the main 
question being asked by latent content analysis is: “what is the text talking about?” (Berg 
& Lune, 2001; Catanzaro, 1988; Downe-Wambolt, 1992; Graneheim & Lundman, 2004). 
Schrerier (2012) contends that qualitative content analysis is suitable for data that 
requires a greater degree of interpretation. Indeed, this approach was thought to be 
most compatible with the research objectives of this study because its main purpose was 
to go beyond the manifest content of the messages and extend to the analysis of latent 
content. To illustrate, the 10 words that appeared most frequently in the tweets revealed 
the manifest level of information, whereas the categorization and coding of those 
messages gave the data its interpretative value.  
A qualitative study is a process that includes multiple steps, in order to gain 
deeper understanding and more comprehensive results at the end. Although the 
following section may explain the analysis in a linear format, the analysis itself 
proceeded in a reflective and iterative manner, in that it relied on cycling back and forth 
between the stages. Below, a description is provided of how the current study proceeded 
through four different stages of qualitative content analysis, showing why both inductive 
and deductive analytical approaches were warranted. Further, both the manifest and 
latent meanings of communication are explored, to arrive at a better understanding of 
what transpired with the disinformation campaigns during the 2016 U.S presidential 
election and the 2019/2020 impeachment inquiry and trial.  
According to Bengtson (2016), the four stages of qualitative analysis are 
decontextualization, recontextualization, categorization and compilation (Bengtsson, 
2016) (see Figure 1, below). The first and second stages can be treated as one part for 
the current study and are explained together. The first stage (decontextualization) can 
33 
be described as familiarization with the data, while the second stage 
(recontextualization) includes initial coding, which was conducted during the first reading 
of the posts. The third stage (categorization) involves searching for main themes, while 
the fourth stage (compilation) includes reviewing, defining, and explicating the main 
themes.  
 
Figure 1 Overview of the process of qualitative content analysis (Bengtsson, 
2016) 
Stages One & Two: The Decontextualization and Recontextualization 
Process  
The first step when conducting any content analysis is to become familiar with 
the data itself. This process involves reading the text to ask “what is going on?,” before 
the researcher deconstructs the textual content down into smaller codes or categories, 
or starts to draw inferences or ascribe meanings (Bengtsson, 2016, pp. 11–12; Berg & 
Lune, 2001). According to Saldana (2015), codes are “words or short phrases that 
symbolically assign a salient, summative, essence-capturing, and/or evocative attribute” 
to a segment of data (p. 3). Codes are subjective, and give “interpreted meaning to each 
individual datum for later purposes of pattern detection” (Saldana, 2015, p. 3). For the 
current study, codes were generated using both an inductive and deductive approach. 
As a consequence of prior experience working as a Research Assistant on multiple 
projects pertaining to the disinformation campaign during the 2016 U.S. election, and 
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assisting with a number of related literature reviews, this researcher already had a well-
developed knowledge about and understanding of the data; therefore, the deductive 
content approach was utilized in many instances. Nevertheless, many new codes were 
generated when the messages were re-read. Indeed, Downe-Wambolt (1992) states that 
the coding process should be performed repeatedly, as interpretations of the messages 
that seemed clear at the beginning may come to be obscured during the process. 
Therefore, the use of both inductive and deductive approaches increased the likelihood 
that the coding would have a higher degree of reliability.  
Moreover, the current study made use of both manifest and latent approaches. 
Firstly, the word frequency query function in NVivo was used to analyze all of the data 
items from the 2016 and 2019/2020 datasets, in order to obtain the 10 most frequent 
words that appeared in the 2,000 postings that were studied. This was done for the 
purpose of exploring the language that was employed in these messages and tweets. 
Secondly, latent analysis was conducted during the coding stage. In particular, the goal 
behind the latent analysis was to identify the “underlying ideas, assumptions, and 
conceptualizations” in the given datasets (Braun & Clarke, 2006, p. 13). The current 
study sought to find meaning at the latent level, as it pertained to the content of the 
messages themselves. The entire process was done in NVivo 12 and Microsoft Excel. In 
the decontextualizing and recontextualizing stages the Facebook posts and Twitter 
tweets were read, and provisional (tentative) codes were assigned in NVivo. 
Simultaneously, Facebook and Twitter posts were read and classified as fake news, real 
news, or undetermined in Excel. It is important to note that a Google search was also 
used in the decontextualization and recontextualization phases, to determine whether or 
not the content of the post was entirely fictional, partially true, or mostly true. The main 
purpose for using NVivo for coding was because it is believed by social researchers to 
produce superior results to manual coding, by making analysis of textual content more 
systematic and transparent, and thus, more readily accessible to replication and 
verification by other researchers (Elg & Ghauri, 2019). 
Additionally, during this process, a reflexive journal/memo was kept in NVivo, 
where any patterns or content that were believed to be critical were contemporaneously 
noted for future references and recall. Moreover, use of NVivo annotation assisted with 
the writing process, discussed further in stage four (below). Writing these thoughts in the 
journal proved helpful, not only during the decontextualization stage, where several 
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patterns and themes began to emerge, but also throughout the entire analytic process. 
The memos created in NVivo were used to pinpoint where information should go, and/or 
whether a theme/parent node should be collapsed into the subtheme/child node. To 
express it differently, these memos provided “fresh” insight into this researcher’s initial 
thoughts.  
Stage Three: The Categorization Process  
In stage three, themes and categories were identified (Bengtsson, 2016, p. 12). 
According to Saldana, significant themes emerge as a researcher codes, categorizes, 
and reflects on the data (Saldana, 2015). Each post was read on the screen and, 
following this, codes were assigned to the relevant sections of text. A codebook was 
developed, and the posts and tweets were coded by following descriptive coding 
techniques. Descriptive coding was the most appropriate choice because it offered the 
ability to organize the vast amount of textual data into manageable word/topic-based 
clusters. Throughout this stage, Braun and Clarke’s (2006) guidelines were relied upon 
heavily to identify similarities between codes and themes, as well to merge together 
those that were related to one another.  
During this phase, a new category, “angle of message,” was added to the Excel 
spreadsheet. Some of the predominant classifications for the angle of the messages in 
the 2016 dataset were pro-Trump, anti-Trump, anti-Clinton, racist, and apolitical chatter. 
In the 2019/2020 impeachment proceeding dataset, some of the predominant angles 
were pro-Trump, health care, anti-Democrats, and anti-impeachment. To draw further 
connections between the codes, the insights recorded in the memos as well as in the 
annotations that were made in NVivo proved their worth. By the end of this phase, a 
number of themes were assembled, for example, codes that were brought together 
related to Trump’s oft-repeated messaging, including rhetoric about “building a wall,” 
“illegal aliens,” and/or “immigration issues,” which in turn created an overarching theme, 
that is, the “pro-Trump” category. 
Stage Four: The Compilation  
This compilation stage included reviewing the findings and identifying the main 
themes, as well as the actual writing up of the research process and research findings. 
According to Braun and Clarke (2006), this stage includes refining and redefining those 
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themes that may not have truly been themes, and to further weed out and eliminate the 
themes that were identified earlier but that subsequently proved to be of little or no value 
(Braun & Clarke, 2006). In this stage, examining prior literature on similar topics helped 
to establish the validity of the reasoning behind choosing particular themes (Aronson, 
1995). According to Aronson, combining the extant literature with the chosen themes 
helps to provide a more coherent story “that stands with merit” (Aronson, 1995, p. 3). In 
order to achieve this, the initial themes that were created were re-considered, to 
determine whether they were truly in line with the overall findings of this study. During 
this phase, some themes and sub-themes required a bit of re-working, with changes 
being made as needed. To illustrate, in the “breakdown of the message,” another 
category was added as “part real, part fake.” When the messages were re-read and re-
checked for factual content, many posts and tweets turned out to have elements of truth; 
thus, it was not possible to classify the entire posting as entirely fake or real. Therefore, 
this classification lent further accuracy to the analysis.  
It is important to note that the final write-up (see Chapter 4 and Chapter 5) 
includes the narratives that were the most prominent and most relevant to the current 
study. For all the data items, annotations were created in NVivo for the purpose of cross-
referencing the original postings with Google search results for the links that 
accompanied the messages. For the 2016 U.S. presidential election dataset, most of the 
original links attached to the messages had already been removed by the social media 
platforms. On the few occasions when a similar story was found in mainstream media 
sites, the hyperlinks to those stories were downloaded and saved as well, in many cases 
accompanied by a brief interpretation of the story and a brief explanation of why the 
Facebook post or Twitter tweet was designated as “real,” “fake,” or “part real, part fake.” 
For the 2019/2020 impeachment proceeding dataset, most of the links attached to or 
embedded in the postings were still active; however, the majority of those postings 
included links to questionable sources. Hence, if the same story that was referred to in 
the postings could be found on mainstream media sites, these links (along with 
interpretations) were added to the annotations. If it was a blatant “fake news” data item, 
where no mainstream media sites had posted similar news, then the designation of “fake 
news” was added to the annotation. This step not only helped in the write-up stage, but 
also helped to mitigate researcher biases and enhance the validity and reliability of the 
findings. Moreover, to present the themes and demonstrate the study’s validity, multiple 
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quotes (posts and tweets) have been included in the findings section (See Chapter 4 
and Chapter 5) to provide detailed insight into the data and how it was interpreted. Lists 
of the 10 most frequently appearing words from each dataset have also been included in 
the finding sections, to provide further evidence of the discourse and/or narratives found 
throughout the various datasets. 
3.2.2. Credibility and Trustworthiness in Qualitative Research  
Human mistakes are an ever-present possibility during the analytic process. 
These mistakes can be caused by errors of interpretation, as well as by personal biases. 
There is always a risk that different researchers would draw dissimilar conclusions from 
the same data. In the area of qualitative research, the terms credibility and 
trustworthiness are employed when assessing a particular study’s quality. It can be said 
that the “trustworthiness of a research report lies at the heart of issues conventionally 
discussed as validity and reliability” (Lincoln & Guba, 1985, p. 294; Seale, 1999, p. 467). 
The current study follows the concepts introduced by Lincoln and Guba (1985), which 
are essential criteria for qualitative research studies: Credibility, Transferability, 
Dependability, and Confirmability (Elo et al., 2014; Golafshani, 2003, p. 601; Pandey & 
Patnaik, 2014; Thomas & Magilvy, 2011).  
Credibility is comparable to the internal validity of the research, in that it 
contributes confidence to the “truth” of the findings. This is one of the most important 
factors in establishing trustworthiness (Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Pandey & Patnaik, 2014, 
p. 5746). A qualitative study may improve its credibility and trustworthiness through the 
use of triangulation. The current study relies on one particular form of triangulation, 
called “triangulation of sources,” which involves “examining the consistency of different 
data sources from within the same method” (Pandey & Patnaik, 2014, p. 5478). Here, 
the current study analyzed the 2016 U.S. presidential election dataset collected from two 
different sources, Facebook and Twitter. The second dataset was collected from the 
same platforms but during the 2019/2020 presidential impeachment inquiry and trial. 
These can both be considered major events in U.S. politics. Both datasets contained 
equal numbers of tweets and messages, to ensure that the findings were as congruent 
as possible.  
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Transferability shows that “the findings have applicability in other context,” and in 
that sense, may be compared to the external validity/generalizability of the research 
(Bengtsson, 2016, p. 13; Pandey & Patnaik, 2014, p. 5746). Data saturation can address 
the issue of transferability. Data saturation is defined as “a point at which observing 
more data will not lead to discovery of more information related to the research 
questions” (Lowe et al., 2018, p. 191). The concept of data saturation was applicable in 
this case, as it was found that the posts and tweets from both datasets became 
repetitive in content over time, and therefore, that the codes that emerged from these 
posts and tweets eventually became repetitive. According to Fusch and Ness (2015), 
“there is a direct link between data triangulation and data saturation; the one (data 
triangulation) ensures the other (data saturation)” (p. 1411). Denzin (2009) reports that 
there is no single theory or method that can capture all of the important information. 
However, Denzin did state that triangulation is the method wherein the researcher “must 
learn to employ multiple external methods in the analysis of the same empirical events" 
(Fusch & Ness, 2015, p. 1411). As mentioned earlier, the current study reports on two 
different events that occurred at different times in U.S. politics, thus partially meeting the 
requirements of data triangulation and data saturation. 
There is no commonly accepted sample size for qualitative studies. However, 
optimal sample size depends on the research questions, and the richness of the data 
(Elo et al., 2014, p. 4). Both datasets had considerably greater numbers of textual items 
than might typically be subjected to qualitative analysis, that is, 1,000 posts from 2016 
(500 from Facebook, 500 from Twitter), and 1,000 posts from 2019/2020 (500 from 
Facebook, 500 from Twitter), which helped to achieve data saturation and avoid 
generalization from too small of a sample size.  
Lincoln and Guba (1985) have identified thick description as an important way to 
achieve external validity. This refers to keeping detailed notes and describing them in 
the write-up (Pandey & Patnaik, 2014), which was done meticulously throughout the 
present study. 
Dependability is similar to reliability, in that its presence reflects that the findings 
are consistent and replicable (Pandey & Patnaik, 2014). An accurate description of the 
analysis and reporting of the relationships between the results and the original data 
should permit readers to draw their own conclusions regarding the trustworthiness of the 
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results (Elo et al., 2014, p. 7). It is important to note that dependability or reliability is 
higher when another researcher can readily follow the decision trail used by the initial 
researcher (Thomas & Magilvy, 2011, p. 153). Qualitative study can be subjective in 
approach; however, keeping a detailed record of critical research decisions in the 
reflective journal helps to ensure that research goals are met, while at the same time 
keeping the researcher on track. Moreover, the codebook plays a crucial role in keeping 
track of how codes were utilized to make sense of the data during the coding and writing 
stage (MacQueen et al., 1998). For the current study, all the reflective journal notes were 
written in NVivo memos, while the codebook was saved as an Excel file.  
Lastly, confirmability occurs when the requirements for credibility, transferability, 
and dependability have been established in the research (Thomas & Magilvy, 2011). The 
term “confirmability” is preferred to the term “objectivity,” and is evidenced by the 
“degree of neutrality or the extent to which the findings of a study are shaped by the 
respondents and not researcher biases, motivation, or interest” (Pandey & Patnaik, 
2014, p. 5746). This is particularly important when analysis includes latent content as 
well as manifest content, as researcher bias or motivation may influence the 
interpretation (Elo et al., 2014). This thesis reports on two main events in U.S. politics, 
both receiving immense attention on social media, and sparking conversations about 
fake news content (misinformation, disinformation, and/or news fabrication). This project 
reports solely on those messages, rather than on any personal researcher biases. In 
order to mitigate any potential researcher biases, detailed notes (in the form of memos in 
NVivo) were kept throughout the analysis process. Moreover, a Google search was also 
conducted on all of the posts to ascertain whether the post was real, fake, or partially 
true, which reduced the likelihood of biases being interjected into the coding process. As 
an extra precaution, annotations on each post were also recorded in NVivo.  
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Chapter 4.  
 
Result A: 2016 U.S. Presidential Election 
This chapter presents the findings of the qualitative content analysis of the 
disinformation campaign that was orchestrated by the Russian Internet Research 
Agency (IRA) during the 2016 U.S. presidential election. The first section of the chapter 
reports on the results of the content analysis of five different Facebook pages that were 
sponsored by the IRA (Mueller, 2019; Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 
2017; United States v. Internet Research Agency LLC, 2018). The next section 
discusses the findings of the analysis of numerous Twitter tweets, also sponsored by the 
Russian IRA. To present these findings, this section relies on direct, word-for-word 
quotations from the messages themselves, as well as on rich description, to convey the 
nature of these findings in as thorough and transparent manner as possible. Moreover, 
the 10 most frequent words from each dataset are presented, to report on the language 
that the messages employed in their effort to micro-target social media users.  
4.1. Disinformation on Facebook in 2016 
Qualitative content analysis was conducted on 100 randomly selected posts from 
each of the five different Facebook pages from the 2016 election period. Recall that 
each of the Facebook pages that were studied originally contained 500 posts in total (all 
together 2,500 posts). All of the posts from each of the pages were randomized, with 
100 posts from each being selected for analysis. Therefore, 500 randomly selected 
Facebook posts from the election time were read and analyzed in Excel and NVivo.  
As noted previously, this dataset of “fake news” posts (part of the disinformation 
campaign orchestrated by the IRA) was collected and assembled by Dr. Jonathan 
Albright (Confessore & Wakabayashi, 2017; Lapowsky, 2018; Timberg, 2017). The 
importance of their decision to collect this data cannot be overstated, given that in 2018, 
Facebook deleted most of the pages and accounts that had been identified as belonging 
to the IRA (Constine, 2018), thereby removing much of the evidence of the IRA’s 
activities, and making further data collection by academic researchers more difficult. 
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4.1.1. Being Patriotic 
One hundred posts were randomly selected from a total of 500 posts on the 
Being Patriotic Facebook page. These IRA-sponsored posts were analyzed in NVivo and 
Excel. Overall, it was found that this group micro-targeted White people from the 
American South, who were more likely to support anti-immigration policies, and more 
likely to belong to right-wing political groups. Mainly, this particular Facebook page 
contained complaints about the treatment of U.S. veterans. Research by DiResta et al. 
(2018) found that the content of this page garnered the most likes (6.3 million) as 
compared to all of the other IRA-sponsored Facebook pages (p. 21). 
One of the patterns that became apparent in the early stages of analysis was that 
79 of the 100 posts were clearly “fake news,” and that 61 out of those 79 posts were 
“pro-Trump” (see Table 1, below). The posts that were classified as “fake news” included 
inflammatory opinions and/or were engaged in outright falsehoods, without any 
supporting evidence. It is important to note that all the unsubstantiated opinion posts 
were also coded as “fake news.” As per Mueller’s report and research by Dr. Jonathan 
Albright, these pages and political ads were sponsored by Russian IRA, and it was done 
to target voters to shape their interests, with the intention to alter their voting behaviour. 
The posts that were classified as “pro-Trump” were very explicit in their support of 
Donald Trump’s presidential campaign, as well as his general political views. The typical 
discourse found on this page might be best exemplified as follows: “The Second 
Amendment secures our lives, protects our property and makes us free from tyranny. 
Stay armed, America, stay armed forever!” or  “Why is it so hard for our Government to 
understand that we want our own citizens to get care before illegal freeloaders who don't 
even try to become a part of the American society?” Both of these statements were 
coded as “fake news” because they both included unsubstantiated opinion rather than a 
fact. These statements from Being Patriotic were not premised on any empirical 
research, nor on any real event. Moreover, messages posted on this Facebook page 
clearly supported Donald Trump’s own narrative, in that they talked about 2nd 
amendment rights, deporting immigrants, building the wall, restricting travel and work 
visas, screening refugees, and curbing legal immigration (Amadeo, 2019). 
Out of the 100 posts studied, 5 of the posts (4 of which were fake news, one of 
which was part real, part fake) were opposed to Hillary Clinton, and therefore, classified 
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as “anti-Clinton.” As cited in the literature review (see Chapter 2), a number of the posts 
created by the Russian IRA were intended to undermine Hillary Clinton’s presidential 
campaign (Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017; Badawy, Ferrara, & Lerman, 2018; Bevan, 2018; 
Kshetri & Voas, 2017; Mueller, 2019; Murray, 2018; Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence, 2017; Reston, 2017; Shane & Mazzetti, 2018; United States v. Internet 
Research Agency LLC, 2018). The following example serves to illustrate how such posts 
were intended to undermine Hillary Clinton:  
Both Clinton and Obama admitted that Hillary has lost and they both told 
her supporters that peaceful transfer of power is the most important thing 
that keeps our nation together. Yet the brainwashed liberal community is 
going mad with riots, petitions, and protests. When will they grow up and 
start acting like civilized people. 
This post was partially true, in the sense that Obama and Hillary had in fact both 
given speeches conceding loss and encouraging the peaceful transfer of power 
(Collinson et al., 2016; Kosoff, 2016). However, there was no supporting evidence with 
respect to the alleged riots, petitions, and protests. 
Table 1 Classification and Angle of the Being Patriotic Facebook Page 
Classification Frequency Percentage 
Fake News 79 79.0% 
Pro-Trump 61 61.0% 
Undetermined  10 10.0% 
Pro-Military  4 4.0% 
Anti-Clinton 4 4.0% 
Part Real, Part Fake 11 11.0% 
Pro-Trump 7 7.0% 
Undetermined  3 3.0% 
Anti-Clinton 1 1.0% 
Undetermined 8 8.0% 
Real News 2 2.0% 
Undetermined  1 1.0% 
Pro-Trump 1 1.0% 
Grand Total 100 100.0% 
 
 The posts that were partially true but that also included some false information 
were classified as “part real, part fake.” This accounted for 11% (n=11) in the data; out of 
those 11 posts, 7 were classified as “pro-Trump” (see Table 1, above). Most of these 
Russian-sponsored posts included inflammatory opinion, alongside some verifiable 
information. Out of the 11 posts, 10 talked about veterans and their struggles, for 
example:  
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At least 50,000 homeless veterans are starving dying in the streets, but 
liberals want to invite 620,000 refugees and settle them among us. We 
have to take care of our own citizens, and it must be the primary goal for 
our politicians. 
This post was classified as “part real, part fake” because the information about 50,000 
homeless veterans was confirmed through multiple mainstream media articles (ABC 
News, 2015; Lawrence, 2015); however, the information about the 620,000 refugees 
was embellished. This post contrasted the desperate condition of American veterans 
with the supposedly more fortunate fate of refugees, and used the numbers that Donald 
Trump had cited in an attack on Hillary Clinton. These examples also demonstrate that 
the Being Patriotic page targeted White American conservatives from the Southern 
United States, tapping into their support for anti-immigration policies, while at the same 
time encouraging those White Americans to vote for Donald Trump in the election. 
Posts that were unclear or that presented insufficient information to determine 
whether they were real or fake were classified as “undetermined” (n = 8) (see Table 1, 
above). These posts could conceivably have represented a specific partisan stance, but 
due to the many links and images that had been deleted by the social media platforms, it 
was impossible to retrieve enough information about the original posts to make an 
accurate classification. It can be assumed that many of these posts included a link to a 
site, picture or a video. Examples of these included brief messages such as: “We won’t 
miss you here,” suggesting a place or an event, or simply asking the social media 
audience “do you agree?”, suggesting that there was an attached image or story.  
NVivo was used to identify the 10 words that appeared most frequently in these 
100 posts from the Facebook page, Being Patriotic. The most frequently mentioned word 
was “country,” appearing 30 times in the 100 posts (see Figure 2, below). Most of these 
posts portrayed America as a great country, and/or as a wonderful country. Some posts 
also attempted to create concern that illegal aliens and immigrants were going to vote 
illegally in the election, for example: 
Illegal aliens are criminals. Criminals, who broke the immigration laws. 
Criminals, who don't pay taxes, but YOU pay taxes to feed them. They have 
no right to be here, but they're already deciding our country's future by 
voting illegally! This has to stop!.  
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Figure 2 List of 10 Most Frequent Words for Being Patriotic Facebook Page 
Other words that appeared frequently in the messages included: “veterans” (n = 
25), “flag” (n = 24), “government” (n = 21), and “freedom” (n = 19) (see Figure 2, above). 
As mentioned previously, this page mainly focused on complaints regarding veterans not 
receiving proper treatment, using words like “country,” “flag,” “freedom” and “God” as 
sacred symbols that were intended to appeal to the reading audience. It also asked over 
and over again for the government to give priority to veterans, rather than to immigrants.  
4.1.2. Blacktivist 
 One hundred posts were randomly selected from the Blacktivist Facebook page 
for further analysis. The posts on the Blacktivist page can generally be categorized as 
either promoting a positive view of black culture, or as portraying a negative view of the 
illegal and discriminatory treatment of black Americans. Several posts urged the sharing 
of a video. This page mainly targeted the black audience, and was the third most visited  
Facebook page of all of the known IRA-sponsored Facebook pages, with over 11 million 
total engagements, and was reported to have the most reactions (1.4 million) (DiResta et 
al., 2018, p. 21). 
Similar to the Being Patriotic Facebook page, the majority of the posts in the 
Blacktivist page fell into the categories of “fake news” (60%) (see Table 2, below). The 
posts that were classified as “fake news” included inflammatory opinions and/or were 
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was made to code all the unsubstantiated opinion posts as “fake news.” Research has 
shown that these pages were sponsored by Russian IRA, and it was done to target 
American voters, with the intention of affecting voting behaviour. Out of those 60 posts 
classified as “fake news,” 36 posts were “anti-racist.” Anti-racist posts were either critical 
of racist groups, such as the Ku Klux Klan (KKK), or were positively oriented toward 
black culture. Posts that were positively oriented, presented black culture as beautiful, or 
something to be proud of, with a focus on style, hair, or family, the latter in particular 
consisting of messages about having “good” black parents. Examples of posts of this 
nature would include: “Be proud of your race, be proud of who you are. Have a pride and 
dignity,” and “Educate your children on black culture appropriation. #Blackisonfleek.” 
These posts were deemed to be “fake news” because they did not include any real news 
story, but rather, an opinion only. Also, it was known for a fact that the authors were not 
African-American, but rather, Internet trolls working from the IRA headquarters in St. 
Petersburg (Linvill & Warren, 2020; MacFarquhar, 2018), who likely knew nothing about 
the life experiences and/or culture of blacks in America. They were also poorly worded, 
seemed to be following a script that was presumably provided to them by their Russian 
employers, and consisted of nothing more than opinions or “feel-good” slogans. It seems 
that these Russian trolls and/or their handlers felt that American blacks would be 
attracted to a Facebook page that promoted ethnic pride and black culture. And if we 
accept that this was the third most visited of the IRA-generated Facebook pages, and 
the one that received the most reactions (see above), then it seems that the IRA may 
have been correct in this regard. 
Table 2 Classification and Angle of the Blacktivist Facebook Page 
Classification Frequency Percentage 
Fake News 60 60.0% 
Anti-Racist 36 36.0% 
Anti-Police 14 14.0% 
Undetermined 6 6.0% 
Anti-Government 4 4.0% 
Undetermined 28 28.0% 
Undetermined 19 19.0% 
Anti-Racist 9 9.0% 
Part Real, Part Fake 10 10.0% 
Anti-Police 6 6.0% 
Anti-Racist 4 4.0% 
Real News 2 2.0% 
Anti-Racist 2 2.0% 
Grand Total 100 100.0% 
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Of the 60 posts categorized as “fake news,” 14 were “anti-police.” Anti-police 
posts were far less variable than the anti-racist posts. Anti-police posts primarily 
consisted of news-based postings about specific incidents involving police use of force 
against black Americans, although in some cases, they made general statements about 
the danger that police posed to black children in particular, or made reference to the 
names of those who had been killed by police. One of these posts stated: “The number 
of black men killed by police is less than the number of American soldiers killed in 
Afghanistan from 2001-2015. Most of those black men killed were unarmed and shot 
while running away.” This “fact” was deemed to be made up, as there was no evidence 
found to support the above-mentioned statement. Government policies and how the 
American government acts in a racist manner toward black Americans was also 
discussed in the Blacktivist Facebook page. For example, one post asked: “Maybe the 
criminal justice system, from start to finish, is seriously racist? What if the government is 
blind and deaf?”  
Out of 100 Blacktivist posts that were analyzed in this present study, 10 were 
classified as “part real, part fake” (see Table 2, above). This occurred where some of the 
facts stated in the post were verifiable, but the post also included an interpretation or spun 
a story around the facts. This was possibly done to give a personal touch to the posts, or 
to make them seem more credible, for example:  
After the shooting, Korryn Gaines' 5-year-old son, Kodi, was shot and 
injured. The child was taken to the hospital, where he is making a recovery. 
While in the hospital, the child`s cousin recorded of Kodi discussing how 
the police entered his family house and shot first. So what are your thoughts 
on this? Do you trust cops now? I think police need to be fair with us but 
no! they are killing out kids.  
It became evident from the reading and coding of these posts that the underlying 
intention was either to create a sense of “otherness” in the black population, in order to 
foster division, or to instill fear of law enforcement authorities and the American criminal 
justice system, or possibly both. 
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Figure 3 List of 10 Most Frequent Words for Blacktivist Facebook Page 
Not surprisingly, “black” was the most frequently used word (n = 45) in the 100 
posts (see Figure 3, above). The second most frequently mentioned word was “police” (n 
= 31). Moreover, “cops” were also mentioned 14 times in the 100 posts. The term 
“police” and “cops” were used interchangeably in the Blacktivist Facebook page. As 
noted earlier, this page routinely posted about police brutality and police misconduct; 
therefore, it stands to reason that police and cops would appear in the list of most 
frequently used words. “White(s)” were also mentioned unfavorably 16 times in the 100 
posts, with discussions about white privilege and white power. Lastly, many posts asked 
the social media audience to watch a video or like a video; hence, the word “video” was 
mentioned 15 times in these 100 posts. While it was not possible to retrieve these 
videos, it is assumed that at least some of them portrayed “unjust” interactions between 
law enforcement officials and blacks.    
4.1.3. Secured Borders 
Secured Borders was another IRA-sponsored Facebook page that was analyzed 
in this study. This page focused mainly on appealing to the right-wing anti-immigration 
movement. Research by DiResta et al. (2018) found that this page had 2,126,061 
engagements and over one million “likes.”  
Most of the 100 posts sampled from Secured Borders (n = 78) again fell into the 
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news,” 67 were further categorized as being “pro-Trump.” These posts were either 
explicitly supportive of Donald Trump, or used language similar to that utilized by Trump, 
such as “drain the swamp,” or describing Mexican immigrants as “murderers and 
rapists,” and immigrants as “illegal/illegals” or as “aliens.” To illustrate, one post 
pronounced that: “Trump is not your president? Go to Mexico and try to protest there - 
and you'll see how patient and kind was President Trump to the ungrateful idiots like 
you.” Hillary Clinton was also mentioned in 4 out of the 78 “fake news” posts in the 
Secured Borders page. These posts portrayed Hillary as a criminal, a corrupt politician, 
and an inadequate leader. Hillary Clinton was also referred to as “Killary” in nine of the 
100 posts. Anti-Clinton related content also understandably reflected pro-Trump 
attitudes. The following example aptly illustrates both pro-Trump ideology and anti-
Clinton attitudes: 
US Marine veteran's plea to America: 'please do not put me or my fellow 
Marines at the mercy of the hands of Killary Clinton as our Commander-in-
Chief' We totally agree. As Commander in Chief Obama humiliated our 
military. His blatant acts of disrespect toward the military are unacceptable. 
Killary already promised that she will continue Obama's policy on many 
accounts, including the way she's going to handle matters regarding our 
veterans, police, army, etc. And it's clear that illegals and refugees are 
much more important for her than our troops. We don't need another anti-
American leftist-socialist as Commander-in-chief! Our military had suffered 
enough under Obama's regime! Do you agree? 
While Donald Trump was not specifically mentioned in this particular post, it was clear 
that the author was discouraging people from voting for Donald Trump’s opponent, 
“Killary” Clinton, and encouraging them to vote instead for Trump. 
Table 3 Classification and Angle of the Secured Borders Facebook Page 
Classification Frequency Percentage 
Fake News 78 78.0% 
Pro-Trump 67 67.0% 
Anti-Clinton 4 4.0% 
Undetermined 4 4.0% 
Racist 3 3.0% 
Part True, Part Fake 21 21.0% 
Pro-Trump 19 19.0% 
Anti-Clinton 1 1.0% 
Racist 1 1.0% 
Undetermined 1 1.0% 
Grand Total 100 100.0% 
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In total, 21 of the 100 posts from Secured Borders were classified as being “part 
real, part fake” (see Table 3, above). The general layout of the posts classified as “part 
real, part fake” involved the presentation of a real news story, followed by inflammatory 
opinion. An example of this is as follows: 
Guess what, friends? Illegal alien has voted for Dems in more than 20 
elections! Shirley Anne Conners, a Canadian woman living in 
Cheektowaga, has been in America, against the law, for decades. 
Moreover she voted for the Democratic Party throughout all these years. 
Finally, recently she was arrested for voter fraud. Since 1995, prosecutors 
say the woman who went by the last name Faragalli voted in more than 20 
federal, state and local elections. Most recently, Conners voted in the 
Democratic Presidential Primary this year. She could spend five years in 
prison if convicted of the charge. I personally think she should get 5 years 
for every time she voted illegally! I can’t help but think “how many illegals 
like her committed this voter fraud over the years? I still don’t believe 
Obama got all these votes legally. Hillary as well.These corrupt bastards 
(and in Obama’s case he’s literally a corrupt bastard) “how long they’ve 
been doing this? Did Bill Clinton similarly got his votes from dead people 
and illegals?? This is an outrage! Only US citizens should be allowed to 
vote!! Illegal aliens should not be rewarded with voting rights! 
Shirley Anne Conners was indeed a Canadian woman living in Cheektowaga who voted 
in 20 federal state and local elections under the name of “Shirley Anne Faragalli” 
(Department of Justice, 2016). However, this post largely included inflammatory 
discourse about “voter fraud,” “illegals,” and “illegal aliens,” with no other factual 
information that could be verified by a Google search.  
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Figure 4 List of 10 Most Frequent Words for Secured Borders Facebook Page 
For the Secured Borders page, words such as “illegals” (n = 157) and “aliens” (n 
= 57)  were mentioned most frequently in the 100 randomly sampled posts (see Figure 
4, above). As mentioned previously, 67 out of 78 posts classified as “fake news” 
included pro-Trump discourse about “draining the swamp,” about Mexicans as 
“murderers and rapists,” or about immigrants as “illegal/illegals” or “aliens.” Through the 
word frequency list, it was found that Donald Trump’s narrative was strongly supported 
by the postings on the Secured Borders page. Some of the other words that were 
included in the 100 posts were “immigration” (n = 67), “country” (n = 66), and “American” 
(n = 63). These words were used to instill fear of and distrust toward “racialized others,” 
and create division within the American populace.  
4.1.4. LGBT United 
The content of the LGBT United Facebook page was largely focused on left-
leaning political groups. In their study of this group, Renee et al. found that the LGBT 
United page had 3,344,331 engagements, and over one million shares (DiResta et al., 
2018, p. 21). 
Of the 100 LGBT United posts analyzed in this present study, 49 were classified 
as “fake news,” while 46 were classified as “undetermined” (see Table 4, below). Most of 
the posts within the dataset were very short, especially when they made use of non-
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textual media (for example, screenshots and images). Indeed, most of the posts on this 
page included the frequent use of non-textual media. There was also a surprising lack of 
political engagement or activism, with a focus on only one or two issues that were likely 
to be controversial or provocative. A very small number (n = 2) of the posts were actually 
based on verifiable, real-life events, and could therefore be classified with confidence as 
“real news.”  
“Fake news” posts typically consisted of a statement of opinion, without any 
provable (or refutable) claims, for example: “LGBT pride is not a sin. It is not something 
to be ashamed of, because it is a part of our nature. Homosexuality is a natural thing 
and occurs in nature pretty often,” or “We live in a world where punching the “shy guy's’ 
face would be considered the normal thing to do... But this is just common fucking 
courtesy!! Why is it so hard just to be nice??”  
Table 4 Classification and Angle of the LGBT United Facebook Page 
Classification Frequency Percentage 
Fake News 49 49.0% 
Pro-LGBT 42 42.0% 
Undetermined 6 6.0% 
Anti-Religious 1 1.0% 
Undetermined 46 46.0% 
Undetermined 23 23.0% 
Pro-LGBT 23 23.0% 
Part Real, Part Fake 3 3.0% 
Anti-Religious 2 2.0% 
Pro-LGBT 1 1.0% 
Real News 2 2.0% 
Grand Total 100 100.0% 
 
Only three of the 100 posts sampled from LGBT United were classified as “part 
real, part fake,” which meant that the post used some factual information, along with 
personal interpretation. The personal interpretation included an inflammatory opinion. All 
three of these “part real, part fake” posts recounted incidents of homophobia, and even 
violence, which could be construed as an attempt to instill fear within the LGBTQ 
community. The following post helps to illustrate this theme: 
Ignorance and Christan all go hand in hand... It's just so hard to fix stupid 
no matter how you try! Montana gay couple files bias complaint after losing 
foster child A couple in Montana is filing a discrimination suit after they say 
state social workers took their foster child away because they are gay, the 
Bozeman Daily Chronicle reports. "It seemed to us they really worked hard 
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to find somebody else to take him instead of leaving him with us, Joseph 
told the Chronicle. Montana's Department of Public Health and Human 
Services on Friday denied that its workers discriminated against the gay 
couple, noting that it has placed and continues to place foster children with 
same-sex couples. Yet they can place children in abusive foster homes and 
group homes with knowledge of the abuse. When are morons like this 
going to realize gay couple can and should be able to foster kids? With all 
the kids in the system you would think it would be great for a child to having 
loving parents. Gay or straight!! 
With respect to the angle, 68% of the posts were classified as “pro-LGBT,” in that 
they featured some sort of positive statement about the LGBTQ community, or some 
sort of negative statement about homophobia or prejudice in general. This was true even 
with many of the posts that were designated as “undetermined,” as there was still some 
indication of this general thrust within the small amount of text that was visible. 
Three of the posts were noteworthy because the angle was “anti-religious” (see 
Table 4, above). These anti-religious posts may serve double duty, in that they might 
lead conservative Christians to feel hostility toward the LGBTQ community. The three 
posts that exhibited anti-religious sentiment specifically targeted Christians, for example: 
“I often wonder why there are not more gay atheists, considering most major religions 
stand in opposition in homosexuality.”  
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The most commonly-used words in the LGBT United page were “gays” (n = 39), 
“people” (n = 24), “parents” (n = 22), “love” (n = 20) and “rights” (n = 14) (see Figure 5, 
above). Many of the posts in the LGBT United page were observed to be spreading 
positive messages about the LGBTQ community. Some of the posts talked about how 
members of the LGBTQ community must face up to people who do not understand 
them, and how they have to fight for their rights. An example of this would be:  
Sometimes I meet remarkably narrow minded people, who keep telling how 
"without us you wouldn't have any rights". But they're wrong. So my reply 
is: without you we wouldn't have to fight for these rights you enjoy all your 
life.  
The apolitical nature of most of the posts found on the LQBT United page, and 
the seeming “disconnect” from the actual lived experiences of members of the LGBTQ 
community in America, could possibly be explained by the fact that these messages 
were posted by Internet trolls from Russia, a country where there are no “gay rights,” 
and where it would thus be difficult to recruit authors who were familiar with LGBTQ 
culture and/or LGBTQ concerns. It could be said that the LGBT United Facebook page 
was a failed experiment in social engineering.         
4.1.5. United Muslims of America 
The Facebook page United Muslims of America was targeting a left-leaning 
audience (DiResta et al., 2018). Most of the posts were about religion and pride, 
demanding respect, and seeking to distance the Muslim faith from terrorism and ISIS. 
The total engagements on this page were 3,933,223, with around two million likes 
(DiResta et al., 2018, p. 21).   
The majority of the posts on United Muslims of America were classified as “fake 
news” (n = 57) (see Table 5, below), indicating that the post consisted of a statement of 
opinion, made up by an Internet troll working with the Russian IRA, rather than a 
provable (or refutable) claim, for example: “You can be Anyone from Anywhere BUT IN 
ISLAM WE ARE ALL THE SAME!.” Of these “fake news” messages, 45 posts were 
broadly “anti-racist” in angle, as seen in this statement: “We are Americans, We are 
Muslims, We are successful in our society....And no, we are not terrorists !!!.”  
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Table 5 Classification and Angle of the United Muslims of America Facebook 
Page 
Classification Frequency Percentage 
Fake News 57 57.0% 
Anti-Racist 45 45.0% 
Undetermined 11 11.0% 
Anti-Trump 1 1.0% 
Undetermined 37 37.0% 
Undetermined 29 29.0% 
Anti-Racist 8 8.0% 
Real News 3 3.0% 
Anti-Racist 3 3.0% 
Part Real, Part Fake 3 3.0% 
Anti-Racist 3 3.0% 
Grand Total 100 100.0% 
 
Of the 100 posts, only three were classified as “part real, part fake,” in that they 
featured an element of provable truth, such as a news story, but also had further 
commentary or claims added. The following post, for instance, referred to the 2015 
murder of three Muslim students in Chapel Hill, North Carolina: “The guy in the picture is 
an atheist, he shot and murdered three Muslim young students few years ago. yet no 
one called him a terrorist.” Likewise, only 3 of the 100 posts were classified as “real 
news,” and those that were classified as such involved only the simple sharing of a news 
story. 
It became evident from the reading and coding of the posts on United Muslims of 
America that the underlying intention was to create a sense of “otherness” in the Muslim 
population, in order to foster division in American society. While the posts attempted to 
boost Muslim pride, they also emphasized the prevalence of racist attitudes toward 
people of the Muslim faith, the stereotypical portrayal of Muslims as “terrorists,” and the 
dangers that Muslims faced from non-Muslims.    
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Figure 6 List of 10 Most Frequent Words for United Muslims of America 
Facebook Page 
The words that appeared most frequently in the United Muslims of American 
page included “Muslims” (n = 40), “share” (n = 24), “Islam” (n = 16), “terrorists” (n = 10) 
and  “Americans” (n = 9) (see Figure 6, above). All of the posts that included the word 
“terrorists” were observed to be arguing that Muslims were not terrorists, as illustrated by 
this post: “Terrorists are not Muslims and Muslims are not Terrorists. Like and Share if 
you agree!.” The frequent use of the word “share” was likely intended to amplify the 
message itself, and to draw more followers to the United Muslims of American page.  
4.2. Disinformation on Twitter in 2016 
Initially, a dataset of 2,946,219 Twitter messages (tweets) from git.hub was 
downloaded from another website, fivethirtyeight.com. These tweets were described as 
originating from the Russian Internet Research Agency (Boatwright, Linvill & Warren, 
2018), Only “English” language tweets (n = 2,500) were retained for analysis. These 
tweets were posted between December 2014 and August 2017, which encompassed the 
peak period of IRA activity in the run-up to, during and following the 2016 U.S. 
presidential election. 
In total, 500 tweets (out of a total of 2,500 previously randomly sampled English-
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Facebook, the Twitter dataset was not separated into different pages, hashtags, and 
account names. Therefore, it was analyzed as one large, uniform dataset.  
 
Figure 7 Breakdown of each Twitter Account Type 
These Russian IRA tweets were coming mainly from four different and 
distinguishable types of troll accounts: Right troll (n = 206), Left troll (n 153), News Feed 
(n = 87) and HashtagGamer (n = 48) (see Figure 7, above). Right troll accounts mostly 
posted pro-Trump (n = 112, 22.4%) and anti-Clinton (n = 39, 7.8%) tweets (see Table 6, 
below). Left troll accounts posted more anti-racist (n = 53, 10.6%) and apolitical chatter 
(n = 44, 8.8%) tweets. Newsfeed accounts (n = 87) posted the local news, which were 
mainly anti-Trump (n = 34), apolitical chatter (n = 31), anti-racist (n = 10), anti-Clinton (n 
= 8), and only 3 pro-Trump tweets. Newsfeed account tweets used real news stories 
about death, horrific crimes and natural disasters, to draw attention, make the general 
populace more concerned about their safety and well-being, and to “rile up” Trump’s 
voter base (Badawy et al., 2018; Cartwright, Weir, Frank, et al., 2019; Mueller, 2019; 
Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2017; Shao et al., 2018; Zannettou et al., 
2019). Lastly, HashtagGamer accounts regularly played hashtag games, with a 
substantial amount of retweeting2 coming from these accounts. An assumption was 
made that it was done to make the posts and hashtags trend on Twitter, with the 
expectation of gaining a larger audience.   
 
2 Retweeting the same information multiple times to evoke any number of responses. It includes, 
tagging other users, and asking them to do the same with their groups of friends on social media 
outlets. These tweets include different hashtags that would be retweeted multiple times to make 
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Table 6 Types of Account and Angle of the Tweets 
Classification Frequency Percentage 
Right Troll 206 41.2% 
Pro-Trump 112 22.4% 
Anti-Clinton 39 7.8% 
Apolitical Chatter 25 5.0% 
Anti-Trump 17 3.4% 
Anti-Racist 13 2.6% 
Left Troll 153 30.6% 
Anti-Racist 53 10.6% 
Apolitical Chatter 44 8.8% 
Anti-Clinton 33 6.6% 
Anti-Trump 16 3.2% 
Pro-Trump 7 1.4% 
News Feed 87 17.4% 
Anti-Trump 34 6.8% 
Apolitical Chatter 31 6.2% 
Anti-Racist 10 2.0% 
Anti-Clinton 9 1.8% 
Pro-Trump 3 0.6% 
HashtagGamer 48 9.6% 
Anti-Clinton 22 4.4% 
Pro-Trump 20 4.0% 
Apolitical Chatter 3 0.6% 
Anti-Racist 2 0.4% 
Anti-Trump 1 0.2% 
Other 6 1.2% 
Grand Total 500 100.0% 
 
If none of the legitimate news sources discussed the content or the so-called 
“news” contained in the message, or if legitimate news sources made statements 
refuting the accuracy of the messaging, then the post was classified as “fake news” (n = 
311, 62.2%) (see Table 7, below). Out of 311 tweets, 135 were classified as “pro-Trump” 
and 79 tweets were classified as “anti-Clinton.” Moreover, 59 tweets consisted of fake 
news which could best be described as “apolitical chatter.” Tweets classified as 
“apolitical chatter” did not appear to be re-circulating “real news,” either to targeted or 
untargeted audiences. Moreover, these tweets appeared to be neutral, in the sense that 
they did not support the candidacy of either Donald Trump or Hillary Clinton.  
Out of 500 IRA tweets sampled, many of them were grounded in “real news” 
events, and thus, ended up being classified as “real news.” These “real news” tweets 
accounted for 33.6% (n = 168) of the dataset (see Table 7, below). Out of 168 tweets, 46 
were “apolitical chatter” that appeared to be re-circulating “real news.” The majority of 
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these posts were word-for-word headlines that were taken directly from mainstream 
news media sites, and often included links leading to different sites. Most of the links 
were not retrievable, as they had been taken down by the social media platform.  
Table 7 Classification and Angle of the Tweets 
Classification Frequency Percentage 
Fake News 311 62.2% 
Pro-Trump 135 27.0% 
Anti-Clinton 79 15.8% 
Apolitical Chatter 59 11.8% 
Anti-Racist 38 7.6% 
Real News 168 33.6% 
Anti-Trump 68 13.6% 
Apolitical Chatter 46 9.2% 
Anti-Racist 34 6.8% 
Anti-Clinton 20 4.0% 
Part Real, Part Fake 19 3.8% 
Pro-Trump 8 1.6% 
Anti-Clinton 6 1.2% 
Anti-Racist 5 1.0% 
Undetermined 2 0.4% 
Anti-Racist 2 0.4% 
Grand Total 500 100.0% 
 
There are number of possible explanations when trying to account for the 
presence of so much apolitical chatter and copying and pasting of headlines from other 
news sites. These tweets could be coming from automated (bot) accounts and not from 
a real person. If these tweets were to come from Russian trolls hired by the IRA, then 
this tactic may have allowed them to mask their lack of fluency in the English language. 
Another possible explanation is that these tweets could have been intended as “hiss” or 
“background noise,” designed to mask the true motivation behind this otherwise sinister 
online activity. 
Posts in the “pro-Trump” and “anti-Clinton” categories could conceivably have 
fallen into either or both categories, especially the “anti-Clinton” tweets that were posted 
after the election, which in the final analysis ended up being classified under the “pro-
Trump” category. An example of this would be the post: “REMINDER VIDEO : It’s 
HILLARY that has the KKK Mentor! #maga #trumptrain.” This post included a link that 
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led to the “truthfeed”3 website. The YouTube video from this website had been taken 
down, but the written article was still available. This tweet was posted in August 2017, 
after the 2016 U.S. presidential election; therefore, it was classified as “fake news,” 
under the “pro-Trump” category, partly because Hillary was no longer a factor, and partly 
because it explicitly featured Donald Trump’s MAGA (Make America Great Again) 
slogan.   
Tweets that were grounded in real news, but included some information that was 
not real and that had been added in order to amplify the interactions on social media 
were categorized as “part real, part fake” (n = 19) (see Table 7, above). Out of these 19 
tweets, “pro-Trump” tweets were the most prevalent (n = 8) in this category. An example 
of this would be the tweet: “Judge Blocks Trump Order cause "immigrants built 
America." Yeah, but some of these immigrants actually want to destroy it.” The first 
statement about the judge blocking Trump’s order was confirmed through The New York 
Times (Shear, Kulish, & Feuer, 2017); however, the rest of the post was deemed to be 
“fake news,” as it consisted of unsubstantiated, anti-immigrant opinion. 
There were 79 tweets (6.08%) that deliberately used fake news to undermine 
Clinton’s chances for the presidency. These were classified as “anti-Clinton,” under the 
“fake news” category. Most (n = 43) of these tweets were coming from Right-leaning 
trolls accounts (see Table 6, above). To illustrate, one tweet said that “When she cut 
welfare she called welfare recipients 'deadbeats.' Hillary Clinton is straight up evil,” while 
another said: “#ThingsMoreTrustedThanHillary Jeffrey Dahmer [American serial killer] 
with a knife.” This was evidently some time after the 2016 presidential campaign, but it 
has been widely reported that the Russian IRA carried on with its “pro-Trump” and “anti-
Clinton” discourse throughout 2017 and 2018 (Nakashima, 2019; Starks et al., 2019). 
 
3Truthfeed is a website known for publishing false and exaggerated stories with pro-Trump 




Figure 8 List of 10 Most Frequent Words of Tweets 
As might be expected, “Trump” was the most frequent word in these tweets (n = 
79), while the next was “Hillary” (n = 39) (see Figure 8, above). The name “Clinton” was 
mentioned 28 times, which not only included Hillary Clinton, but also included mentions 
of Bill Clinton. “Blacks” were mentioned 26 times in the 500 tweets. Moreover, “Obama” 
was mentioned 36 times, for example: “#ThanksObama for legitimaizing hateful groups, 
especially those racist Black life matter thugs.”  
4.3. Conclusion 
Overall, the findings of the qualitative textual analysis of the 500 messages that 
appeared in the set of 2,500 randomly sampled disinformation campaign tweets posted 
by the Russian Internet Research Agency strongly support the oft-reported conclusion 
that these Twitter feeds were intended to help the presidential campaign of Donald 
Trump, and to stoke dissension, distrust, anger and fear among American voters (Allcott 
& Gentzkow, 2017; Badawy, Ferrara, & Lerman, 2018; Mueller, 2019; Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence, 2017; United States v. Internet Research Agency LLC, 
2018).  
The analysis of both social media platforms suggested that the majority of the 
posts were fake news, and that there were multiple angles through which these posts 
attempted to target specific populations. The Facebook pages Being Patriotic and 
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Muslims of Americans, on the other hand, concentrated on anti-racist posts (at the same 
time attempting to instill fear of and hostility toward Whites among the Black populace). 
Last of all, the LGBT United Facebook page posted pro-LGBT and anti-religious 
messaging. The IRA-generated Twitter tweets exhibited similar patterns and themes to 
those of the IRA-sponsored Facebook groups. Analysis indicated that most of the tweets 
were fake news, and that the angle of those tweets were by-in-large pro-Trump. In 
addition, the 10 most frequently appearing words provided insight into the language that 
each Facebook group and Twitter feed employed in their posts in order to micro-target 
social media users.  
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Chapter 5.  
 
Result B: 2019/2020 Impeachment Inquiry and Trial 
This chapter sets out the findings of the qualitative content analysis of the social 
media messaging during the 2019/2020 impeachment inquiry and trial of U.S. President 
Donald Trump. This chapter begins with the findings from five different Facebook pages 
which were identified as sources of fake news by Media Bias/Fact Check website. The 
next part of the chapter discusses the findings from five different hashtags that were 
trending on Twitter during the impeachment inquiry and trial of Donald Trump. As was 
the case with chapter 4, this chapter relies on quotes as well as rich description to 
convey the nature of these findings in as thorough and transparent manner as possible. 
Moreover, the 10 most frequent words generated in NVivo’s word frequency query for 
each dataset are discussed, to explore the language that was employed in the 
messages in their effort to micro-target social media users.  
5.1. Disinformation on Facebook in 2019/2020 
A qualitative content analysis was conducted on 100 randomly selected posts 
from each of five Facebook pages: American Thinker, Council of American-Islamic 
Relations (CAIR), Godfather Politics, United American Patriots and Wallbuilders. All of 
these pages were considered to come from questionable sources, identified as such by 
the Media Bias/Fact Check website. All the posts from each of the five pages were 
randomized, and the first 100 of those randomized posts were selected for this study. 
These randomly selected posts were read and analyzed in Excel and NVivo. 
5.1.1. American Thinker 
For the current study, 100 posts were chosen randomly out of 785 posts from the 
American Thinker Facebook page. As previously mentioned, these posts were analyzed 
in NVivo and Excel. This page was designated as “questionable” by the Media Bias/Fact 
Check (MBFC) website because it had failed multiple fact checks and was using poor 
sources to back up its posts. MBFC also found that this page posted messages with an 
extreme right-wing bias, and often promoted conspiracy theories (Media Bias/Fact 
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Check, 2020). As of May 2020, 141,301 people liked this page and 141,431 people 
followed this page. 
Out of the 100 posts sampled from American Thinker, 69 were as “fake news” 
(see Table 8, below). These posts featured inflammatory opinions and blatant lies, 
without referencing any credible source. Out of those 69 “fake news” posts, 34 were 
categorized as “anti-Democrat.” These posts exhibited clear disdain for the Democratic 
party’s ideology and also attacked Democratic party leaders. To illustrate, a post from 
American Thinker proclaimed: “One of the standard jokes about Chicago politics is that a 
lot of people who voted Republican during their lives start voting Democrat after their 
deaths. Voting integrity group finds millions of inactive registrations.” Eleven of the posts 
portrayed the impeachment inquiry and trial against Donald Trump as a charade created 
by Democrats in order to get more votes in the upcoming 2020 presidential election. One 
such post stated that:  
In many ways, the Democrats have accomplished their goals. First, they 
got to use the word ‘impeachment’ even though it was really only an inquiry. 
Second, they didn't force the moderates into voting yes or no. I am betting 
no on a formal impeachment. 
Nancy Pelosi, the Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, also came under 
attack in many of the posts, for example: “So, I ask Ms. Pelosi: What contents of 
President Trump’s SOTU 2020 were so objectionable? Time for classless, clueless 
Pelosi to go.”  
Fifteen of these 69 “fake news” posts were classified as “pro-Trump” (see Table 
8, below). These posts supported Trump’s narrative and advocated for a finding of 
innocence in the impeachment inquiry and trial. One example of this might be: 
Volodymyr Zelensky [the President of the Ukraine] was wiping his face from 
the crumbs of a 125-million-dollar meal, fed to him by the Pentagon 
between March and July of 2019, when he spoke to President Trump on 
July 25. President Trump Never Impounded Even One Dollar from Ukraine 
Aid. 
Another example would be:  
I wasn't at all surprised when President Trump told Fox & Friends 
yesterday, ‘I want a trial.’ I’ve long believed that it could offer the perfect 
opportunity to turn over the boulder of the Deep State…conspiracy to 
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hobble his election and presidency and examine the creepy-crawlies that 
scramble in the light of day. 
Some of these posts on the American Thinker page were blatantly showing support for 
Trump, and arguing that the impeachment inquiry and trial were part of a conspiracy by 
the Democratic party, deliberately designed to thwart Donald Trump.  
Table 8 Classification and Angle of the American Thinker Facebook Page 
Classification Frequency Percentage 
Fake News 69 69.0% 
Anti-Democrat 34 34.0% 
Pro-Trump 15 15.0% 
Anti-Media 7 7.0% 
Racist 7 7.0% 
Anti-LGBTQ 3 3.0% 
Undetermined 3 3.0% 
Part Real, Part Fake 24 24.0% 
Anti-Democrat  11 11.0% 
Undetermined 7 7.0% 
Pro-Trump 4 4.0% 
Racist 2 2.0% 
Undetermined 4 4.0% 
Real News 3 3.0% 
Pro-Trump 2 2.0% 
Pro-Democrat 1 1.0% 
Grand Total 100 100.0% 
 
As discussed in the literature review (Chapter 2), Donald Trump has often 
exhibited hostility toward and distrust of the mainstream media. He refers to them as 
“lamestream” media and “fake news” because their reporting does not align with his own 
narratives. In total, 7 out of the 69 fake news posts (see Table 8, above) on the 
American Thinker page supported Donald Trump’s characterizations of mainstream 
media. One post read: “As usual, fake news media ignored a Democrat irresponsibly 
throwing a racial-hate-generating grenade into a crowd of blacks. Biden Throws Blacks 
Another Racist Dog Biscuit.” It was not only the Democrats who were attacked in these 
posts, but also, mainstream media, especially when it came to the level of credibility that 
these platforms held. Additionally, 7 out of 69 posts were “racist” in nature. These also 
aligned with Trump’s ban on Muslim travel, or his characterization of Mexicans as drug 
traffickers and rapists, or his insistence of building a border wall. For example, one post 
asked: 
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Just how extreme is the bill? It does away with all border enforcement, 
stops the deportation of immigrants who have engaged in serious felonies 
or acts of moral turpitude, and allows immigration judges to…step in and 
oversee federal criminal trials. The most shocking thing, though, is that, 
when it comes to criminals already deported over the last twenty years for 
serious felonies or acts of moral turpitude, the bill requires that American 
taxpayers pay the billion or so dollars needed to bring all 480,000 of them 
back to America. House Democrats work to open America's doors to 
criminal foreigners (posted on February 02, 2020). 
Lastly, 3 out of 69 posts were classified as “anti-LGBTQ.” These posts were 
denigrating individuals of the LGBTQ community and their life-choices. One post asked: 
“Why have so many decided that the solution for children — children! — suffering from 
gender delusions is disfiguring surgeries and dangerous hormone treatments? The 
'Transgender' Endgame.” In addition, these posts tried to portray members of the  
LGBTQ community as bad, and to demonstrate that the LGBTQ community did not 
comply with “Christian” values, for example: “Drag queens, the men who dress as 
sexualized women to outdo them with such irony, are showing some impressive male 
aggressiveness against the Christians who oppose them.” 
Out of 100 posts, 24 were classified as “part real, part fake.” These posts 
included some information that was real and could be cross-verified on mainstream 
media sites through a Google search. Nonetheless, these same posts included 
inflammatory opinion and used questionable sources, for example:  
This will not be the first time an anxious military accidentally shot down a 
non-threatening commercial aircraft. On July 17, 1996, a comparable 
missile strike destroyed TWA 800 off the coast of Long Island…shortly after 
the Boeing 747 took off from JFK. Ukrainian 752 Shoot-Down Mirrors Fate 
of TWA 800.  
The post commences with an unsubstantiated opinion and then reports on some factual 




Figure 9 List of 10 Most Frequent Words for American Thinker Facebook 
Page 
Lastly, the 10 most frequent words in the dataset were generated using NVivo’s 
word frequency query. These words assisted in understanding the overall thrust of the 
discourse used in these posts in their effort to target specific social media users. First 
and foremost, “Democrats” (n = 28) was the most mentioned word in the 100 posts (see 
Figure 9, above). Moreover, words such as “Trump” (25 times) and “president” (20 
times) appeared quite routinely in the 100 randomly-sampled posts. Most of the posts 
attacked the Democrats and supported Trump and his policies. Lastly, the word 
“impeachment” was mentioned 18 times, while “political” was mentioned 10 times. 
Impeachment and negative discourse about politics often went hand-in-hand, where 
impeachment was referred to as “political disaster,” or a “political sham” orchestrated by 
the Democrats against the President. 
5.1.2. Council on American-Islamic Relations 
Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) has been identified as a 
questionable source by the MBFC website. CAIR has faced many allegations and 
criticisms over a lengthy period of time. In 2014, the United Arab Emirates designated 
CAIR as a terrorist organization, due to its alleged ties to the Muslim Brotherhood (Media 
Bias/Fact Check, 2020; UAE, 2014). Also, many academics have accused CAIR of 
being an American affiliate of the Muslim Brotherhood (Merley, 2009). That said, the 
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Overall, this page uses questionable sources to support its posts, and is considered to 
be right-center biased (Media Bias Fact Check, 2020). The CAIR Facebook page had 
138,990 likes and 138,057 followers as of May 2020.  
An analysis of 100 posts randomly selected out of 733 posts taken from the CAIR 
Facebook page showed that slightly more than half of them (n = 56) included 
inflammatory opinion alongside some real news context (see Table 9, below). These 
posts were classified during content analysis as “part real, part fake.” Of those 56 posts, 
40 were “anti-racist” in perspective, many of them discussing how Muslims should be 
treated more equitably in America. These posts argued that Muslims were being treated 
unfairly in the U.S., but at the same time, claimed that CAIR was there to support them 
through their hard times. Many of these posts tapped into the issues of insensitivity 
toward the Hijab and the treatment that Muslim workers purportedly receive in the 
workplace, for example, “Columbus Police may reconsider hijab ban Shortly after that 
recruit left the academy, the Ohio chapter of the Council on American-Islamic Relations 
filed an employment discrimination complaint.” Another post on the same subject said 
that:  
Soon after the incident, Coleman connected with the DFW chapter Council 
for American-Islamic Relations. “Asking a Muslim woman to take off her 
hijab would be like asking another lady to take off her shirt in…public,” said 
Faizan Syed, Executive Director of CAIR. “It really was like either you 
undress at work or you go home.” Syed said an attorney representing 
Chicken Express reached out to the organization. He says he hopes to 
partner with Chicken Express for diversity training. “What can be done to 
make sure that people like Ms. Coleman can go to work, feel safe, feel 
welcomed at their business?” said Syed. Fast-Food Manager Reprimanded 
for Sending Worker Home for Wearing a Hijab.  
Of the 56 posts from the CAIR Facebook page that were categorized as “part 
real, part fake,” the angle of two of them could best be described as “anti-Trump” (see 
Table 9, below). These posts referred Trump’s policies as being dangerous and cruel 
toward immigrant people, to illustrate:  
I have come to realize that I was clueless as to how far an administration 
might actually go in furthering Israel’s narrative at the expense of 
Palestinians — and how much they could undermine U.S. interests in the 
process. I'm a veteran Middle East peace negotiator. Trump's plan is the 
most dangerous I've ever seen. 
Another example would be: 
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CAIR "issued the following written statement late Monday: ‘The Supreme 
Court’s decision will further marginalize immigrant communities and will 
inevitably create a socioeconomic hierarchy in our immigration…system. 
The Trump administration’s policy could quite literally kill people by making 
them too afraid to seek life-saving medical care, and the Supreme Court 
seems to agree such a cruel system is acceptable.’ Local immigration 
advocates speak on SCOTUS "public charge" ruling.  
Table 9 Classification and Angle of the CAIR Facebook Page 
Classification Frequency Percentage 
Part Real, Part Fake 56 56.0% 
Anti-Racist 53 53.0% 
Anti-Trump 2 2.0% 
Anti-Police 1 1.0% 
Real News 31 31.0% 
Anti-Racist 24 24.0% 
Racist 3 3.0% 
Undetermined 3 3.0% 
Anti-Trump 1 1.0% 
Fake News 13 13.0% 
Anti-Racist 5 5.0% 
Undetermined 5 5.0% 
Anti-Trump 2 2.0% 
Racist 1 1.0% 
Grand Total 100 100.0% 
 
Out of the 100 posts randomly selected for content analysis, 13 were classified 
as “fake news.” These posts lacked verifiable information, and mostly asked people to 
join an event, talk, or attend conferences sponsored by CAIR, for example, “Show Up In 
Court & At Rally Against the Muslim Ban,” or “Watch: Islam in 90: What’s the deal with 
Jihad?” One post (out of 13 classified as “fake news”) expressed great concern about 
Trump’s immigration ban, but it was too broad to be considered “real news” or “part real, 
part fake.” Therefore, it was coded as “fake news,” while the angle of post was classified 
as “anti-Trump”:  
We long worried that what Donald Trump could do to one community, he 
could then also do to others. Today’s new expanded Ban proves this fear 
true. In addition to banning even more Muslim countries, 
this…administration has gone further, banning immigrants from even more 
nations. We call on members of Congress to act now to support the current, 
comprehensive version of the No Ban Act and move to reign in the 
President’s bigoted immigration agenda immediately. Enough is enough. 
No Muslim Ban Ever Coalition Condemns Trump Administration’s 
Expanded Muslim Ban. 
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Figure 10 List of 10 Most Frequent Words for CAIR Facebook Page 
According to the 10 most frequent words generated in NVivo for the posts 
sampled from the CAIR Facebook page, “CAIR” was mentioned 106 times (see Figure 
10, above). As this page is about Muslims, the word “Muslims” understandably appeared 
103 times in the 100 posts. As mentioned above, all of the posts argued that the Council 
on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) was there to support their fellow Muslims, thus 
words such as “American,” “Islamic,” “Council” and “Relations” appeared regularly in the 
10 most frequent words list (n = 54, 53, 45 and 40 respectively). Lastly, CAIR also 
provides extensive coverage of Muslim Americans and their “rights” (n = 33) on its 
Facebook page.  
Overall, the CAIR Facebook page mostly included “part real, part fake” posts, 
and only 13 “fake news” posts. This page is still considered to be a questionable source 
by the Media Bias/Fact Check website. All of the “part real, part fake” posts featured 
opinion which included advertisements of the CAIR website, with very little factual 
information. In future, however, it would be beneficial to analyze more posts from this 
page, before designating it as a fake news source.   
5.1.3. Godfather Politics 
The Godfather Politics Facebook page is considered to be questionable/fake 
based on the observation that posts on this page strongly favour right-wing groups while 


























10 Most Frequent Words
70 
“over-the-top use of loaded language in headlines,” the routine publication of conspiracy 
theories, and the promotion of propaganda against left-leaning groups (Media Bias/Fact 
Check, 2020). As of May 2020, the Godfather Politics Facebook page had 21,532 likes 
and 20,649 followers.  
For the current study,100 posts were randomly selected out of 670 posts 
harvested from the Godfather Politics Facebook page during the impeachment inquiry 
and trial (September 2019 to February 2020). The majority of these posts (70%) were 
categorized as “fake news” (see Table 10, below). These posts used extreme right-wing 
sources (i.e., The Washington Sentinel, Freedom Outpost, and The Republican Legion) 
and included incendiary opinion. The analysis of these 100 posts produced similar 
findings to that of the American Thinker Facebook page, in that 27 out of 70 posts were 
“anti-Democrat” and 26 were “pro-Trump” in perspective. Posts in the “anti-Democrat” 
category featured advertisements of propaganda such as: “Get Your Making Liberals 
Cry Again T-Shirt. Making Liberals Cry Again T-Shirt (Made in the USA).” The “anti-
Democrat” category also included negative messaging about Joe Biden, Trump’s rival in 
the 2020 U.S. presidential election. Examples of these anti-Biden posts included: “How 
Did Five of Joe Biden’s Family Members Become Millionaires from His Political 
Career?,” and “Did someone wake ‘Sleepy Joe?’.”  
The “pro-Trump” category included multiple posts that supported Trump’s own 
narrative, advanced pro-Trump propaganda, and/or asked social media users to vote for 
Trump in the upcoming 2020 presidential election. Examples of such posts would 
include: “Twitter Blacks Out Trump Campaign Video Because it is Pro-Life ⋆ The 
Washington Sentinel,” and 
The TRUMPinator 2020 Limited Edition Print. The Trumpinator is here and 
he’s melting snowflakes. Despite liberal temper tantrums, Trump is coming 
back in 2020 to usher in the #RedWave. Are you with us? #Trump … #2020 
#GOP #TrumpTrain #MAGA #GOP #KAG2020. 
There were 10 posts that made explicitly racist remarks, and were thus coded as 
“racist” (see Table 10, below). Most of these posts also supported Trump’s political 
messaging about “building the wall” and illegal immigrants. Examples of this would 
include: “Build The Damn Wall Men’s T-Shirt Only $14.95,” and “Our country can’t afford 
judges who refuse to uphold our laws. How A Massachusetts Judge Allegedly Helped An 
Illegal Alien Escape ICE.” “Anti-media” posts (n = 3) and “anti-LGBTQ” posts (n = 2) 
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were also found in the 100 messages sampled from the Godfather Politics Facebook 
page. On multiple occasions, Trump has been observed referring to CNN as “fake news” 
(Schwartz, 2018). Similar characterizations of CNN were found on the Godfather Politics 
page. Indeed, some of the references to CNN found on the Godfather Politics page 
sounded a lot like the utterances of Donald Trump: “Isn’t it weird CNN hasn’t said 
anything about this yet? Illegal Alien Who Avoided Deportation Allegedly Murdered 22 
Elderly People,” and “This in spite of the constant mainstream media attacking President 
Trump. President Trump's Approval Rating Hits Post-Impeachment High.” As well, 
attacks on left-wing groups were evidenced in “anti-LGBTQ” posts such as: “Left-Wing 
Medical Journal Claims Parents Who Won’t Allow Transgender Treatments are Child 
Abusers,” and “Leftist Court Forces Professor to Use Transgender Pronouns in Class.”  
Table 10 Classification and Angle of the Godfather Politics Facebook Page 
Classification Frequency Percentage 
Fake News 70 70.0% 
Anti-Democrat 27 27.0% 
Pro-Trump 26 26.0% 
Racist 10 10.0% 
Anti-Media 3 3.0% 
Undetermined 2 2.0% 
Anti-LGBTQ 2 2.0% 
Part Real, Part Fake 17 17.0% 
Pro-Trump 9 9.0% 
Anti-Democrat 5 5.0% 
Undetermined 3 3.0% 
Real News 8 8.0% 
Racist 3 3.0% 
Undetermined 2 2.0% 
Anti-Media 1 1.0% 
Anti-Democrat 1 1.0% 
Anti-Trump 1 1.0% 
Undetermined 5 5.0% 
Grand Total 100 100.0% 
 
Seventeen out of the 100 posts sampled from the Godfather Politics Facebook 
page included partial information that was factual, but also included opinions that were 
intended to enflame or incite reaction, and were thus classified as “part real, part fake” 
(see Table 10, above). It is important to note that these posts also relied upon 
questionable sources, although some of the stories were reported by credible media 
sources. An example of this would be: “That's why we all voted for Trump! Ohio: Two 
Lifelong Democrats Tell Why They’ll Vote For Trump Again In 2020.” This claim was 
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supported in recent polls conducted by The New York Times Upshot and Siena College, 
which found that “Two-thirds of battleground state voters who chose Trump in 2016 but 
selected Democrats in the midterms say they will return to the president next year” 
(Cohn & Miller, 2019). 
 
Figure 11 List of 10 Most Frequent Words for Godfather Politics Facebook 
Page 
According to the NVivo’s word frequency query on the 100  posts sampled from 
the Godfather Politics page, “Trump” (n = 56), “shirt” (n = 12), “president” (n = 12), 
“2020” (n = 10), “Donald” (n = 8), and “#MAGA” (n = 6) were at the top of the 10 most 
mentioned words (see Figure 11, above). As seen in the above analysis, most of these 
posts were “pro-Trump,” and described him as being a great president. These posts also 
asked social media users to vote for Trump in the upcoming 2020 election. Moreover, 
advertisements of shirts were usually posted as a way of promoting Trump and his 
political agenda, examples including, “Trump 45 Suck It Up Snowflake Patriotic T-Shirt” 
or “Build The Damn Wall Men’s T-Shirt Only $14.95.” On the other hand, “Democrats” 
were mentioned 11 times, but in order to degrade them. In all, 32 out of 100 posts were 
classified as “anti-Democrat” (see Table 10, above). 
5.1.4. United American Patriots 
For the current study, 100 randomly selected posts (out of 599) from the United 
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been described as fake/questionable, based on the extreme right-wing bias of its 
reporting. This page routinely posts un-sourced, “loaded language” and disinformation 
(especially, conspiracy theories about the Democrats and other groups perceived as 
being “left wing”), with an eye to deceiving social media users into believing those 
fabricated stories (Media Bias/Fact Check, 2020). As of May 2020, the United American 
Patriots Facebook page had 1,059,465 likes and 1,047,864 followers. 
Most of the posts in this group (n = 82) were categorized as “fake news” (see 
Table 11, below). These posts used questionable sources (e.g, Patriot Journal, and 
gopdailybrief), and some of them included provocative opinion. Out of 82 “fake news” 
posts, 52 were categorized as “anti-Democrat.” The “anti-Democrat” posts routinely 
attacked the Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, Nancy Pelosi, and U.S 
Congressman, Adam Schiff, who led the impeachment inquiry. Examples of posts that 
attacked the House Speaker and Adam Schiff include: “Prosecutor Pulls Back Pelosi's 
Curtain - Claims Nancy Will Most Likely Abandon Her Crusade For Impeachment,” and 
“Schiff's Impeachment Witness Is In Trouble - Her Emails Show She May Have Given 
False Testimony.” A few of the posts also attacked Donald Trump’s rival in the 2020 U.S. 
presidential election, former Vice-President Joe Biden. An example of a post that 
attacked the former Vice-President is: “Joe Biden Slips Up On Live TV Rally - Tells 
Teenage Girl And Anyone Under 15 He Has "Something Special" For Them.”  This 
particular post refers to the oft-repeated (false) narrative that Joe Biden has engaged in 
multiple counts of sexually inappropriate behaviour, and that he has a predilection for 
younger females.    
Table 11 Classification and Angle of the United American Patriots Facebook 
Page 
Classification Frequency Percentage 
Fake News 82 82.0% 
Anti-Democrat 52 52.0% 
Pro-Trump 27 27.0% 
Pro-Gun 3 3.0% 
Part Real, Part Fake 14 14.0% 
Pro-Trump 7 7.0% 
Anti-Democrat 7 7.0% 
Real News 4 4.0% 
Anti-Democrat 2 2.0% 
Anti-Trump 2 2.0% 
Grand Total 100 100.0% 
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Twenty-seven of the posts that fell into the “fake news” category were classified 
as being “pro-Trump.” These posts presented Trump as a positive political figure, while 
portraying impeachment as a “Democrat game.” To illustrate, one post announced: 
“President Trump and Pence Stand In the Rain - Make Unscheduled Stop To Respect 
Two Fallen Soldiers,” while another said: “New Dug-Up Videos Of Schiff And Bolton 
Could Derail Democrats - President Trump Declares The Impeachment Game Is ‘Over’.”  
Lastly, 3 of the posts in the “fake news” category were further classified as “pro-gun.” 
These posts showed concern for the 2nd amendment rights of Americans, for instance: 
“After Virginia Governor Plans To Grab Our Guns - 2nd Amendment Leaders Send In 
The Reinforcements to Protect Our Rights.”  
Fourteen out of the 100 posts  sampled from United American Patriots were 
classified as “part real, part fake” (see Table 11, above). These posts included 
questionable/fake sources, although in many cases, similar information could be found 
on credible mainstream media sites. However, all of these posts were supplemented 
with inflammatory opinion. In this “part real, part fake” category, the angle of the posts 
was evenly divided between “pro-Trump” (n = 7) and “anti-Democrat” (n = 7). Examples 
of such posts might include: “After President Trump Commits To New Tax Cuts - He 
Also Says Social Security Could Be Back On The Table,” and “After Nancy Rips Up 
Trump's Speech On Live TV - Donald Turns The Tables On Her: ‘That's Her Legacy’.”  
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As was the case with the Godfather Politics Facebook page, “Trump” (n = 43) 
was the most frequently-mentioned word in the United American Patriotic page (see 
Figure 12, above). In this page, Trump was featured as a respected political figure, while 
“Democrats” (n = 22) and members of the Democratic party “Schiff” (n = 14), “Pelosi” (n 
= 14), and “Biden” (n = 13) were highlighted at negative political figures. Moreover, many 
posts called for the support of Donald Trump in the 2020 election; as a consequence, 
“Donald” and “2020” appeared 10 times each in the 100 posts.  
5.1.5. Wallbuilders 
For the current study, 100 out of 203 posts harvested from the Wallbuilders 
Facebook page were randomly selected for content analysis. As of May 2020, this page 
had 185,078 likes and 182,315 followers. The Wallbuilders Facebook page usually posts 
supposedly historical information from a right-wing Christian perspective, which is 
typically non-factual. According to Media Bias/Fact Check, Wallbuilders often supports 
Trump on moral grounds, and most of the posts on this page are opinion-based and lack 
credible sources. The group has faced multiple criticisms for being an anti-LGBTQ “hate” 
group, as well as being an anti-immigration and anti-Islam group. The owner of the page, 
David Barton, has been criticized for publishing false history posts on multiple occasions 
(Mantyle, 2018; Media Bias/Fact Check, 2020). Overall, this page was believed to be 
fake/questionable based on its extreme right-wing bias, being regarded as hate group, 
and being known to promote propaganda (Media Bias/Fact Check, 2020). 
The majority of the posts in this group (n = 70) were classified as “fake news” 
(see Table 12, below). Out of those 70 “fake news” posts, 53 were classified as 
pertaining to “American history.” While they purported to be about history, these posts 
were typically advertisements that led to the Wallbuilders website, and that called upon 
social media users to watch and learn about “Biblical values” on their website, as 
illustrated below:  
One of the most important parts of WallBuilders is educating the next 
generation on the Biblical Values that this country was founded on. 
Tomorrow, we encourage all students and families and teachers and… 
Americans to pray at See you at the Pole. Tomorrow at 7am at your schools 
flag pole. The theme for the event is a Bible verse found in the Old 
Testament -- 2 Chronicles 7:14. "If my people, who are called by my name, 
will humble themselves and pray and seek my face and turn from their 
76 
wicked ways, then I will hear from heaven, and I will forgive their sin and 
will heal their land." Students Around the World Will Pray Together: 'See 
You at the Pole' Event Set for Sept. 25. 
Table 12 Classification and Angle of the Wallbuilders Facebook Page 
Classification Frequency Percentage 
Fake News 70 70.0% 
American History  53 53.0% 
Pro-Trump 8 8.0% 
Pro-Life 7 7.0% 
Anti-LGBTQ 2 2.0% 
Part Real, Part Fake 22 22.0% 
American History 18 18.0% 
Pro-Life 2 2.0% 
Anti-LGBTQ 2 2.0% 
Real News 4 4.0% 
American History 3 3.0% 
Anti-LGBTQ 1 1.0% 
Undetermined 4 4.0% 
Grand Total 100 100.0% 
 
Moreover, 8 of those 70 “fake news” posts  supported President Donald Trump, 
and thus, were classified as “pro-Trump” (see Table 12, above). In this category, several 
of the posts questioned the basis of the impeachment of Trump, for instance:  
With today's impeachment trial to begin we wanted to look back and see if 
there is a case for impeachment? Check this video out and let us know 
your thoughts in the comment section below. Is there a case for 
impeachment? #WallBuilders #Faith #Impeachment #Trump #Truth 
#history.  
There were also messages that asked visitors to the social media site to vote for Trump 
in the upcoming election, for example, “Make sure to get out and vote this November!  
#MAGA #Donald #Trump #Tuesday #Vote #Voting #UnitedStates #America 
#WallBuilders #History #Local #Truth #City #Mayor #Video #YouTube.” Additionally, 7 
out of the 70 “fake news” posts were classified as “pro-Life.” This category could also be 
regarded as “pro-Trump,” in that it coincided with Trump’s expressed political viewpoint, 
for example, “#good..Trump Admin Stops University From Forcing Nurses To Assist In 
Abortions- Good News Friday.” That said, it is questionable whether Trump is actually 
pro-Life, or if he has simply adopted this stance as a matter of political expediency (Los 
Angeles Times, 2020). Lastly, two out of 70 “fake news” posts were classified as “anti-
LGBTQ,” in that they attacked the LGBTQ community, and used poor sources to bolster 
their claims, for instance, “We must pay attention to the dangerous ideology that is 
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taking root in our nation. Whose Children Are They?” This post included a link to the 
FoundationofTruth.com, where parents expressed their concerns regarding schools 
encouraging kids to choose their own sexual preference, rather than allowing the 
parents to decide on behalf of their children. 
Lastly, 22 out of the 100 posts sampled from Wallbuilders included some factual 
information, along with inflammatory opinion. Even though all of these posts 
incorporated poor sources, similar information was available on credible sources through 
a Google search. In this “part real, part fake” category, two of the posts were designated 
as “anti-LGBTQ,” while two were designated as “pro-Life.” As mentioned earlier, these 
categories could arguably have been classified as pro-Trump,” in that they supported his  
political narrative. Examples of the above include: “Great news out of South Dakota. 
S.D. House Passes Landmark Bill Banning Transgender Treatment on Children”, or 
Big win! Supreme Court leaves Kentucky ultrasound law in place. Franklin 
Graham. This is a win for life! I’m thankful that this week the Supreme Court 
let the Kentucky law stand that requires mothers to view an ultrasound and 
hear the baby’s heartbeat before going through with an abortion.…The 
ACLU tweeted “Abortion is a right—and it’s legal in all 50 states.” Our 
Constitution says that LIFE is a right—not abortion. Yesterday was Human 
Rights Day—those who support human rights need to realize that abortion 
is the greatest human rights violation in the world today, robbing millions of 
children of their chance at life.  
However, those four messages were categorized as “anti-LGBTQ” or “pro-Life” because 
of their emphasis on those particular issues, and because they did not mention Donald 
Trump by name.     
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Figure 13 List of 10 Most Frequent Words for Wallbuilders Facebook Page 
A list of the 10 most frequent words, generated in NVivo, ties this analysis 
together. The Wallbuilders Facebook page was observed to be advertising their own 
website page on 43 occasions in the 100 posts. Therefore, the word “Wallbuilders” (n = 
43) was top on the list of 10 most frequent words (see Figure 13, above). This page is 
also known to talk about “history” (n = 32), “faith” (n = 14), “Christian” (n = 13) values, 
and report on “America” or “American” events (n = 13). The word “legislators” came up 
14 times in the 100 posts, and all of these posts included an invitation to attend the 
ProFamily Legislators Conference organized by the owner of the Wallbuilder page, 
David Barton.  
5.2.  Disinformation on Twitter in 2019/2020 
This current study also analyzed five Twitter hashtags that were trending during 
the impeachment inquiry and trial of U.S. President Donald Trump. In order to arrive at 
an equal number of tweets to those analyzed from the 2016 dataset of Facebook posts 
and Twitter messages and the 2019/2020 Facebook dataset, 100 tweets from each 
hashtag (500 tweets in total) were randomly selected. The main focus of the analysis of 
these hashtags was to investigate the potential role of disinformation campaigns and 
foreign interference in social media during the 2019/2020 impeachment inquiry and trial 
of Donald Trump. Qualitative content analysis was conducted on these 500 tweets, while 
Excel and NVivo software were used to code and analyze them. Moreover, NVivo’s word 
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words on each of the five hashtags. This was undertaken to better understand the 
discourse used in the tweets.  
5.2.1. #Impeachment 
For this study, 100 tweets out of 14,893 tweets from #Impeachment were 
randomly selected for qualitative content analysis. During the early stages of analysis, it 
was found that the majority of these tweets (n = 98) included inflammatory opinions and 
lacked back-up sources for those opinions (see Table 13, below). Recall that according 
to the Pew Research survey, 46% respondents in the  U.S. adults felt that Trump did 
something wrong regarding the Ukraine issue, and that it was enough to justify his 
removal from the office (Gramlich, 2020). However, 28% respondents felt that while he 
did something wrong, it was not enough to remove him from the office, whereas 25% felt 
that he did nothing wrong. Similar discourse could be observed in the analysis of 
#Impeachment.  
Out of 98 “fake news” tweets, 90 were against Trump, and asked the justice 
system to impeach him (see Table 13, below). In many of the posts, he was described 
as “criminal,” “guilty,” a “lunatic” and an “orange orangutan.” The following tweets serve 
to illustrate the general anti-Trump flavour found on #Impeachment: “Something a guilty 
person tweets when he knows he can be #impeached for the #crimes he committed. 
#Impeachment #ImpeachAndRemove,” “You are a lier, corrupt and a threat to our 
National Security. #Resign or be #Impeached #Impeachment,” and “Will someone 
PLEASE invoke the 25th Amendment on this lunatic before he starts WWIII? Is there 
anyone in his Cabinet who will #DoTheRightThing, or are you all a bunch of cowards?” 
#Impeachment #ImpeachTheMF.”  
In contrast to most of the other Facebook posts and Twitter tweets considered in 
this study, only two out of 98 “fake news” tweets were categorized as being “pro-Trump.” 
One tweet questioned the integrity of the impeachment process, while another stated 
that Trump had done nothing to get himself impeached. The first tweet, questioning the 
integrity of the process asked: “#Congress said they #Impeached #Trump with in the 
house. If they wanted more witnesses why didn't they Subpoena them in the house?! 
Why didn't they let #Trump defend himself?! #Impeachment.” The second tweet referred 
to above argued that Trump had done nothing wrong, and tried to deflect the attack 
80 
toward Hillary Clinton: “You are a #LyingSackOfIrrelevantShit you know the law, at least 
well enough to get a #ChildRapistOff #WeKnowWhatYouDid your Husband was 
#Impeached for #FelonyCrimes @realDonaldTrump didnt do #JackShit other than 
#BeatYourSorryAssin2016 #FadeAwayHillary #DontSethRichMe #Cult45 
#Impeachment.” It is important to note that the second tweet could arguably have been 
classified as “anti-Democrat,” but a research decision was made to classify it as “pro-
Trump,” as it was asserting that Trump was innocent.   
Table 13 Classification and Angle of the #Impeachment Twitter Hashtag 
Classification Frequency Percentage 
Fake News 98 98.0% 
Anti-Trump 90 90.0% 
Pro-Democrat 4 4.0% 
Anti-Democrat 2 2.0% 
Pro-Trump 2 2.0% 
Undetermined 2 2.0% 
Grand Total 100 100.0% 
 
Out of 98 “fake news” tweets, four were categorized as “pro-Democrat” (see 
Table 14, below). Adam Schiff was praised for his work against Trump in the 
impeachment inquiry and trial, for example, “@AdamSchiff is an honest, smart, 
competent leader who excelled at the #impeachment hearing of #IMPEACHED 
#EvilToxicLawless #Murderer @POTUS @VP #CorruptLIAR @realDonaldTrump 
@SecPompeo @PressSec @GOP @FOXTV @FoxandFriends.” On other hand, two out 
of 98 “fake news” tweets under study were categorized as “anti-Democrat” (see Table 
13, above). One of the posts was demanding that Nancy Pelosi be impeached instead: 
“#Pelosi NEEDS to be #IMPEACHED for failing to execute her responsibility to carry out 
#CongressDuties to Check 45! #Impeachment #ImpeachPelosi.” Another post attacked 
Hillary Clinton: “I think #HillaryClinton is all for the #ImpeachTrump scheme because she 




Figure 14 List of 10 Most Frequent Words for #Impeachment Twitter Hashtag 
According to the results of NVivo’s word frequency query on these 100 randomly 
selected tweets, the word “impeachment” (n = 115) was top on the list. This included 
words such as impeach, impeachments, impeachable, and impeached. As shown in the 
analysis above, the vast majority of these posts were opposed to Donald Trump, with his 
name (“Trump”) being mentioned 32 times in the 100 tweets (see Figure 14, above). 
Twenty-five of the posts tagged Donald Trump’s Twitter page (“realdonaldtrump”). 
Moreover, 12 posts discussed whether Trump should face prison time for his “crimes,” a 
discourse that was also observed in the four posts that came from the “#fbr” hashtag 
(Follow Back Resistance against Trump) and the five posts that used the 
“#Impeachmenthearing” hashtag, all expressing disapproval of Donald Trump.   
It is important to note that #Impeachment dataset seemed more like a forum for 
the expression of public outrage about Donald Trump and his actions than a deliberate 
propaganda or fake news hashtag created by hostile foreign actors. Additionally, it could 
be argued that individuals who are expressing strong political opinions without providing 
mainstream media sources to back up those opinions are not necessarily engaging in 
the manufacturing and dissemination of fake news. Therefore, it would be beneficial to 
analyze more posts from this hashtag, before designating it as a fake news hashtag 
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5.2.2. #RussianInterference 
Russian’s interference in U.S. politics has been under scrutiny for a number of 
years now. It is probably for that reason that the #RussianInterference hashtag appeared 
in Twitter’s trending list during the impeachment inquiry and trial. This hashtag was 
chosen for this study on the basis of how it was trending and not on the basis of potential 
influence of hostile foreign actors. For the current study, 100 tweets were randomly 
selected out of a larger sample of 1,386 tweets harvested from the #RussianInterference 
hashtag. Like the #Impeachment hashtag, the majority of these tweets (n = 96) included 
inflammatory opinion that lacked back-up sources to support the view being advanced 
(see Table 14, below). Therefore, these tweets were classified as “fake news.” Out of 96 
“fake news” tweets, most (n = 61) were “anti-Russian” in their perspective. These tweets 
referred to Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election and the 2016 Brexit 
referendum. Further, these tweets demanded that the justice system publish the 
concealed report into Russia’s interference in the British political system. This concealed 
report included the results of an 18-month investigation conducted by the UK 
Parliament’s cross-party Intelligence and Security Committee on the Russian 
disinformation campaign during the Brexit referendum (Maidment, 2020). Concerns 
about Russian political interference can be exemplified as follows: “Much public interest 
in #RussiaReport  Pls can we have info on #RussianReport & #RussianInterference as 
#BorisJohnson refuses to #ReleaseTheRussiaReport  #ReleaseTheRussianReport,”  
“Vladimir Putin has destroyed the UK and the USA. #RussianInterference,” and 
Special Counsel Robert Mueller was emphatic when he testified before 
House Intelligence on July 24 re. #RussianInterference in the 2016 
election: ‘It wasn’t a single attempt. They’re doing it as we sit here, and they 
expect to do it during the next campaign’.  
Table 14 Classification and Angle of the #RussianInterference Twitter 
Hashtag 
Classification Frequency Percentage 
Fake News 96 96.0% 
Anti-Russian 61 61.0% 
Anti-Trump 29 29.0% 
Anti-Democrat 6 6.0% 
Part Real, Part Fake 3 3.0% 
Anti-Russian 3 3.0% 
Undetermined 1 1.0% 
Grand Total 100 100.0% 
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Out of 96 “fake news” tweets, 29 were classified as “anti-Trump” (see Table 14, 
above). These tweets suggested that Russian interference possibly helped Trump to 
become the U.S. president in 2016. Donald Trump was also referred to as the 
“illegitimate president,” “#TreasonousTrump,” and “corrupt” in multiple tweets, for 
example,  
Putin, helped Trump win the White House in 2016, wants him to stay put. 
During his three years in office, the president has wreaked havoc across 
the U.S. government, undermined NATO, and blasted holes in the 
international trade system. #RussianInterference. 
Moreover, tweets made reference to the bots that supported Trump during the 2016 
election and indicated that all of these bots were coming from Russia: “There are only 2 
types of people that still support Trump, after everything he’s done: imbeciles, co-
conspirators, and bots. That’s not a typo. #bots aren’t people, they’re tools of 
#RussianInterference.” 
Democrats were also discussed in these “fake news” tweets. Six out of 96 tweets 
presented Democrats as negative political figures, and thus were classified as “anti-
Democrat.” These posts claimed that Bernie Sanders was somehow involved with the 
Russian bots, for example, “Ugh, #BernieBots!! #NoBernie #NeverBernie 
#RussianInterference #DropOutBernie #DropOutSanders”, and 
Russian funded no doubt. There is no way that the "We want Free Stuff," 
BernieBros, donated any funds near this amount from their pockets. Media 
needs to do their job and dig deeper into where all this money came from! 
Putin & Oligarchs, no doubt.  #RussianInterference. 
Hillary Clinton was also discussed up in two of the posts, too illustrate: “President 
J.Trump @realDonaldTrump won the Democrats hands down, never forget that during 
the campaign and before election, @CNN reported that @HillaryClinton was leading. 
After the election,they brought #RussianInterference. Over 3yrs, did it make Democrats 
better? NO!”  
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Figure 15 List of 10 Most Frequent Words for #RussianInterference Twitter 
Hashtag 
The 10 most frequent words generated in NVivo indicated that 
“RussianInterfernce” (n = 100) was mentioned the most in the 100 posts, but only 
because this hashtag was used in all of the tweets. The word “elections” was referred 18 
times in the dataset. Many of these posts discussed how “Trump” (n = 10) had funded 
“Russian”[s] (n = 10) to help him in the “2016” (n = 8) election (see Figure 15, above). 
Moreover, people demanded that the Prime Minister of the U.K., Boris Johnson, release 
the suppressed report into Russia’s interference in the British political system, which was 
expressed through hashtags “#ReleaseTheRussiaReport” (n = 15) and “#BorisJohnson” 
(n = 11). It is important to acknowledge that the report was recently released, and the 
government recognized that the threat was underestimated and U.K. was considered to 
be as one of Russia's top targets (Intelligence and Security Committee, 2020). 
5.2.3. #ShamImpeachment 
During the impeachment inquiry and trial, #ShamImpeachment was trending on 
Twitter. For the current study, 100 tweets were randomly selected for analysis from the 
13,608 tweets using this hashtag. In the early stages of the analysis, it became apparent 
that all of the 100 tweets lacked credible sources, and that they all included inflammatory 
opinion; thus, all 100 of the tweets were coded as “fake news” (see Table 15, below). In 
total, 48 posts denigrated the Democratic party and its members. Democrats were 
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scurrying of panicked swamp rats Don’t know what they have planned but they will try 
something else. The #Dems are truly like belligerent children having a major temper 
tantrum. #ShamImpeachment #Trump2020 #DrainTheSwamp #CorruptDemocrats.”  
The Speaker of the United States House of Representative, Nancy Pelosi, was 
called “the alcoholic speaker Piglosi” and “Nashy” in multiple tweets. Likewise, Adam 
Schiff, U.S. Representative, was called names such as “Pencil neck Schiff” and Jerrold 
Nadler was referred as “Waddling Nadler.” One tweet managed to capture all of these 
insults in one shot: 
The Radical DemocRAT Party ie: The Resistance has IMPLODED. The 
@DNC is in shambles, thanks to the likse of The Alcoholic Speaker Piglosi, 
Pencil Neck Schiff and Waddling Nadler. The Party of Corruption and 
Racism has destroyed temselves with the #ShamImpeachment. 
It is important to note that this tweet was written poorly, with many spelling and 
grammatical errors, which could indicate that these posts were written by someone 
whom English was not a first language. In fact, another tweet actually raised the issue of 
Russian bots and language barriers: “There are vast amounts of Russian bots 
programmed to quote #ShamImpeachment, these bots need to attend English classes 
for us to believe this shit they are posting.” Since there has been no prior research on 
the data and it is hard to infer that it’s actually coming from hostile actors; therefore, 
more research is needed on this hashtag.   
Table 15 Classification and Angle of the #ShamImpeachment Twitter Hashtag 
Classification Frequency Percentage 
Fake News 100 100.0% 
Anti-Democrat 48 48.0% 
Pro-Trump 32 32.0% 
Anti-Impeachment 19 19.0% 
Anti-Russian 1 1.0% 
Grand Total 100 100.0% 
 
While Democrats were the target of derision in 48 of the 100 tweets, Donald 
Trump was commended in 32 of the tweets, which were therefore coded as being “pro-
Trump.” In this category, tweets included Trump’s campaign slogan(s), KAG and/or 
MAGA, followed with #ShamImpeachment, and asserted that Trump was innocent. An 
example of a tweet where Donald Trump was said to be innocent and that also 
questioned the basis of impeachment process is as follows: “The only compelling & 
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overwhelming evidence is that @realDonaldTrump did not commit any impeachable 
offense. The only bipartisan vote was against impeachment. Five impeachment 
managers voted to impeach @POTUS before the Ukraine call. This is a targeted hit-job. 
#ShamImpeachment.” Another example where Trump was portrayed as a positive 
political figure, and that also included Trump’s KAG (Keep America Great) campaign 
slogan for the upcoming 2020 election, pronounced that,  
For all the dimms ! They r left scratching their heads. Trump just keeps 
winning. Best economy , taking down terrorists etc. even the 
#ShamImpeachment  ended up helping trump. Raised max $$, has 
independants , Hispanics and blacks all with him now ! #KAG #trump2020.  
Lastly, an “anti-impeachment” category was created, in order to properly classify the 19 
tweets that did not include any information, except for the hashtag #ShamImpeachment. 
This could be assumed that this was done to amplify the hashtag to reach larger social 
media audience.  
 
Figure 16 List of 10 Most Frequent Words for #ShamImpeachment Twitter 
Hashtag 
To conclude the content analysis, and to better understand the language of the 
tweets, NVivo’s word frequency query option was used on these 100 randomly selected 
tweets. First, the word “#Shamimpeachment” (n = 104) was the most frequent in the list 
(see Figure 16, above), as this hashtag appeared in every message, sometimes more 
than once. In addition, the word “impeachment” was mentioned 21 times, including 
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Trump’s Twitter account (“realdonaldtrump”) was tagged 14 times in the dataset, while 
the name “Trump” appeared 13 times on its own.  Other hashtags were used to show 
support for Trump in the upcoming 2020 “election” (n = 12), including “#KAG” (n = 8) and 
“#Trump2020” (n =7).  
5.2.4. #Trump2020 
For the current study, 100 tweets referring to #Trump2020 were randomly 
selected from a total of 2,320 tweets downloaded from this hashtag. As was the case 
with other Twitter hashtags examined in the current study, all of the tweets sampled from 
the #Trump2020 hashtag included inflammatory opinion and lacked credible sources to 
back up their opinions. Accordingly, all of these tweets were coded as “fake news” (see 
Table 16, below). Through multiple cycles of coding, it was found that these tweets fell 
under two major categories: “pro-Trump” (n = 46) and “anti-Democrat” (n = 41). There 
were some tweets that could have been placed under the “pro-Trump” category, as they 
followed typical Trump discourse about building a wall, protecting gun rights, and the 
mainstream media as being a source of fake news. However, a research decision was 
made to keep them separate, resulting in seven tweets being categorized as “anti-
media,” four as “racist,” and two as “pro-gun.”  
Tweets that used messaging similar to that used by Trump regarding the media 
as “fake news” while at the same time expressing  support for Trump in the 2020 
election included: “Oh thank you for sharing the media suppressing the speech of our 
WONDERFUL and amazing President.  #GodBlessPresidentTrump #Trump2020.” As 
mentioned above, 4 posts were racist, but could also have been categorized as “pro-
Trump,” in that they talked about building a wall and reducing the number of refugees in 
the U.S., for example: “The STRONG WALL is going up! #KAG 
#PromisesMadePromisesKept #Trump2020 and Exclusive — Michelle Malkin: 60 
Terrifying Reasons Trump Is Right to Reduce Refugees via @BreitbartNews 
@realDonaldTrump #Trump2020.” Americans are very sensitive about their guns and 
gun rights, which also happens to be one of the assurances that Trump has used in his 
election campaigns: “And people out there actually believe this idiot. Yea the way that 
Jack Wilson controlled his gun is all the gun control you need to be talking about #Pro2A 
#Trump2020.” Lastly, statements were made in these tweets, blatantly indicating that 
Trump should and would win the 2020 election, and that later, his family members would 
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hold the office, for example: “We are all going to feel great emptiness in 2025 when the 
@realDonaldTrump ride is over. #Trump2020 #Ivanka2024 [Daughter of Donald Trump] 
#DonJr2032 [eldest son of Donald Trump] #LeftistTearsForever”, “So GREAT to have an 
AMERICAN PATRIOT and not an Iranian ally as our PRESIDENT!! #Trump2020,” and 
“#Trump2020 or the US is dead!.” 
Table 16 Classification and Angle of the #Trump2020 Twitter Hashtag 
Classification Frequency Percentage 
Fake News 100 100.0% 
Pro-Trump 46 46.0% 
Anti-Democrat 41 41.0% 
Anti-Media 7 7.0% 
Racists 4 4.0% 
Pro-Gun 2 2.0% 
Grand Total 100 100.0% 
 
Forty-one of the #Trump2020 tweets presented Democrats in a negative light. 
Those tweets referred to Democrats as “destroying the America,” and as being “corrupt.” 
Adam Schiff was attacked in many of the posts, for example, “@AdamSchiff get the hell 
out out of the basement and stop with the secretive shit. You are nothing but a worthless 
liar and POS. #fuckSchiff #SchiftySchiff #Trump2020LandslideVictory 
#DemocratsAreCorrupt #Trump2020.” Hillary Clinton was also mentioned in a few of the 
tweets, for instance: “Cannot accept the consequences of 2016 election. #Trump2020 
#DemocratsAreDestroyingAmerica”, and “You lost...just like she did...go cry to ur mama 
now. bye bye #Trump2020.” In order to show that Democrats were destroying America, 
multiple posts talked about their involvement with a terrorist country: “Democrats  hate 
trump so much they take sides with a terrorist  country and guy killed 600 plus 
Americans  smh. #DemocratsAreDestroyingAmerica #Democrats #shameful 
#Trump2020.”   
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Figure 17 List of 10 Most Frequent Words for #Trump2020 Twitter Hashtag 
To understand the language of the posts, a list of the 10 most frequent words 
was generated in NVivo. Not surprisingly, all of the 100 tweets included the word 
“#Trump2020” (see Figure 17, above). As explained in the above content analysis, more 
than half of the tweets were in favour of Trump and his policies. NVivo’s word frequency 
query produced similar results. In the 100 posts, there were 20 mentions of “Trump” and 
his campaign slogan “#KAG” (n = 14), and “#MAGA” (n = 14). Many (n = 12) of these 
tweets tagged Trump’s Twitter account, “@realdonaldtrump.” On the other hand, 41 out 
of 100 tweets (see Table 16, above) disfavoured the “Democrats” (n = 13), and stated 
that Democrats were “lying” (n = 6) about everything to aid with Trump’s “impeachment” 
(n = 6). The word “Qanon” was mentioned 7 times in the 100 posts. QAnon is a 
conspiracy theory group that posts a lot of pro-Trump and anti-Democratic material 
(LaFrance, 2020). QAnon is a group that believes in a deep-state conspiracy, especially 
in the FBI, CIA, the Department of Justice, and the Pentagon, that is out to get Donald 
Trump and his supporters. However, the conspiracy group also believes that “if you’re a 
Trump supporter, then you should believe that Donald Trump is in complete control of 
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5.2.5. #Trump2020Landside 
“#TRUMP2020Landside is something someone from the opposition party 
came up with to make supporters of the president look stupid. These are 
the tactics of the left.”  
The #Trump2020Landside hashtag was presumably intended to be named 
#Trump2020Landslide. However, the error in naming the hashtag provides further 
evidence that its authors were not especially fluent in the English language, spelling the 
title Landside, instead of Landslide. The Landside hashtag started trending during the 
impeachment inquiry and trial. In total, 13,936 tweets were retrieved from this hashtag 
between September 2019 to February 2020. For this current study, 100 posts were 
randomly selected for analysis. Similar to what transpired with the classification of the 
#ShamImpeachment and the #Trump2020 tweets, all 100 of the tweets sampled from 
the #Trump2020Landside were classified as “fake news” (see Table 17, below). These 
tweets did not contain any credible or verifiable pieces of information, with all of the 
tweets attempting to incite support for Donald Trump, or stir up hostility toward the 
Democrats, the media, or members of the LGBTQ community. The majority of these 
tweets (n = 57) were decidedly “pro-Trump” in angle.  
Trump has referred to the media as “fake news” on multiple occasions. Five of 
the tweets classified as “pro-Trump” also favoured his “anti-media” narrative, while one 
of them coincided with his “anti-LGBTQ” agenda. Examples of pro-Trump, anti-media 
tweets would include: “OMG! Did you give him the debate questions in advance Donna? 
cheaters get hired to work at CNN don’t they Donna? #TRUMP2020Landside 
#Trump2020LandslideVictory,” and “sorry a reporter is not a FOUNDATION. They 
should be Unbiased but your socialist agenda, @georgesoros, and the evil LEFT 
LEANING(Lying) media, are all destroying AMERICA!!! #TRUMP2020Landside 
#SHIFFSHOULDBEINPRISION.” The “anti-LGBTQ” community tweet said: “WOW! 
Comparing same sex couples with good ole fashioned God fearing population 
maintaining Heterosexual couples? No comparison! Ah come on man! Another reason 
not to vote for #DemocratsHaveLostTheirDamnMinds and put them back in the minority 
where they belong! #TRUMP2020Landside.” Tweets also supported his narrative about 
building a wall along the Mexican border, and used similar language (i.e., drain the 
swamp and 2nd amendment) to that used by Trump on multiple occasions, for example: 
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Mr. President, I’m SO PROUD of you Sir, PLEASE BE CAREFUL  CHOO-
CHOO, All Aboard the #Trump Train #MAGA #KAG #BuildTheWall #1A 
#2A #BackTheBlue #DrainTheDeepStateSwamp #TRUMP2020Landside 
#Vets. Give my love to Melania” , “#TRUMP2020Landside.. Until the job is 
done to protect every #American citizen no other issue takes precedence, 
and no other candidate is acceptable. #TRUMP2020Landside. 
Table 17 Classification and Angle of the #Trump2020Landside Twitter 
Hashtag 
Classification Frequency Percentage 
Fake News 100 100.0% 
Pro-Trump 57 57.0% 
Anti-Democrat 37 37.0% 
Anti-Media 5 5.0% 
Anti-LGBTQ 1 1.0% 
Grand Total 100 100.0% 
 
Thirty-seven of the tweets were distinctly “anti-Democrat” in flavour (see Table 
17, above). These tweets attacked the Democrats, and portrayed them in a negative 
light, for example: “Between Pelosi’s temper tantrum, not being able to conduct a 
caucus, and losing their sham impeachment, wow democrats have really proved 
themselves as clowns. #TRUMP2020Landside,” and “Who are you again?  #LibTards 
#TRUMP2020Landside.” Former President Barack Obama was referred to as “Obumer” 
on multiple occasions, to illustrate, “It wasn't easy for us blue collar folks, happy to say i 
survived the obumer admin though! #MAGA #KAG #TRUMP2020LANDSIDE.” Likewise, 
Adam Schiff, U.S. Representative, was called names such as “Oh Little Adam Shit, I 
can't wait until it comes out you were the whistleblower, oh my,just had a thought, could 
the whistleblower be the Russian you talked to about Trump? #TRUMP2020Landside.” It 
is noteworthy that the term “little Adam Shitt” was first coined by Donald Trump himself, 
back in 2018, when taking exception to the fact that Adam Schiff had (accurately) 
pointed out that Trump’s Acting Attorney General had not been duly confirmed by the 
U.S. Senate (Forgey, 2018).      
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Figure 18 List of 10 Most Frequent Words for #Trump2020Landside Twitter 
Hashtag 
Finally, NVivo was used to generate a list of the 10 most frequent words that 
appeared in the 100 tweets sampled from the #Trump2020Landside hashtag. First, the 
word “#Trump2020Landside” was mentioned 103 times in the 100 tweets, as this 
hashtag was used in all of the tweets. As illustrated above, 24 of the tweets mentioned 
the “president” (i.e., Donald Trump), 18 favoured “Trump,” while 11 disfavoured the 
“Democrats” (see Figure 18, above). Twelve of these tweets featured Trump’s campaign 
slogan “#MAGA,” (Make America Great Again), 8 used his new slogan, “#KAG” (Keep 
America Great), while 7 used the KAG slogan along with the year 2020. Seven of the 
tweets also tagged Donald Trump’s Twitter account (“@realdonaldTrump”), in support of 
his candidacy in the upcoming presidential election. There were eight tweets mentioning 
Democrats, also using the word “never,” in the context of proclaiming that the Democrats 
would “never” be able defeat Trump in the 2020 election.  
Conclusion 
The findings from the content analysis of the five Facebook pages and five 
trending Twitter hashtags that appeared during the 2019/2020 impeachment process 
have been presented in this chapter. The majority of these posts and tweets were 
classified as “fake news,” and exhibited multiple angles of attack. There were notable 
similarities across all of the Facebook pages and Twitter hashtags studied. The 
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featured many “anti-Democrat” posts. The Twitter hashtags, #ShamImpeachment, 
#Trump2020, and #Trump2020Landside, were replete with “anti-Democrat” tweets. On 
the other hand, “pro-Trump” messages appeared with frequency in the almost all of the 
Facebook pages and Twitter hashtags, except for the CAIR Facebook page and 
#RussianInterference.  Only two of the Facebook pages, CAIR and United American 
Patriots, included “anti-Trump” messages. Similarly, only two Twitter hashtags, 
#Impeachment and #RussianInterference, included “anti-Trump” messaging. Of all the 
Facebook pages and Twitter hashtags subjected to content analysis in this study, only 
one dataset, #Impeachment, included “pro-Democrat” messaging.  
Chapters 4 and 5 have reported on the results of the qualitative content analysis 
of social media messaging and disinformation campaigns during two major political 
events in the United States, the 2016 U.S. presidential election and the 2019/2020 
impeachment inquiry and trial, both events centering around the current President, 
Donald Trump. Chapter 6 will discuss the overarching themes that emerged from this 
study of these two events, and the role that social media messaging and disinformation 
campaigns played in shaping how these events unfolded, as seen through the lens of 
agenda setting theory. Moreover, the themes described in the next chapter will be 
situated within larger empirical studies from a range of disciplines, to provide a more 
comprehensive understanding of disinformation campaigns and foreign interference in 
domestic politics.  
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Chapter 6.  
 
Merging the Studies: Overarching Themes as seen 
through the Lens of Agenda Setting Theory 
This chapter will discuss the overarching themes that emerged from the 
complementary analyses of social media messaging and disinformation campaign during 
the 2016 U.S. presidential election and the 2019/2020 impeachment inquiry and trial. 
These themes represent the most prominent narratives that were observed in samples 
taken from Facebook and Twitter during the election and during impeachment 
proceedings. These themes will be studied through the lens of agenda setting theory. 
Recall that according to agenda setting theory, issues that are accorded higher priority 
by the media can be expected to attain greater prominence in the public sphere (Caulk, 
2016; Wallsten, 2007). Beyond this, the news media also direct our attention to what 
they consider to be the specific and salient aspects of these issues. This combined 
influence of the news media on the public’s attention to, and the learning of, the key 
details of the major issues may be regarded as the “agenda-setting” role played by the 
news media (McCombs, 2007). 
Second-level agenda setting theory plays a vital role in understanding this 
process, because when agenda setting occurs, it signals to the public which issues hold 
the greatest importance. In other words, in the second level of agenda setting, the media 
not only tells us what to think about, but how to think about certain subjects and/or 
people (Golan & Wanta, 2001, p. 248). Donald Trump and the Democrats were 
frequently discussed in the sampled Facebook and Twitter postings, in order to attract 
public attention and shape public attitudes and beliefs. When the mass media focuses 
on a particular subject or individual person, and when the public thinks about and talks 
about that topic, certain attributes are emphasized (McCombs, 2007). As time goes on, 
or as circumstances change, these subjects or individuals may sometimes be mentioned 
less frequently, or at other times, only in passing. In the current study, multiple attributes 
were mentioned frequently, primarily favouring Donald Trump and his political policies. 
 It is important to note that the Facebook pages and Twitter hashtags were 
primarily selected for this thesis on the basis of the probable involvement of foreign 
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actors. The issues that were discussed on these pages and hashtags included 2nd 
amendment rights, immigration (both legal and illegal), the LGBTQ community, health 
care (pro-life), the legitimacy of mainstream media and race, all of which were in 
alignment with Donald Trump’s main narratives. Some anti-Trump discourse was 
observed in a few of the Facebook pages and Twitter hashtags from the 2016 
presidential election period, including  the United Muslims of America Facebook page, 
which had only one anti-Trump post, along with the 2016 Twitter dataset with 68 anti-
Trump tweets. From the 2019/2020 impeachment dataset, the CAIR Facebook page had 
five anti-Trump posts, while only two anti-Trump posts were found in the United 
American Patriots Facebook page. However, the #Impeachment hashtag on Twitter 
featured more anti-Trump discourse, with 90 out of 100 tweets offering disparaging 
comments about Donald Trump. Lastly, the #RussianInterference hashtag on Twitter 
had 29 anti-Trump tweets. Both the #Impeachment and #RussianInterference hashtags 
were selected for analysis on the basis of their trending rate on Twitter, rather than 
solely depending on a search for Russian-sponsored hashtags. These hashtags may 
provide legitimate opinions from the users of social media, rather than messages from 
foreign trolls. As mentioned earlier, there has not been any research done on the use of 
social media and disinformation during the impeachment proceedings. As a 
consequence, it is more difficult to prove conclusively that these hashtags were 
sponsored by foreign actors; therefore, further research should be undertaken into the 
provenance of these hashtags, and if possible, the authors of the individual messages. 
That, however, is beyond the scope of this present study.    
In the past, agenda setting theory mainly studied the influence of mainstream 
media on politics, rather than the influence of social media on politics. Nowadays, 
however, social media plays a significant role in delivering people their daily dose of 
news. According to the Pew Research Center, 43% of Americans get their news from 
Facebook, while 12% get their news from Twitter (Shearer & Matsa, 2018). Other 
studies have indicated that two-thirds of Facebook users get their news from Facebook, 
while six-out-of-ten Twitter users get their news from Twitter (Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017; 
Gottfried & Shearer, 2016). Thus, there is well-founded concern for potential 
manipulation of sentiment in social media. Therefore, studying social media postings 
through the lens of agenda setting theory is essential to understanding the influence of 
social media on recent political events. 
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The qualitative analysis of these two recent events in U.S. politics provides 
insight into the overarching themes that were present in the type of “fake news” being 
circulated in social media at those times. Those themes or narratives were employed in 
order to micro-target specific populations, and at the same time tap into the widely held 
attitudes and beliefs of Americans, with an eye to influencing the voting choices of 
Americans. This included encouraging certain groups of Americans to get out and vote, 
in particular those who favoured law and order agendas, were pro-military, and were 
thought to be more likely to share anti-immigration sentiments and subscribe to racial 
stereotyping. On the other hand, the social media messaging attempted to discourage 
(suppress) voting by racialized minorities such as blacks, Latinos, Muslims and other 
marginalized minority groups such as the LGBTQ. To express it differently, these 
messages tapped into issues that were intended to create division among American 
voters and to further incite an “us vs. them” mentality. However, it was hard to infer how 
much of this data was driven by hostile foreign actors. 
Moreover, throughout the analysis, numerous examples of posts and tweets 
were provided that either supported Donald Trump or opposed the Democrats. There 
were comparatively few messages that criticized Donald Trump or questioned his 
suitability for the presidency. However, approximately 480 posts out of 2,000 did not 
mention Donald Trump by name, but they clearly supported his political agenda. These 
posts included all the pro-gun, anti-immigration, anti-media, anti-LGBTQ, and anti-
Democrat sentiments. A post from the Secured Borders Facebook page did not include 
his name; however, his political policies were considered, while at the same time 
attacking the Democrats:   
I really don't understand this libtarded obsession with the rights of people 
who shouldn't be in the country in the first place, while neglecting safety 
and security of American people. This is unacceptable! I sincerely hope 
that there are no more successful Terrorist attacks on American soil. But 
hoping isn't enough in this case, we need to build the wall, enforce 
immigration law, deport illegal alien leeches, reinstate & reinforce travel 
ban and keep all invading scum out of the country! Better save our tax 
dollars for Americans than waste welfare money on possible terrorist! 
 One of the main discourses used to foster division involved legislative and policy 
issues pertaining to immigration. Through the analysis of the sampled social media 
postings during the 2016 and 2019/2020 political events, it could be seen that 
immigration-related issues were featured in Secured Borders, Being Patriotic, American 
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Thinker, CAIR, Godfather Politics, Blacktivist, LGBT United, Wallbuilder, 2016 Twitter, 
and #Impeachment. These immigration issues were aligned closely with Trump’s  
campaign statements and day-to-day Twitter ruminations, as he has been observed on 
multiple occasions referring to immigrants as “illegal aliens,” “criminals,” “traitors,” 
“scums,” “rapists,” and “drug-pushers” (Amadeo & Boyle, 2020; Blake, 2019). This 
present content analysis of 2,000 messages posted on Facebook and Twitter before, 
during and after the presidential election and during the subsequent impeachment 
process found that immigrants (both legal and illegal) were referred as “criminal aliens,” 
“criminal illegal,” “illegal aliens,” “criminal scums,” “sinful criminals,” “greedy criminals,” 
“freeloaders,” “scumbags,” and “alien leeches.” These are similar to the derogatory 
names that Trump has used repeatedly when referring to immigrants. In fact, the 
immigration issues used in the 2016 election to discredit Hillary Clinton and Barack 
Obama have been rethreaded for the 2020 presidential election campaign. In 2016, the 
Russian-sponsored Secured Borders Facebook page included a message saying that: 
“Hillary Clinton has made it clear that she supports and will expand President Obama's 
immigration policies.” This type of messaging re-appeared in the #Trump2020 Twitter 
hashtag, for example: “We all know Trump's stance on the account of criminal illegals 
#Trump2020.” These two examples can be explained through the lens of agenda setting 
theory, as on the one hand, Donald Trump was being portrayed in these social media 
pages and hashtags as a “savior,” who would ride to the rescue and save the American 
people from “criminal illegals,” while  on the other hand, Democratic politicians (and 
especially Hillary Clinton) were being portrayed as the destroyers of the American way of 
life.  
Throughout the analysis of both studies, it was found that Donald Trump was 
suggested as the better choice for president, because he would protect Americans from 
“illegal aliens.” Moreover, in both 2016 and 2019/2020 datasets, 48 posts and tweets 
indicated that immigrants were dangerous and criminal. Therefore, American voters 
should be extremely careful with their choice of political leaders and in deciding who gets 
to sit in the Oval Office. The underlying message was that if more immigrants were 
allowed to come to America, then white Americans should be fearful of losing their long-
held dominant position in the American social structure.  
Moreover, 22 messages from both the 2016 and 2019/2020 datasets argued that 
veterans should be taken care of first, as they had not been receiving proper treatment 
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during Obama’s presidential period. Those posts raised similar concerns that by bringing 
in more immigrants, or allowing illegal immigrants to remain, the veterans would not be 
able to receive the resources that they needed. These posts and tweets also discussed 
their fear of immigrants, how Obama brought more immigrants (criminals) into the 
country, and how he offered amnesty to undocumented immigrants so that they could 
have their status normalized and thus remain in the country legally. We should ask 
ourselves why there is so much discourse pertaining to the supposed plight of veterans 
on these social media sites. In the U.S., military service is held in higher esteem than 
others forms of civil service (The Economist, 2017). The U.S. places great emphasis on 
its military might, and on its military history (Karlin & Hunt, 2018). As noted by Daddis 
(2018), “the male combat solider has long been the staple of American war literature.” 
Historical and fictional movies and TV shows about American military heroes abound 
(Weikle, 2020). Thus, by making frequent reference to veterans, the creators of this 
social media messaging are attempting to tap into images of members of the military 
service being brave, invincible, and of them sacrificing their lives for the greater good of 
the country, only to be sacrificed by their country in favour of giving greater rights and 
benefits to undeserving groups of  people (immigrants) who have not earned those rights 
and benefits.      
To avoid the predicted cataclysm, American voters were encouraged to vote for 
Trump. The Being Patriotic Facebook page included messages saying: “Why is it so 
hard for our Government [Barack Obama and his administration] to understand that we 
want our own citizens to get care before illegal freeloaders who don't even try to become 
a part of the American society?,” and “Veterans should be the first ones to get welfare, 
healthcare and housing. They have earned this right by spilling their own blood in the 
name of America!.” Another message appeared on the same Being Patriotic Facebook 
page, arguing that “illegal aliens” were bringing crime into the country: “In 2013, the 
government released 36,007 convicted criminal aliens responsible for homicides, sexual 
assaults, kidnapping, and other serious crimes.” Secured Borders, another IRA-
generated page from the 2016 election period, had a message saying that: “Over past 
years, criminal aliens sexually assault 70,000 American women  and that's just the tip of 
the iceberg, because full data on these cases is censored by liberals.” These earlier 
messages can be compared to more recent messages, such as the one from Godfather 
Politics, claiming that “Illegal Alien Who Avoided Deportation Allegedly Murdered 22 
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Elderly People,” or another recent message from the American Thinker Facebook page, 
stating that “Trump Creates Division to Strip Citizenship from Criminals Who Were 
Naturalized.”  
Issues such as “illegal immigration” are framed in a negative fashion, and then 
presented in a cognitive/affective manner, which is part of the second-level process 
identified by agenda setting theory (Golan & Wanta, 2001). This present study found that 
once the fear of immigrants and immigration in general were instilled in the American 
followers of these social media platforms, further follow-up messages were added, 
arguing that only Trump could save them, whereas Democrats would expose them to 
greater danger.  
Legislative and policy issues pertaining to gun control, pro-life, and the LGBTQ 
community were apparent during both time periods under study. These topics 
underscored the notion that people should feel that they were under attack and that their 
rights had been or would be stripped away from them by Democrats. On the other hand, 
Donald Trump was often portrayed as the only person who would be able to rescue 
them from a fate worse than death. There are few issues that will rile up Americans more 
than gun control. This issue has been fought over in the executive and legislative 
branches, in the courts, in the media, and on the streets (Gun Control, 2018). Former 
U.S. President Barack Obama was loathed in some circles because of his efforts to 
introduce more restrictive gun control legislation (Vizzard, 2015). We can see how the 
authors of these social media messages attempted to tap into this fear and loathing, by 
examining, for example, a message from the Being Patriotic page during the presidential 
election period saying that: “Now, when the democrats are pushing more and more gun 
control legislations, we have to stand for our rights to be armed,” or a message from the 
more recent United American Patriots page, asking: “Why so liberal circles seek to set 
more restrictions on gun ownership?,” and another message from #Trump2020Landside 
Twitter hashtag: “@realDonaldTrump is genuine and truly real. He will protect our rights. 
The democrats are clowns, There is only one choice for election day. 
#TRUMP2020Landside #2A rights.”  
The anti-abortion and LGBTQ discourses that appeared in the IRA-sponsored 
Facebook posts and Twitter feeds during the 2016 election period re-appeared in the 
2019/2020 dataset from the impeachment inquiry and trial. Again, it was felt that this was 
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being done in order to micro-target social media users who were either in favour of 
abortion rights and LGBTQ rights or who were strongly opposed to abortion rights and 
LGBTQ rights, to further drive a wedge between them. Like gun rights, the issues of 
abortion rights and LGBTQ rights have been fought over in the executive and legislative 
branches, in the courts, in the media, and on the streets for the better part of the past 
century (Holland, 2016). These two issues have religious overtones, and seem to be 
particularly offensive to Catholics and evangelical Christians, who have been strongly 
opposed to LGBTQ members and abortions. Both abortion and anything remotely 
related to LGBTQ behavior have often been treated as immoral and even illegal (Minter, 
1993; Pew Research Center, 2020). The Wallbuilders Facebook page brings up the 
issue of unborn children and their rights, saying: “Unborn don't but illegals do have 
constitutional rights?” Another message, again from Wallbuilders, goes on at 
considerable length:  
This is a win for life! I’m thankful that this week the Supreme Court let the 
Kentucky law stand that requires mothers to view an ultrasound and hear 
the baby’s heartbeat before going through with an abortion.… More The 
ACLU tweeted “Abortion is a right—and it’s legal in all 50 states.” Our 
Constitution says that LIFE is a right—not abortion. Yesterday was Human 
Rights Day—those who support human rights need to realize that abortion 
is the greatest human rights violation in the world today, robbing millions of 
children of their chance at life. 
Additionally, posts and tweets asserted that the LGBTQ community did not 
adhere to “normal” American (Christian) values. Multiple posts have appeared on the 
sampled Facebook pages such as LGBT United, American Thinker, GodFather Politics, 
and Wallbuilder, and Twitter hashtags such as #Trump2020Landside, where they asked 
the justice system to ban clinics that supported gender transition options. Moreover, 
these messages used different names to denigrate the LGBTQ community, referring to 
them as “drag queens,” the “gender delusional group,” and a “dangerous rot to our 
nation.” Posts also stated that this was the reason they were not voting for Democrats, 
and were instead voting for Trump. These topics appeared to be designed to serve two 
main purposes: 1) to make the American public believe that these were clear and 
present dangers to the moral fabric of American society, and that they should be 
frightened of them, and 2) the Democrats did not care about these issues, whereas, 
Donald Trump would save the country by standing up on these issues. 
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As mentioned previously, Democrats were portrayed as negative political figures 
in most of the 2,000 messages sampled from multiple Facebook pages and Twitter 
hashtags at two different time intervals. The Democrats were portrayed as “illegitimate” 
and “not fit for the job.” This was done to make American voters believe that Democrats 
would not do their jobs properly, and therefore, that voters should not support them in 
the upcoming election(s). Meanwhile, the messages sampled from both time intervals 
tended to paint Trump as a great American leader. Often, as seen above, he was 
portrayed as the “savior” of the American people and of their values.  
In the 2016 election, Trump’s rival, Hillary Clinton was quite routinely presented 
in a negative light, and was said to be unfit for the job. A lot of this discourse was 
misogynistic in nature, relying on the stereotype of women as being more frail and more 
emotional than men, and thus incapable of doing a man’s job (Stevenson, 2016; 
Sullivan, 2019a). It is thought that this notion would have held appeal for males, and 
especially those males who felt that normative masculinity could and should be 
demonstrated by possessing a gun, fighting for your country, being opposed to all forms 
of non-heterosexual practices, and believing that a woman’s place was in the home. This 
line of attack included Hillary’s frequent mention of her close relationship with Obama, 
and of her leaked emails (implying that as a woman, she was incompetent to run a 
political campaign, let alone a country). The names of Obama and Hillary were brought 
together on multiple occasions to prove to the public that if you voted for Hillary, she 
would continue with Obama’s policies, which would later destroy the American way-of-
life, or leastwise, the way-of-life for gun-owning, church-going Americans who were 
opposed to abortion, same sex marriage, and to women or members of an ethnic 
minority holding high office.  
In 2019/2020, Donald Trump was portrayed as a victim of a Democratic plot to 
impeach him and remove him from the office. This was especially evident in the 
Facebook pages American Thinker, Godfather Politics, United American Patriots, and 
Wallbuilders, and the Twitter hashtags #shamimpeachment, #Trump2020, and 
#Trump2020Landside, which all attempted to paint a picture of the impeachment inquiry 
and trial as a Democratic strategy to attack Donald Trump. On these Facebook pages 
and Twitter hashtags, impeachment was referred to as “sham,” “frenzy,” “fake,” 
“disaster,” and “unfair.” At the same time, Democrats were referred as “corrupt,” 
“traitors,” and it was also claimed that they were “destroying the America.” For example, 
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it has been claimed (without evidence) that the hashtag #TRUMP2020Landside was 
created by someone or some entity opposed to Donald Trump, in order to ridicule Trump 
and his supporters: “#TRUMP2020Landside is something someone from the opposition 
party came up with to make supporters of the president look stupid. These are the 
tactics of the left.” That said, it is felt that #TRUMP2020Landside was not an intentional 
parody of IRA-sponsored websites or extreme-right-wing websites, but rather, a failed 
attempt by someone or some entity to create and amplify pro-Trump messaging under 
the guise of a genuine discussion forum. It was claimed that the impeachment inquiry 
and trial were invented by the Democrats to discourage American voters from voting for 
Trump in the upcoming 2020 election. Furthermore, it was said that this was part of the 
Democrats “evil” plan, and that there was no basis for impeaching President Trump, 
because he had done nothing wrong.  
Overall, the discourse, narratives and major themes that were identified in the 
messages sampled from the 2019/2020 impeachment process were similar in many 
respects to those identified in the messages sampled from the 2016 election period. 
Clearly, the earlier dataset may be regarded as evidence of foreign interference and 
disinformation campaigns in U.S. politics, as all of the messages were known to have 
come from the Russian-sponsored Internet Research Agency websites (Allcott & 
Gentzkow, 2017; Badawy et al., 2018; W. L. Bennett & Livingston, 2018; Bovet & Makse, 
2019; de Cock Bunning et al., 2019; Mueller, 2019; Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence, 2017; Parkinson, 2016; Silverman, 2016). The same cannot be said for 
certainty with the second (later) dataset. While these later social media sites can be 
regarded as sources of “fake news,” and often appear as though they are highly 
orchestrated (contrived), pro-Trump/anti-Democratic campaigns, there is little evidence 
at this time to suggest that they were IRA-generated. That said, the language, discourse 
and narratives found on some of these newer sites look remarkably similar to the 
language, discourse and narratives found on the earlier IRA sites. It is conceivable that 
there was hostile foreign activity on these sites.  
The 10 most frequently appearing words in all of the datasets showed that 
“Trump” was the most common word, with 606 mentions. Most of these posts and tweets 
included positive messaging regarding Donald Trump and his political stance. Secondly, 
the word “Americans” appeared 383 times in the 2,000 posts. These posts mostly 
discussed American values, American Patriots, American veterans, and American 
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culture.  Moreover, the word “impeachment” appeared 352 times. This included words 
such as #Impeachment, Impeach, Impeached, and Impeachable. The NVivo word 
frequency query reveled that the word “illegals” appeared 349 times. The word “illegals” 
was mostly attached with aliens, and immigrants, an example: “Illegal aliens put a strain 
on our economy, schools and hospitals and even pose serious national security threats”. 
Mostly (n = 157) this word was mentioned in the Secured Borders page. Words such as 
“country” (n = 261) and “like” (n = 245) also appeared in the datasets. Lastly, the word 
“Muslims” appeared 221 times in the two datasets. In the 2016 dataset, Facebook page 
United Muslims of America and Twitter dataset posted anti-racists posts regarding 
Muslims. However, Secured Borders page posted racists posts, example including: 
The Quran explicitly instructs Muslim men on how to take sex slaves, 
including prepubescent girls. After bloody conquests of local Jewish tribes, 
the Islamic prophet Muhammad decreed, as stated in the Quran, that rape 
and sexual slavery are an earthly reward by Allah to devout (truncated). 
Only the CAIR page from the later dataset discussed about Muslims. These posts talked 
about the struggles of Muslims Americans and explained how CAIR is helping them, for 
example” “CAIR-NY & HNY Ferry Reach Settlement on Behalf of Three Muslim 
Families.” 
Overall, for over four decades, research into agenda setting theory has expanded 
its scope from how the media shapes the public agenda to factors that shape the 
media’s agenda (Fu, 2013; Golan, 2006). Past research on agenda setting has indicated 
that there is a tangible relationship between the issues that the media emphasizes and 
the issues that the public deems to be important (McCombs & Shaw, 1972). Through the 
lens of first-level agenda setting, it can be seen that the postings from selected social 
media platforms portrayed Trump as the most prominent candidate in the 2016 
presidential race. Through the lens of second-level agenda setting, it can be seen that 
these social media vehicles were used to frame messages that would favour Trump and 
his policies in order to gain more voter support. These messages mentioned “hot button” 
issues, such as: immigration, second amendment rights, the LGBTQ community, pro-life, 
and the media. Additionally, during the impeachment inquiry, various social media 
messaging sites including Facebook and Twitter were used in support of Donald Trump, 
and attempted to paint him as the victim of the supposed weaponization of the 
impeachment process by the Democratic party.  
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Chapter 7.  
 
Conclusion 
The primary goal of this research was to examine the major issues that were 
advanced by Facebook pages and Twitter hashtags that were involved in the 
propagation and dissemination of fake news and disinformation during the 2016 U.S. 
presidential election and the 2019/2020 impeachment proceedings against Donald 
Trump. Trump was usually covered as a positive political figure, whereas Democrats 
were typically covered as negative political figures. “Hot button” issues such as 
immigration, guns, veterans and abortion were used to micro-target social media users 
on both Facebook and Twitter. That said, more work needs to be undertaken to 
understand the actual impact of disinformation when it comes to voting. The fact that 
people read something on social media does not necessarily mean that they take it to 
heart and act on that information. The remainder of this chapter includes a summary of 
the key findings. Further, this chapter addresses the strengths and limitations of the 
present research, and suggests steps that could be taken to move this research forward. 
7.1. Key Findings 
This study examined two major events that occurred in U.S. politics: the 2016 
U.S. presidential election, and the 2019/2020 impeachment inquiry and trial. Both of 
these major events involved current U.S. president, Donald Trump. Further, the study 
examined political messaging on Twitter and Facebook, the two most popular social 
media platforms (Gottfried & Shearer, 2016). 
It would be difficult to prove conclusively that the IRA’s disinformation activities 
on social media swayed public opinion enough to alter the outcome of the 2016 U.S. 
presidential election, or to alter the opinion about or outcome of the recent impeachment 
process. To determine this, it would be necessary to survey a large and representative 
sample of regular social media users who had wittingly or unwittingly been exposed to 
these fake news and disinformation campaigns, and ask them to indicate whether the 
fake news that they had been exposed to online had influenced how they voted on 
election day, or influenced how they viewed the more recent impeachment process.  
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 In the 2016 election, most of the messages posted on Facebook and Twitter by 
the Russian Troll Army before, during and after the election sought to increase voter 
turnout for Donald Trump, and at the same time, suppress voter turnout for Hillary 
Clinton. These posts attempted to micro-target specific social media audiences, in order 
to drum up greater support for Donald Trump. Examples have been provided throughout 
this thesis to illustrate how this micro-targeting was accomplished. For example, the IRA 
sponsored Being Patriotic Facebook page messages specifically targeted Southern 
white Americans and conservatives, with “hot” topics such as veterans’ struggles and 
anti-immigration policies. The Facebook page Secured Borders posted more racists 
posts, which blatantly attacked Muslim Americans, Blacks, and also talked about 
keeping “illegals” out of the country by building a wall. On the other hand, posts on the 
Russian IRA-sponsored Facebook pages, United Muslims of America and Blacktivist, 
were anti-racist in tone, sometimes with religious overtones. It was thought that these 
particular pages were intended to foment distrust of white people, law enforcement 
agencies, and the American political system, and perhaps suppress voter turnout by 
Muslims and blacks. The Twitter dataset included mixed reviews about all the issues. 
Although, majority of the tweets still included pro-Trump agenda. Nevertheless, there 
was still a lot of apolitical chatter.  
During the 2019/2020 impeachment proceedings, similar patterns were found to 
those of the 2016 election. This study found that most of the fake news were posted in 
favour of Trump and against his impeachment proceedings, whereas the Democrat party 
and its members were attacked in most of the sampled social media postings. These 
posts also micro-targeted specific populations by focusing on certain issues, for 
example, the Facebook CAIR page concentrated on anti-racist posts, while Facebook 
pages such as American Thinker, Godfather Politics, and Wallbuilders focused more on 
racist posts and anti-LGBTQ posts. The twitter dataset was more specific to the 
impeachment proceedings of Donald Trump. It mainly discussed issues of legitimacy of 
impeachment, and showed support for Trump and against his impeachment. There were 
two hashtags #Impeachment and #RussianInterference which discussed anti-Trump 
attitudes and support for his impeachment. It is important to note that it cannot be said 
with certainty that disinformation activities by foreign actors were in evidence throughout 
both datasets. It is likely that some of the activity in the second dataset came from 
foreign sources, but not to the same extent as the first dataset.  
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7.2. Limitations and Future Directions 
As with most research projects, this project has a number of limitations, some of 
which could be addressed through future research endeavors. It is important to note that 
this is an exploratory research, as there have not been any other studies as of yet on the 
dissemination of disinformation on social media sites during the impeachment inquiry 
and trial; therefore, more research is needed on this topic. 
The scope of the study and the time limitations did not permit consideration of all 
of the data that was harvested from both social media platforms during both events. 
Therefore, a larger sample size might alter the final results. There is a high level of 
confidence that the messages from 2016 were Russian IRA-generated. Recall that 
Robert Mueller brought up the issue of Russian interference in his report (Mueller, 2019), 
and that messages from the first dataset were selected for their known IRA origins. On 
the other hand, the Facebook data collected from the 2019/2020 impeachment 
proceedings were selected on the basis of an assessment made by a third party – Media 
Bias/Fact Check. While the Facebook pages typically expounded extreme views, with no 
supporting evidence, it was not possible to infer from that alone that they were being 
controlled by hostile foreign actors. The Twitter data was collected on the basis of 
whether or not the hashtag was trending, an assessment which may or may not reflect 
an orchestrated propagation and dissemination of fake news. However, it has been 
argued by other observers that many of these hashtags start “trending” as a 
consequence of amplification achieved through the coordinated use of social media bots 
(Barbaro et al., 2020; Dilanian, 2020; Goldman et al., 2020).  
This study focused exclusively on data obtained from the two most popular social 
media platforms, Twitter and Facebook (Gottfried & Shearer, 2016). Future research 
should also consider newly discovered disinformation campaigns in other online 
platforms or online news sources, for example, Instagram, YouTube, Reddit, and 
Breitbart. Instagram was launched in October 2010, and at this point has the highest 
growth rate of any of the social media outlets. It had 10 million users one year after it 
was founded, but exceeded 500 million by June 2016, with about 100 million living in the 
U.S. (Schmidbauer et al., 2018). Instagram, which is owned by Facebook, was also 
thought to have been used (or abused) in the fake news campaigns surrounding the 
2016 U.S. presidential election and the 2019/2020 impeachment proceedings. As it is 
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one of the fastest-growing social media platforms, further research into Instagram would 
definitely be beneficial, especially when it comes to research into the use of images and 
videos, something that was not done in this present study. 
 Another research direction would be to compare data from this current study to 
data taken from The Buffalo Chronicle (Canadian Edition), USAReally, and the website 
EU Disinformation, where supporting evidence already exists that the messaging was in 
fact created by the Russian IRA. This would allow for an exploration of the continuity or 
discontinuity of discourses and themes across borders and across time periods, as the 
EU Disinformation site contains numerous known examples of IRA messaging during the 
2019 European Parliamentary election (Satariano, 2019; Scott & Cerulus, 2019). The 
Buffalo Chronicle (Canadian Edition) was said to have targeted Canadians during the 
2019 federal election (Oved, 2019), and USAReally is said to be targeting American 
voters in the upcoming 2020 election (Collins & Zadrozny, 2018; Roose, 2018). 
Many of the IRA-generated fake news and disinformation posts and tweets 
pertaining to the 2016 U.S. election were deliberately taken down by Facebook and 
Twitter. Most of the links to external sources on those posts and tweets were erased at 
the same time. This made it difficult to know precisely what those links contained. It is 
possible that they may have led back to Russian websites that hosted fake news or 
falsified images. In a few cases, it was discovered that the links found on these posts did 
indeed lead back to Russian websites. Wherever such links still existed, they were 
saved for future research purposes. In future, all the data from those links should be 
downloaded and saved, to preclude any issues that might arise should any remaining 
links happen to be deleted. After that, any retrieved videos and images could be 
subjected to content analysis. The second data set was collected during the more recent 
impeachment inquiry and trial, and thus, the links to other news stories, videos, images, 
Facebook pages and Twitter hashtags were still active. The data available from following 
these links could and should be downloaded and saved for future inspection.    
Another limitation is that all of the codes and classifications that were assigned to 
the posts and tweets that were sampled in this study were created by only one 
researcher. With additional coders, inter-rater reliability measures might provide more 
concrete measures of reliability across coder interpretations and coding techniques. That 
said, it is thought that the use of inductive and deductive approaches in both parts of this 
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study helped to prevent biases from being interjecting into the coding process. The 
multiple stages of coding and the cyclical nature of the data collection and analysis, 
which are consistent with the grounded theory approach, allowed for the careful 
interrogation of each code and theme. A breakdown of the classifications was presented 
at the beginning of the report on each of the datasets, and detailed descriptions and 
quotes were used across subjects to further promote transparency. Although this study 
is not triangulated by the use of multiple researchers, or through the application of 
different theoretical perspectives or research methods, it is felt that the analysis of two 
different events that occurred at two different times, plus the use of data from different 
data sources and platforms, enabled the patterns to emerge naturally, and allowed for 
internal triangulation of the findings across the two different datasets and the different 
time periods from which they were taken. However, future studies in this area could 
benefit from multiple researchers coding the data and triangulating their results, which in 
turn might enhance the validity of studies of a similar nature and/or that employ a similar 
methodological approach.  
The posts and tweets that were classified as “fake news” included inflammatory 
opinions and/or were engaged in outright falsehoods, without any supporting evidence, 
and/or included an unsubstantiated opinion. As Facebook and Twitter are platforms for 
people’s opinions, and sometimes you cannot expect people to have opinions that are 
based on empirical research; therefore, future studies can benefit from adding another 
category as “unsubstantiated opinion” which will differentiate “news” from “opinion.”  
7.3. Conclusion 
Overall, this thesis straddles different fields across academia, including 
criminology, political science, linguistic. and communications. The current study reports 
mostly on U.S. political events; however, disinformation activities conducted by hostile 
foreign actors are by no means restricted to social media in the United States. Recall 
that extensive use was made of Twitter to advocate for Britain leaving the EU during the 
2016 Brexit referendum (Bastos & Mercea, 2019; Evolvi, 2018; Howard & Kollanyi, 2016; 
Intelligence and Security Committee, 2020; Narayanan et al., 2017). Numerous Twitter 
bots were discovered during the Brexit referendum that were eventually traced back to 
the Russian-IRA, and accusations were leveled by the former Prime Minster regarding 
Russian interference in the U.K. elections and the spread of fake news on social media 
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(BBC News, 2017; Intelligence and Security Committee, 2020; Mason, 2017; Narayanan 
et al., 2017). Moreover, such activities have been documented in the Czech Republic 
and Slovakia as far back as 2013 (Smoleňová, 2015), and in the 2014 election in the 
Ukraine (Cartwright, Weir, Nahar, et al., 2019; Khaldarova & Pantti, 2016; Mejias & 
Vokuev, 2017). Further, there was evidence suggesting that foreign actors may have 
tried to influence the 2019 Canadian federal election. In February 2019, CBC issued an 
analysis of 9.6 million tweets from Twitter troll accounts that were linked to suspected 
foreign influence campaigns, that attempted to stoke controversy over pipelines, 
refugees and immigration in Canada (Oral, 2019; Rocha & Yates, 2019). These 
accounts were suspected to have originated in Russia, Iran, and Venezuela (Oral, 
2019). 
It appears that disinformation attacks mounted by hostile foreign actors during 
the 2016 U.S. presidential election and the 2016 Brexit referendum were able to achieve 
results that likely would not have been attainable through more conventional military 
tactics. Again, the disinformation tactics employed by the Russians seemingly 
succeeded in disintegrating the European Union, installing a pro-Russian figure in the 
White House, and testing the strength of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 
all without firing a single shot. This could be construed as an all-out assault on Western-
style democracy (Cartwright, Weir, Nahar, et al., 2019). With democracy under threat 
from the intentional and possibly criminal manipulation of social media, and the resulting 
“digital wildfires” (Webb et al., 2016), legislators and government regulatory agencies 
around the world are eagerly seeking solutions and defenses against disinformation 
warfare. This present study analyzed data taken from suspected fake news and 
disinformation campaigns on Facebook and Twitter, which adduced evidence of foreign 
interference in U.S. politics, and highlighted some of the main narratives that appeared 
and re-appeared across the various datasets.  
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